CPE, qui signifie Common Platform Enumeration, est un système normalisé de dénomination du matériel, des logiciels et des systèmes d'exploitation. CPE fournit un schéma de dénomination structuré pour identifier et classer de manière unique les systèmes informatiques, les plates-formes et les progiciels sur la base de certains attributs tels que le fournisseur, le nom du produit, la version, la mise à jour, l'édition et la langue.
CWE, ou Common Weakness Enumeration, est une liste complète et une catégorisation des faiblesses et des vulnérabilités des logiciels. Elle sert de langage commun pour décrire les faiblesses de sécurité des logiciels au niveau de l'architecture, de la conception, du code ou de la mise en œuvre, qui peuvent entraîner des vulnérabilités.
CAPEC, qui signifie Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (énumération et classification des schémas d'attaque communs), est une ressource complète, accessible au public, qui documente les schémas d'attaque communs utilisés par les adversaires dans les cyberattaques. Cette base de connaissances vise à comprendre et à articuler les vulnérabilités communes et les méthodes utilisées par les attaquants pour les exploiter.
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An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when Windows improperly handles calls to the LUAFV driver (luafv.sys), aka 'Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability'. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2019-0730, CVE-2019-0731, CVE-2019-0805, CVE-2019-0836, CVE-2019-0841.
Category : Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control.
Métriques
Métriques
Score
Gravité
CVSS Vecteur
Source
V3.0
5.5
MEDIUM
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty Metrics
The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.
Attack Vector
This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.
Local
A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.
Attack Complexity
This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Low
Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required
This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.
Low
The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.
User Interaction
This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.
None
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.
Base: Scope Metrics
An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.
Scope
Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.
Unchanged
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.
Base: Impact Metrics
The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.
Confidentiality Impact
This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.
None
There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.
Integrity Impact
This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.
High
There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability Impact
This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.
None
There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.
Temporal Metrics
The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.
Environmental Metrics
nvd@nist.gov
V2
2.1
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N
nvd@nist.gov
EPSS
EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.
Score EPSS
Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.
Date
EPSS V0
EPSS V1
EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)
EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)
EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2021-04-18
30.1%
–
–
–
–
2021-09-05
–
30.1%
–
–
–
2021-09-12
–
30.1%
–
–
–
2021-10-24
–
30.1%
–
–
–
2021-11-21
–
30.1%
–
–
–
2022-01-09
–
30.1%
–
–
–
2022-02-06
–
–
1.91%
–
–
2022-04-03
–
–
1.91%
–
–
2022-04-17
–
–
1.91%
–
–
2022-09-04
–
–
1.91%
–
–
2023-03-12
–
–
–
0.08%
–
2023-03-19
–
–
–
0.11%
–
2023-04-02
–
–
–
0.08%
–
2023-04-30
–
–
–
0.08%
–
2023-05-07
–
–
–
0.08%
–
2023-05-14
–
–
–
0.08%
–
2024-02-11
–
–
–
0.08%
–
2024-04-07
–
–
–
0.08%
–
2024-06-02
–
–
–
0.08%
–
2024-07-21
–
–
–
0.08%
–
2024-08-04
–
–
–
0.08%
–
2024-08-25
–
–
–
0.08%
–
2024-11-24
–
–
–
0.08%
–
2024-12-22
–
–
–
41.96%
–
2025-01-26
–
–
–
34.43%
–
2025-02-16
–
–
–
41.96%
–
2025-01-19
–
–
–
41.96%
–
2025-01-25
–
–
–
34.43%
–
2025-02-16
–
–
–
41.96%
–
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
3.29%
2025-03-30
–
–
–
–
3.59%
2025-03-30
–
–
–
–
3.59,%
Percentile EPSS
Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
Date de publication : 2019-04-15 22h00 +00:00 Auteur : Google Security Research EDB Vérifié : Yes
Windows: LUAFV LuafvCopyShortName Arbitrary Short Name EoP
Platform: Windows 10 1809 (not tested earlier)
Class: Elevation of Privilege
Security Boundary (per Windows Security Service Criteria): User boundary
Summary:
The LUAFV driver bypasses security checks to copy short names during file virtualization which can be tricked into writing an arbitrary short name leading to EoP.
Description:
When creating a virtualized file in LuafvCopyFile one of the things that the driver copies across is the short name of the original file by calling LuafvCopyShortName. This uses the FileShortNameInformation information class to set the short name, however the problem with using this is it normally requires SeRestorePrivilege to be enabled, which a non-administrator won’t have access to. Therefore to bypass the privilege check the virtualized file is reopened without security checks, which results in the check being ignored.
The code looks roughly like the following:
NSTATUS LuafvCopyShortName(PFLT_INSTANCE Instance,
PFILE_OBJECT ReadObject,
HANDLE WriteHandle) {
HANDLE FileHandle;
PFILE_OBJECT WriteObject;
NTSTATUS = FltCreateFileEx2(
LuafvDriverData,
Instance,
&FileHandle,
&WriteObject,
FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES,
...,
IO_NO_PARAMETER_CHECKING);
FILE_NAME_INFORMATION Name = {};
if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
if (NT_SUCCESS(FltQueryInformationFile(Instance, ReadHandle, &Name, sizeof(Name),
FileAlternateNameInformation))) {
status = FltSetInformationFile(Instance, WriteObject,
&Name, IoStatusBlock.Information, FileShortNameInformation);
}
}
return status;
}
We can see in the code the writable file is re-opened with new access and without specifying IO_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK. As FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT is specified then NTFS will mark this file as having restore privilege, even though the caller doesn’t, as the previous mode will be KernelMode. The original file is then queried for its alternate name (which is really its short name) and the short name is set through the FileShortNameInformation which will now succeed due to the way the file handle was opened.
Of course the question is how would you get this code to write an arbitrary short name? Although it’s not obvious if the name of the file is already a short name (as in a 8.3 DOS compatible name) then FileAlternateNameInformation doesn’t fail but returns the normal file name back to the caller. Therefore we can exploit this as follows:
1) Create a file with the arbitrary short name inside a directory which is virtualized, ProgramData is ideal for this as we can create arbitrary files. Make the file writeable only to administrators.
2) Open the file for virtualization, but don’t do anything to cause delayed virtualization to occur.
3) Use some symbolic tricks in the VirtualStore directory to cause the creation of that file to be redirected to a long name which would normally have an auto-generated short name.
4) Force the delayed virtualization to occur, the file with the long name will be created, however the short name will be read from the source file which has an arbitrary name. The short name is written bypassing security checks.
There’s probably other ways of doing this without symbolic link tricks, for example there’s a race between the time the file is opened and when the short name is queries. As the file is opened with FILE_SHARE_DELETE it should be possible to rename the source file between the initial open but before reading the short name.
What you could do with this ability is another matter. You could possibly trick some parsing operation which is relying on short names. Or you could create a directory which had two “normal” names rather than one auto generated one which could trick certain things. At any rate the EoP is the fact we can do this without needing SeRestorePrivilege.
I’m not going to speculate on how to fix this, as said while you might be able to block mount point traversal (seems unlikely as the user’s profile could be on a remote share or another drive) there’s probably other ways around this.
Proof of Concept:
I’ve provided a PoC as a C# project. It will create an arbitrary file with an arbitrary short file name.
1) Compile the C# project. It’ll need to pull NtApiDotNet from NuGet to build.
2) As a normal user run the PoC passing the name of the target file to create (with a long file name) and the arbitrary short file name.
Expected Result:
The virtualization operation fails.
Observed Result:
The virtualization operation succeeds and the file has an arbitrary short name.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/46715.zip