Portée | Impact | Probabilité |
---|---|---|
Integrity | Unexpected State |
Références | Description |
---|---|
CVE-2000-0900 | Hex-encoded path traversal variants - "%2e%2e", "%2e%2e%2f", "%5c%2e%2e" |
CVE-2005-2256 | Hex-encoded path traversal variants - "%2e%2e", "%2e%2e%2f", "%5c%2e%2e" |
CVE-2004-2121 | Hex-encoded path traversal variants - "%2e%2e", "%2e%2e%2f", "%5c%2e%2e" |
CVE-2004-0280 | "%20" (encoded space) |
CVE-2003-0424 | "%20" (encoded space) |
CVE-2001-0693 | "%20" (encoded space) |
CVE-2001-0778 | "%20" (encoded space) |
CVE-2002-1831 | Crash via hex-encoded space "%20". |
CVE-2000-0671 | "%00" (encoded null) |
CVE-2004-0189 | "%00" (encoded null) |
CVE-2002-1291 | "%00" (encoded null) |
CVE-2002-1031 | "%00" (encoded null) |
CVE-2001-1140 | "%00" (encoded null) |
CVE-2004-0760 | "%00" (encoded null) |
CVE-2002-1025 | "%00" (encoded null) |
CVE-2002-1213 | "%2f" (encoded slash) |
CVE-2004-0072 | "%5c" (encoded backslash) and "%2e" (encoded dot) sequences |
CVE-2004-0847 | "%5c" (encoded backslash) |
CVE-2002-1575 | "%0a" (overlaps CRLF) |
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
CAPEC-ID | Nom du modèle d'attaque |
---|---|
CAPEC-120 | Double Encoding The adversary utilizes a repeating of the encoding process for a set of characters (that is, character encoding a character encoding of a character) to obfuscate the payload of a particular request. This may allow the adversary to bypass filters that attempt to detect illegal characters or strings, such as those that might be used in traversal or injection attacks. Filters may be able to catch illegal encoded strings, but may not catch doubly encoded strings. For example, a dot (.), often used in path traversal attacks and therefore often blocked by filters, could be URL encoded as %2E. However, many filters recognize this encoding and would still block the request. In a double encoding, the % in the above URL encoding would be encoded again as %25, resulting in %252E which some filters might not catch, but which could still be interpreted as a dot (.) by interpreters on the target. |
CAPEC-468 | Generic Cross-Browser Cross-Domain Theft An attacker makes use of Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) injection to steal data cross domain from the victim's browser. The attack works by abusing the standards relating to loading of CSS: 1. Send cookies on any load of CSS (including cross-domain) 2. When parsing returned CSS ignore all data that does not make sense before a valid CSS descriptor is found by the CSS parser. |
CAPEC-64 | Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc. |
CAPEC-72 | URL Encoding This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. |
Nom | Organisation | Date | Date de publication | Version |
---|---|---|---|---|
PLOVER | Draft 3 |
Nom | Organisation | Date | Commentaire |
---|---|---|---|
Eric Dalci | Cigital | updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction | |
Veracode | Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping | ||
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Observed_Example, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Name | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes |