Détail du CWE-1242

CWE-1242

Inclusion of Undocumented Features or Chicken Bits
Incomplete
2020-02-24
00h00 +00:00
2025-04-03
00h00 +00:00
Notifications pour un CWE
Restez informé de toutes modifications pour un CWE spécifique.
Gestion des notifications

Nom: Inclusion of Undocumented Features or Chicken Bits

The device includes chicken bits or undocumented features that can create entry points for unauthorized actors.

Description du CWE

A common design practice is to use undocumented bits on a device that can be used to disable certain functional security features. These bits are commonly referred to as "chicken bits". They can facilitate quick identification and isolation of faulty components, features that negatively affect performance, or features that do not provide the required controllability for debug and test. Another way to achieve this is through implementation of undocumented features. An attacker might exploit these interfaces for unauthorized access.

Informations générales

Modes d'introduction

Architecture and Design
Implementation
Documentation

Plateformes applicables

Langue

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Systèmes d’exploitation

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined)

Conséquences courantes

Portée Impact Probabilité
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Access Control
Modify Memory, Read Memory, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism

Mesures d’atténuation potentielles

Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation

The implementation of chicken bits in a released product is highly discouraged. If implemented at all, ensure that they are disabled in production devices. All interfaces to a device should be documented.


Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités

Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Modèles d'attaque associés

CAPEC-ID Nom du modèle d'attaque
CAPEC-212 Functionality Misuse
An adversary leverages a legitimate capability of an application in such a way as to achieve a negative technical impact. The system functionality is not altered or modified but used in a way that was not intended. This is often accomplished through the overuse of a specific functionality or by leveraging functionality with design flaws that enables the adversary to gain access to unauthorized, sensitive data.
CAPEC-36 Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

Références

REF-1071

Doors of Durin: The Veiled Gate to Siemens S7 Silicon
Ali Abbasi, Tobias Scharnowski, Thorsten Holz.
https://i.blackhat.com/eu-19/Wednesday/eu-19-Abbasi-Doors-Of-Durin-The-Veiled-Gate-To-Siemens-S7-Silicon.pdf

REF-1072

Breakthrough Silicon Scanning Discovers Backdoor in Military Chip
Sergei Skorobogatov, Christopher Woods.
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/Silicon_scan_draft.pdf

REF-1073

God Mode Unlocked: Hardware Backdoors in x86 CPUs
Chris Domas.
https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Thu-August-9/us-18-Domas-God-Mode-Unlocked-Hardware-Backdoors-In-x86-CPUs.pdf

REF-1074

Hardware Backdooring is Practical
Jonathan Brossard.
https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Brossard/BH_US_12_Brossard_Backdoor_Hacking_Slides.pdf

REF-1075

Security, Reliability, and Backdoors
Sergei Skorabogatov.
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/SG_talk_SRB.pdf

Soumission

Nom Organisation Date Date de publication Version
Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Intel Corporation 2020-02-13 +00:00 2020-02-24 +00:00 4.0

Modifications

Nom Organisation Date Commentaire
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-08-20 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-04-28 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-01-31 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2024-02-29 +00:00 updated Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2025-04-03 +00:00 updated Relationships