CWE-1317 Detail

CWE-1317

Improper Access Control in Fabric Bridge
Draft
2020-12-10 00:00 +00:00
2024-02-29 00:00 +00:00

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Improper Access Control in Fabric Bridge

The product uses a fabric bridge for transactions between two Intellectual Property (IP) blocks, but the bridge does not properly perform the expected privilege, identity, or other access control checks between those IP blocks.

Extended Description

In hardware designs, different IP blocks are connected through interconnect-bus fabrics (e.g. AHB and OCP). Within a System on Chip (SoC), the IP block subsystems could be using different bus protocols. In such a case, the IP blocks are then linked to the central bus (and to other IP blocks) through a fabric bridge. Bridges are used as bus-interconnect-routing modules that link different protocols or separate, different segments of the overall SoC interconnect.

For overall system security, it is important that the access-control privileges associated with any fabric transaction are consistently maintained and applied, even when they are routed or translated by a fabric bridge. A bridge that is connected to a fabric without security features forwards transactions to the slave without checking the privilege level of the master and results in a weakness in SoC access-control security. The same weakness occurs if a bridge does not check the hardware identity of the transaction received from the slave interface of the bridge.

Informations

Modes Of Introduction

Architecture and Design
Implementation

Applicable Platforms

Language

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologies

Name: Processor Hardware (Undetermined)
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)

Common Consequences

Scope Impact Likelihood
Confidentiality
Integrity
Access Control
Availability
DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Read Memory, Modify MemoryMedium

Observed Examples

Reference Description
CVE-2019-6260Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) device implements Advanced High-performance Bus (AHB) bridges that do not require authentication for arbitrary read and write access to the BMC's physical address space from the host, and possibly the network [REF-1138].

Potential Mitigations

Phases : Architecture and Design
Ensure that the design includes provisions for access-control checks in the bridge for both upstream and downstream transactions.
Phases : Implementation
Implement access-control checks in the bridge for both upstream and downstream transactions.

Detection Methods

Simulation / Emulation

RTL simulation to ensure that bridge-access controls are implemented properly.
Effectiveness : High

Formal Verification

Formal verification of bridge RTL to ensure that access control cannot be bypassed.
Effectiveness : High

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Rationale : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comments : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Related Attack Patterns

CAPEC-ID Attack Pattern Name
CAPEC-122 Privilege Abuse
An adversary is able to exploit features of the target that should be reserved for privileged users or administrators but are exposed to use by lower or non-privileged accounts. Access to sensitive information and functionality must be controlled to ensure that only authorized users are able to access these resources.

References

REF-1138

CVE-2019-6260: Gaining control of BMC from the host processor
Stewart Smith.
https://www.flamingspork.com/blog/2019/01/23/cve-2019-6260:-gaining-control-of-bmc-from-the-host-processor/

REF-1381

aes0_wrapper.sv lines 72 - 78
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/b9ecdf6068445d76d6bee692d163fededf7a9d9b/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/aes0/aes0_wrapper.sv#L72-L78

REF-1382

clint.sv line 71
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/b9ecdf6068445d76d6bee692d163fededf7a9d9b/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/clint/clint.sv#L71C2-L71C36

REF-1383

Fix for clint.sv line 78
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/45a004368b5a31857008834d9780536f0764f055/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/clint/clint.sv#L78

Submission

Name Organization Date Date Release Version
Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna Intel Corporation 2020-05-19 +00:00 2020-12-10 +00:00 4.3

Modifications

Name Organization Date Comment
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-10-28 +00:00 updated Observed_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-04-28 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-06-28 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-10-13 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2024-02-29 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, References
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