CVE-2016-1721 Détail

CVE-2016-1721

Score / Gravité

7.8

Haute

Catégories

Overflow

EPSS

0.16%V3

Vecteur

Local

Publié

2016-02-01
10h00 +00:00

Modifié

2017-09-09
07h57 +00:00

Liens officiels

CVE.org

NVD

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Descriptions du CVE

The kernel in Apple iOS before 9.2.1, OS X before 10.11.3, and tvOS before 9.1.1 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via unspecified vectors.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID	Nom de la faiblesse	Source
CWE-119	Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data.

Métriques

Métriques	Score	Gravité	CVSS Vecteur	Source
V3.0	7.8	HIGH	CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H More informations Base: Exploitabilty Metrics The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Local A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file. Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. Low The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope Metrics An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges. Scope Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same. Base: Impact Metrics The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. High There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal Metrics The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental Metrics	[email protected]
V2	7.2		AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C	[email protected]

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.

EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 39358

Date de publication : 2016-01-27 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : Google Security Research
EDB Vérifié : Yes

Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=618 The _ool variations of the IOKit device.defs functions all incorrectly deal with error conditions. If you run the mig tool on device.defs you can see the source of the kernel-side MIG handling code; here is the relevant generated code for io_service_get_matching_services_ool: mig_internal novalue _Xio_service_get_matching_services_ool (mach_msg_header_t *InHeadP, mach_msg_header_t *OutHeadP) { ... // some typedefs Request *In0P = (Request *) InHeadP; Reply *OutP = (Reply *) OutHeadP; kern_return_t RetCode; io_object_t existing; <-- (a) ... // check the input types RetCode = is_io_service_get_matching_services_ool(In0P->Head.msgh_request_port, (io_buf_ptr_t)(In0P->matching.address), In0P->matchingCnt, &OutP->result, &existing); <-- (b) if (RetCode != KERN_SUCCESS) { MIG_RETURN_ERROR(OutP, RetCode); } OutP->existing.name = (mach_port_t)iokit_make_object_port(existing); <-- (c) At (a) it declares an io_object_t existing on the stack (io_object_t is just a pointer.) It then passes the address of that local to is_io_service_get_matching_services_ool, and if that function succeeds passes the value of existing to iokit_make_object_port. Here's is_io_service_get_matching_services_ool (which importantly is NOT generated code): /* Routine io_service_get_matching_services_ool */ kern_return_t is_io_service_get_matching_services_ool( mach_port_t master_port, io_buf_ptr_t matching, mach_msg_type_number_t matchingCnt, kern_return_t *result, io_object_t *existing ) { kern_return_t kr; vm_offset_t data; vm_map_offset_t map_data; kr = vm_map_copyout( kernel_map, &map_data, (vm_map_copy_t) matching ); data = CAST_DOWN(vm_offset_t, map_data); if( KERN_SUCCESS == kr) { // must return success after vm_map_copyout() succeeds *result = internal_io_service_get_matching_services(master_port, (const char *) data, matchingCnt, existing); vm_deallocate( kernel_map, data, matchingCnt ); } return( kr ); } Note here that it returns kr which *only* indicates if the vm_map_copyout failed. This will of course succeed so the return value of this function will always be KERN_SUCCESS, even if internal_io_service_get_matching_services fails... Let's look at that function: static kern_return_t internal_io_service_get_matching_services( mach_port_t master_port, const char * matching, mach_msg_type_number_t matching_size, io_iterator_t *existing ) { kern_return_t kr; OSObject * obj; OSDictionary * dict; if( master_port != master_device_port) return( kIOReturnNotPrivileged); obj = matching_size ? OSUnserializeXML(matching, matching_size) : OSUnserializeXML(matching); if( (dict = OSDynamicCast( OSDictionary, obj))) { *existing = IOService::getMatchingServices( dict ); kr = kIOReturnSuccess; } else kr = kIOReturnBadArgument; if( obj) obj->release(); return( kr ); } Indeed, if this function fails it doesn't set existing to a safe value but does return an error code. However, the _ool variation ignores this error code (it just returns it to userspace via the result parameter.) This means that the generated code thinks that is_io_service_get_matching_services_ool succeed and it therefore pass existing in iokit_make_object_port which will eventually (if the uninitialized value wasn't NULL) call a virtual function on it (taggedRetain) when adding the object to the dictionary storing all iokit user objects. All of the _ool variations of IOKit API's have this problem; PoCs are included for all of them but they may or may not crash depending on the state of the stack. Proof of Concept: https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39358.zip