Modes d'introduction
Architecture and Design : The product's design might not consider checking and handling extreme conditions.
Manufacturing : For hardware manufacturing, sub-par components might be chosen that are not able to handle the expected environmental conditions.
Plateformes applicables
Technologies
Class: System on Chip (Undetermined)
Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined)
Conséquences courantes
Portée |
Impact |
Probabilité |
Confidentiality Integrity Availability | Varies by Context, Unexpected State
Note: Consequences of this weakness are highly dependent on the role of affected components within the larger product. | |
Exemples observés
Références |
Description |
| Lack of anti-glitch protections allows an attacker to launch a physical attack to bypass the secure boot and read protected eFuses. |
Mesures d’atténuation potentielles
Phases : Requirements
In requirements, be specific about expectations for how the product will perform when it exceeds physical and environmental boundary conditions, e.g., by shutting down.
Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation
Where possible, include independent components that can detect excess environmental conditions and have the capability to shut down the product.
Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation
Where possible, use shielding or other materials that can increase the adversary's workload and reduce the likelihood of being able to successfully trigger a security-related failure.
Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités
Justification : This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate
Commentaire : Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
Références
REF-1248
Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS
Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF).
https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf REF-1255
Semi-invasive attacks - A new approach to hardware security analysis
Sergei P. Skorobogatov.
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-630.pdf REF-1285
Physical Security Attacks Against Silicon Devices
Texas Instruments.
https://www.ti.com/lit/an/swra739/swra739.pdf?ts=1644234570420 REF-1286
On The Susceptibility of Texas Instruments SimpleLink Platform Microcontrollers to Non-Invasive Physical Attacks
Lennert Wouters, Benedikt Gierlichs, Bart Preneel.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/328.pdf
Soumission
Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Date de publication |
Version |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-21 +00:00 |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
4.7 |
Modifications
Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Commentaire |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-06-28 +00:00 |
updated Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Type |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-10-13 +00:00 |
updated References |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |