CVE-2018-0966 : Détail

CVE-2018-0966

3.3
/
Bas
47.58%V3
Local
2018-04-11
23h00 +00:00
2018-04-18
07h57 +00:00
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Descriptions du CVE

A security feature bypass exists when Device Guard incorrectly validates an untrusted file, aka "Device Guard Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability." This affects Windows Server 2016, Windows 10, Windows 10 Servers.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check. This can cause the product to perform invalid actions when the resource is in an unexpected state.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.0 3.3 LOW CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

Low

Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of modification is constrained. The data modification does not have a direct, serious impact on the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

[email protected]
V2 2.1 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 44466

Date de publication : 2018-04-15 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : Google Security Research
EDB Vérifié : Yes

Windows: CiSetFileCache TOCTOU CVE-2017-11830 Incomplete Fix Platform: Windows 10 1709 (including Win10S) Class: Security Feature Bypass Summary: The fix for CVE-2017-11830 is insufficient to prevent a normal user application adding a cached signing level to an unsigned file by exploiting a TOCTOU in CI leading to circumventing Device Guard policies. Description: The previous issue I reported was due to not checking for write access on the target file handle when setting the cache. This allows a user application to abuse a TOCTOU and rewrite the file after the hash has been generated for the file. The only changed code seems to be below: FILE_OBJECT target_file; ObReferenceObjectByHandle(FileHandle, 0, *IoFileObjectType, &target_file); if (target_file->SharedWrite) { return STATUS_SHARING_VIOLATION; } if (target_file->WriteAccess) { ← Additional check for the file being opened for write. if ((PsGetProcessProtection(PsGetCurrentProcess()) & 7) != ProtectedProcessLight) return STATUS_SHARING_VIOLATION; } The fix was to add a check that the target file passed isn’t writable. This combined with the check for FILE_SHARE_WRITE should mean the user can’t hold on to a writable file handle. However, when the file handle is converted to a file object with ObReferenceObjectByHandle the desired access is 0, which means we can pass a handle with any granted access including SYNCHRONIZE or READ_CONTROL, which do not respect file sharing. So we can still exploit this issue by doing the following: 1. Open the file for write access. 2. Reopen another handle to the file for SYNCHRONIZE access. This works as this access right can be used regardless of the sharing mode. 3. Set cached signing level through the handle opened in 2. 4. Wait for oplock, rewrite file using handle opened in 1. Release oplock. Proof of Concept: I’ve provided a PoC as a C# project. It will allow you to “cache sign” an arbitrary executable. If you want to test this on a locked down system such as Win10S you’ll need to sign the PoC (and the NtApitDotNet.dll assembly) so it’ll run. Or use it via one of my .NET based DG bypasses, in that case you can call the PoC_CacheSignature.Exploit.Run method directly. It copies notepad to a file, attempts to verify it but uses an oplock to rewrite the contents of the file with the untrusted file before it can set the kernel EA. 1) Compile the C# project. It will need to grab the NtApiDotNet v1.1.7 package from NuGet to work. 2) Execute the PoC passing the path to an unsigned file and to the output “cache signed” file, e.g. poc unsigned.exe output.exe 3) You should see it print the signing level, if successful. 4) You should not be able to execute the unsigned file, bypassing the security policy enforcement. NOTE: If it prints an exception then the exploit failed. The opened catalog files seemed to be cached for some unknown period of time after use so if the catalog file I’m using for a timing signal is already open then the oplock is never broken. Just rerun the poc which will pick a different catalog file to use. Also the output file must be on to a NTFS volume with the USN Change Journal enabled as that’s relied upon by the signature level cache code. Best to do it to the boot drive as that ensures everything should work correctly. Expected Result: Access denied or at least an error setting the cached signing level. Observed Result: The signing level cache is applied to the file with no further verification. You can now execute the file as if it was signed. Proof of Concept: https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/44466.zip

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1511

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1607

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1703

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1709

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version 1709

Références

http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1040660
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44466/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103622
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID