The device is susceptible to electromagnetic fault injection attacks, causing device internal information to be compromised or security mechanisms to be bypassed.

Electromagnetic fault injection may allow an attacker to locally and dynamically modify the signals (both internal and external) of an integrated circuit. EM-FI attacks consist of producing a local, transient magnetic field near the device, inducing current in the device wires. A typical EMFI setup is made up of a pulse injection circuit that generates a high current transient in an EMI coil, producing an abrupt magnetic pulse which couples to the target producing faults in the device, which can lead to:

• Bypassing security mechanisms such as secure JTAG or Secure Boot
• Leaking device information
• Modifying program flow
• Perturbing secure hardware modules (e.g. random number generators)

Modes Of Introduction

Architecture and Design
Implementation

Applicable Platforms

Language

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologies

Class: System on Chip (Undetermined)
Name: Microcontroller Hardware (Undetermined)
Name: Memory Hardware (Undetermined)
Name: Power Management Hardware (Undetermined)
Name: Processor Hardware (Undetermined)
Name: Test/Debug Hardware (Undetermined)
Name: Sensor Hardware (Undetermined)

Common Consequences

Observed Examples

Potential Mitigations

Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation

• 1. Redundancy - By replicating critical operations and comparing the two outputs can help indicate whether a fault has been injected.
• 2. Error detection and correction codes - Gay, Mael, et al. proposed a new scheme that not only detects faults injected by a malicious adversary but also automatically corrects single nibble/byte errors introduced by low-multiplicity faults.
• 3. Fail by default coding - When checking conditions (switch or if) check all possible cases and fail by default because the default case in a switch (or the else part of a cascaded if-else-if construct) is used for dealing with the last possible (and valid) value without checking. This is prone to fault injection because this alternative is easily selected as a result of potential data manipulation [REF-1141].
• 4. Random Behavior - adding random delays before critical operations, so that timing is not predictable.
• 5. Program Flow Integrity Protection - The program flow can be secured by integrating run-time checking aiming at detecting control flow inconsistencies. One such example is tagging the source code to indicate the points not to be bypassed [REF-1147].
• 6. Sensors - Usage of sensors can detect variations in voltage and current.
• 7. Shields - physical barriers to protect the chips from malicious manipulation.

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Rationale : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comments : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Related Attack Patterns

Notes

This entry is attack-oriented and may require significant modification in future versions, or even deprecation. It is not clear whether there is really a design "mistake" that enables such attacks, so this is not necessarily a weakness and may be more appropriate for CAPEC.

References

REF-1141

Secure Application Programming in the presence of Side Channel Attacks
Marc Witteman.
https://riscureprodstorage.blob.core.windows.net/production/2017/08/Riscure_Whitepaper_Side_Channel_Patterns.pdf

REF-1142

Injection of transient faults using electromagnetic pulses. Practical results on a cryptographic system
A. Dehbaoui, J. M. Dutertre, B. Robisson, P. Orsatelli, P. Maurine, A. Tria.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/123.pdf

REF-1143

Precise Spatio-Temporal Electromagnetic Fault Injections on Data Transfers
A. Menu, S. Bhasin, J. M. Dutertre, J. B. Rigaud, J. Danger.
https://hal.telecom-paris.fr/hal-02338456/document

REF-1144

BAM BAM!! On Reliability of EMFI for in-situ Automotive ECU Attacks
Colin O'Flynn.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/937.pdf

REF-1145

Design and Validation of a Platform for Electromagnetic Fault Injection
J. Balasch, D. Arumí, S. Manich.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8311630

REF-1146

Error control scheme for malicious and natural faults in cryptographic modules
M. Gay, B. Karp, O. Keren, I. Polian.
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13389-020-00234-7.pdf

REF-1147

Automatic Integration of Counter-Measures Against Fault Injection Attacks
M. L. Akkar, L. Goubin, O. Ly.
https://www.labri.fr/perso/ly/publications/cfed.pdf

REF-1285

Physical Security Attacks Against Silicon Devices
Texas Instruments.
https://www.ti.com/lit/an/swra739/swra739.pdf?ts=1644234570420

Submission

Modifications