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CPE Name: cpe:2.3:a:nodejs:undici:4.0.0:alpha1:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
Informations
Vendor
nodejsProduct
undiciVersion
4.0.0Update
alpha1Target Software
node.jsRelated CVE
| CVE ID | Publié | Description | Score | Gravité |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js. Undici cleared Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers for `fetch()`, but did not clear them for `undici.request()`. This vulnerability was patched in version(s) 5.28.4 and 6.11.1. | 4.3 |
Moyen |
||
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js. An attacker can alter the `integrity` option passed to `fetch()`, allowing `fetch()` to accept requests as valid even if they have been tampered. This vulnerability was patched in version(s) 5.28.4 and 6.11.1. | 3.5 |
Bas |
||
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js. Undici already cleared Authorization headers on cross-origin redirects, but did not clear `Proxy-Authentication` headers. This issue has been patched in versions 5.28.3 and 6.6.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. | 4.5 |
Moyen |
||
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client written from scratch for Node.js. Prior to version 5.26.2, Undici already cleared Authorization headers on cross-origin redirects, but did not clear `Cookie` headers. By design, `cookie` headers are forbidden request headers, disallowing them to be set in RequestInit.headers in browser environments. Since undici handles headers more liberally than the spec, there was a disconnect from the assumptions the spec made, and undici's implementation of fetch. As such this may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a third-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the third party site. This was patched in version 5.26.2. There are no known workarounds. | 3.9 |
Bas |
||
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client for Node.js. Starting with version 2.0.0 and prior to version 5.19.1, the undici library does not protect `host` HTTP header from CRLF injection vulnerabilities. This issue is patched in Undici v5.19.1. As a workaround, sanitize the `headers.host` string before passing to undici. | 6.5 |
Moyen |
||
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client for Node.js. Prior to version 5.19.1, the `Headers.set()` and `Headers.append()` methods are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks when untrusted values are passed into the functions. This is due to the inefficient regular expression used to normalize the values in the `headerValueNormalize()` utility function. This vulnerability was patched in v5.19.1. No known workarounds are available. | 7.5 |
Haute |
||
| undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`=< [email protected]` users are vulnerable to _CRLF Injection_ on headers when using unsanitized input as request headers, more specifically, inside the `content-type` header. Example: ``` import { request } from 'undici' const unsanitizedContentTypeInput = 'application/json\r\n\r\nGET /foo2 HTTP/1.1' await request('http://localhost:3000, { method: 'GET', headers: { 'content-type': unsanitizedContentTypeInput }, }) ``` The above snippet will perform two requests in a single `request` API call: 1) `http://localhost:3000/` 2) `http://localhost:3000/foo2` This issue was patched in Undici v5.8.1. Sanitize input when sending content-type headers using user input as a workaround. | 5.3 |
Moyen |
||
| undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`undici` is vulnerable to SSRF (Server-side Request Forgery) when an application takes in **user input** into the `path/pathname` option of `undici.request`. If a user specifies a URL such as `http://127.0.0.1` or `//127.0.0.1` ```js const undici = require("undici") undici.request({origin: "http://example.com", pathname: "//127.0.0.1"}) ``` Instead of processing the request as `http://example.org//127.0.0.1` (or `http://example.org/http://127.0.0.1` when `http://127.0.0.1 is used`), it actually processes the request as `http://127.0.0.1/` and sends it to `http://127.0.0.1`. If a developer passes in user input into `path` parameter of `undici.request`, it can result in an _SSRF_ as they will assume that the hostname cannot change, when in actual fact it can change because the specified path parameter is combined with the base URL. This issue was fixed in `[email protected]`. The best workaround is to validate user input before passing it to the `undici.request` call. | 9.8 |
Critique |
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| Authorization headers are cleared on cross-origin redirect. However, cookie headers which are sensitive headers and are official headers found in the spec, remain uncleared. There are active users using cookie headers in undici. This may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a 3rd-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the 3rd party site. This was patched in v5.7.1. By default, this vulnerability is not exploitable. Do not enable redirections, i.e. `maxRedirections: 0` (the default). | 6.5 |
Moyen |
||
| undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js. It is possible to inject CRLF sequences into request headers in undici in versions less than 5.7.1. A fix was released in version 5.8.0. Sanitizing all HTTP headers from untrusted sources to eliminate `\r\n` is a workaround for this issue. | 6.5 |
Moyen |
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