CVE-2000-0655 : Détail

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Date	EPSS V0	EPSS V1	EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)	EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)	EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06	–	–	11%	–	–
2022-04-03	–	–	11%	–	–
2022-05-22	–	–	11%	–	–
2023-03-12	–	–	–	1.12%	–
2023-06-11	–	–	–	1.12%	–
2024-02-11	–	–	–	1.35%	–
2024-06-02	–	–	–	1.35%	–
2024-10-27	–	–	–	1.35%	–
2024-12-22	–	–	–	1.45%	–
2025-01-26	–	–	–	1.45%	–
2025-01-19	–	–	–	1.45%	–
2025-01-25	–	–	–	1.45%	–
2025-03-18	–	–	–	–	15.25%
2025-03-18	–	–	–	–	15.25,%

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.

Date	Percentile
2022-02-06	89%
2022-04-03	94%
2022-05-22	95%
2023-03-12	82%
2023-06-11	83%
2024-02-11	86%
2024-06-02	86%
2024-10-27	87%
2024-12-22	86%
2025-01-26	87%
2025-01-19	86%
2025-01-25	87%
2025-03-18	94%
2025-03-18	94%

source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1503/info Netscape Browsers use the Independent JPEG Group's decoder library to process JPEG encoded images. The library functions skip JPEG comments; however, the browser uses a custom function to process these comments and store them in memory. The comment includes a 2-byte "length" field which indicates how long the comment is - this value includes the 2-bytes of the "length" field. To determine the length of the comment string alone (for memory allocation), the function reads the value in the "length" field and subtracts two. The function then allocates the length of the comment + one byte for NULL termination. There is no error checking to ensure the "length" value is valid. This makes it possible to cause an overflow by creating an image with a comment "length" field containing the value 1. The memory allocation call of 0 bytes (1 minus 2 (length field) + 1 (null termination)) will succeed. The calculated comment size variable is declared unsigned, resulting in a large positive value (from 1 minus 2). The comment handling function goes into a loop to read the comment into memory, but since the calculated comment size is enormous this causes the function to read the entire JPEG stream, overwriting the heap. It is theoretically possible to exploit this to execute arbitrary code. The browser, mail and news readers are all vulnerable to this. https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/20098.jpg