CAPEC-606

Weakening of Cellular Encryption
Haute
Draft
2015-11-09
00h00 +00:00
2018-07-31
00h00 +00:00
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Descriptions du CAPEC

An attacker, with control of a Cellular Rogue Base Station or through cooperation with a Malicious Mobile Network Operator can force the mobile device (e.g., the retransmission device) to use no encryption (A5/0 mode) or to use easily breakable encryption (A5/1 or A5/2 mode).

Informations du CAPEC

Conditions préalables

Cellular devices that allow negotiating security modes to facilitate backwards compatibility and roaming on legacy networks.

Compétences requises

Adversaries can purchase and implement rogue BTS stations at a cost effective rate, and can push a mobile device to downgrade to a non-secure cellular protocol like 2G over GSM or CDMA.

Atténuations

Use of hardened baseband firmware on retransmission device to detect and prevent the use of weak cellular encryption.
Monitor cellular RF interface to detect the usage of weaker-than-expected cellular encryption.

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse

CWE-757

 Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade')
A protocol or its implementation supports interaction between multiple actors and allows those actors to negotiate which algorithm should be used as a protection mechanism such as encryption or authentication, but it does not select the strongest algorithm that is available to both parties.

Soumission

Nom Organisation Date Date de publication
CAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation 2015-11-09 +00:00

Modifications

Nom Organisation Date Commentaire
CAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation 2018-07-31 +00:00 Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences