CVE-2016-5348 : Détail

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.

Original at: https://wwws.nightwatchcybersecurity.com/2016/10/04/advisory-cve-2016-5348-2/ Summary Android devices can be crashed remotely forcing a halt and then a soft reboot by a MITM attacker manipulating assisted GPS/GNSS data provided by Qualcomm. This issue affects the open source code in AOSP and proprietary code in a Java XTRA downloader provided by Qualcomm. The Android issue was fixed by in the October 2016 Android bulletin. Additional patches have been issued by Qualcomm to the proprietary client in September of 2016. This issue may also affect other platforms that use Qualcomm GPS chipsets and consume these files but that has not been tested by us, and requires further research. Background – GPS and gpsOneXtra Most mobile devices today include ability to locate themselves on the Earth’s surface by using the Global Positioning System (GPS), a system originally developed and currently maintained by the US military. Similar systems developed and maintained by other countries exist as well including Russia’s GLONASS, Europe’s Galileo, and China’s Beidou. The GPS signals include an almanac which lists orbit and status information for each of the satellites in the GPS constellation. This allows the receivers to acquire the satellites quicker since the receiver would not need to search blindly for the location of each satellite. Similar functionality exists for other GNSS systems. In order to solve the problem of almanac acquisition, Qualcomm developed the gpsOneXtra system in 2007 (also known as IZat XTRA Assistance since 2013). This system provides ability to GPS receivers to download the almanac data over the Internet from Qualcomm-operated servers. The format of these XTRA files is proprietary but seems to contain current satellite location data plus estimated locations for the next 7 days, as well as additional information to improve signal acquisition. Most Qualcomm mobile chipsets and GPS chips include support for this technology. A related Qualcomm technology called IZat adds ability to use WiFi and cellular networks for locations in addition to GPS. Background – Android and gpsOneXtra Data Files During our network monitoring of traffic originating from an Android test device, we discovered that the device makes periodic calls to the Qualcomm servers to retrieve gpsOneXtra assistance files. These requests were performed almost every time the device connected to a WiFi network. As discovered by our research and confirmed by the Android source code, the following URLs were used: http://xtra1.gpsonextra.net/xtra.bin http://xtra2.gpsonextra.net/xtra.bin http://xtra3.gpsonextra.net/xtra.bin http://xtrapath1.izatcloud.net/xtra2.bin http://xtrapath2.izatcloud.net/xtra2.bin http://xtrapath3.izatcloud.net/xtra2.bin WHOIS record show that both domains – gpsonextra.net and izatcloud.net are owned by Qualcomm. Further inspection of those URLs indicate that both domains are being hosted and served from Amazon’s Cloudfront CDN service (with the exception of xtra1.gpsonextra.net which is being served directly by Qualcomm). On the Android platform, our inspection of the Android source code shows that the file is requested by an OS-level Java process (GpsXtraDownloader.java), which passes the data to a C++ JNI class (com_android_server_location_GnssLocationProvider.cpp), which then injects the files into the Qualcomm modem or firmware. We have not inspected other platforms in detail, but suspect that a similar process is used. Our testing was performed on Android v6.0, patch level of January 2016, on a Motorola Moto G (2nd gen) GSM phone, and confirmed on a Nexus 6P running Android v6.01, with May 2016 security patches. Qualcomm has additionally performed testing on their proprietary Java XTRA downloader client confirming this vulnerability. Vulnerability Details Android platform downloads XTRA data files automatically when connecting to a new network. This originates from a Java class (GpsXtraDownloader.java), which then passes the file to a C++/JNI class (com_android_server_location_GnssLocationProvider.cpp) and then injects it into the Qualcomm modem. The vulnerability is that both the Java and the C++ code do not check how large the data file actually is. If a file is served that is larger than the memory available on the device, this results in all memory being exhausted and the phone halting and then soft rebooting. The soft reboot was sufficient to recover from the crash and no data was lost. While we have not been able to achieve remote code execution in either the Qualcomm modem or in the Android OS, this code path can potentially be exploited for such attacks and would require more research. To attack, an MITM attacker located anywhere on the network between the phone being attacked and Qualcomm’s servers can initiate this attack by intercepting the legitimate requests from the phone, and substituting their own, larger files. Because the default Chrome browser on Android reveals the model and build of the phone (as we have written about earlier), it would be possible to derive the maximum memory size from that information and deliver the appropriately sized attack file. Possible attackers can be hostile hotspots, hacked routers, or anywhere along the backbone. This is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the attack file would need to be as large as the memory on the phone. The vulnerable code resides here – (GpsXtraDownloader.java, lines 120-127): connection.connect() int statusCode = connection.getResponseCode(); if (statusCode != HttpURLConnection.HTTP_OK) { if (DEBUG) Log.d(TAG, “HTTP error downloading gps XTRA: “ + statusCode); return null; } return Streams.readFully(connection.getInputStream()); Specifically, the affected code is using Streams.readFully to read the entire file into memory without any kind of checks on how big the file actually is. Additional vulnerable code is also in the C++ layer – (com_android_server_location_GnssLocationProvider.cpp, lines 856-858): jbyte* bytes = (jbyte *)env->GetPrimitiveArrayCritical(data, 0); sGpsXtraInterface->inject_xtra_data((char *)bytes, length); env->ReleasePrimitiveArrayCritical(data, bytes, JNI_ABORT); Once again, no size checking is done. We were able to consistently crash several different Android phones via a local WiFi network with the following error message: java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Failed to allocate a 478173740 byte allocation with 16777216 free bytes and 252MB until OOM at java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream.expand(ByteArrayOutputStream.java:91) (It should be noted that we were not able to consistently and reliable achieve a crash in the C++/JNI layer or the Qualcomm modem itself) Steps To Replicate (on Ubuntu 16.04) 1. Install DNSMASQ: sudo apt-get install dnsmasq 2. Install NGINX: sudo apt-get install nginx 3. Modify the /etc/hosts file to add the following entries to map to the IP of the local computer (varies by vendor of the phone): 192.168.1.x xtra1.gpsonextra.net 192.168.1.x xtra2.gpsonextra.net 192.168.1.x xtra3.gpsonextra.net 192.168.1.x xtrapath1.izatcloud.net 192.168.1.x xtrapath2.izatcloud.net 192.168.1.x xtrapath3.izatcloud.net 4. Configure /etc/dnsmasq.conf file to listed on the IP: listen-address=192.168.1.x 5. Restart DNSMASQ: sudo /etc/init.d/dnsmasq restart 6. Use fallocate to create the bin files in “/var/www/html/” sudo fallocate -s 2.5G xtra.bin sudo fallocate -s 2.5G xtra2.bin sudo fallocate -s 2.5G xtra3.bin 7. Modify the settings on the Android test phone to static, set DNS to point to “192.168.1.x”. AT THIS POINT – Android will resolve DNS against the local computer, and serve the GPS files from it. To trigger the GPS download, disable WiFi and enable Wifi, or enable/disable Airplane mode. Once the phone starts downloading the files, the screen will go black and it will reboot. PLEASE NOTE: on some models, the XTRA file is cached and not retrieved on every network connect. For those models, you may need to reboot the phone and/or follow the injection commands as described here. You can also use an app like GPS Status and ToolboxGPS Status and Toolbox. The fix would be to check for file sizes in both Java and native C++ code. Mitigation Steps For the Android platform, users should apply the October 2016 Android security bulletin and any patches provided by Qualcomm. Please note that as per Qualcomm, the patches for this bug only include fixes to the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) and the Qualcomm Java XTRA downloader clients. Apple and Microsoft have indicated to us via email that GPS-capable devices manufactured by them including iPad, iPhones, etc. and Microsoft Surface and Windows Phone devices are not affected by this bug. Blackberry devices powered by Android are affected but the Blackberry 10 platform is not affected by this bug. For other platforms, vendors should follow guidance provided by Qualcomm directly via an OEM bulletin. Bounty Information This bug has fulfilled the requirements for Google’s Android Security Rewards and a bounty has been paid. References Android security bulletin: October 2016 CERT/CC tracking: VR-179 CVE-ID: CVE-2016-5348 Google: Android bug # 213747 / AndroidID-29555864 CVE Information As provided by Qualcomm: CVE: CVE-2016-5348 Access Vector: Network Security Risk: High Vulnerability: CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (‘Resource Exhaustion’) Description: When downloading a very large assistance data file, the client may crash due to out of memory error. Change summary: check download size ContentLength before downloading data catch OOM exception Credits We would like to thank CERT/CC for helping to coordinate this process, and all of the vendors involved for helpful comments and a quick turnaround. This bug was discovered by Yakov Shafranovich, and the advisory was also written by Yakov Shafranovich. Timeline 201606-20: Android bug report filed with Google 2016-06-21: Android bug confirmed 2016-06-21: Bug also reported to Qualcomm and CERT. 2016-09-14: Coordination with Qualcomm on public disclosure 2016-09-15: Coordination with Google on public disclosure 2016-10-03: Android security bulletin released with fix 2016-10-04: Public disclosure