Modes d'introduction
Architecture and Design : COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
Implementation
Operation
Plateformes applicables
Langue
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Conséquences courantes
Portée |
Impact |
Probabilité |
Confidentiality Access Control | Read Application Data, Bypass Protection Mechanism | |
Exemples observés
Références |
Description |
| Java-oriented framework compares HMAC signatures using String.equals() instead of a constant-time algorithm, causing timing discrepancies |
| Smartphone OS uses comparison functions that are not in constant time, allowing side channels |
| Password-checking function in router terminates validation of a password entry when it encounters the first incorrect character, which allows remote attackers to obtain passwords via a brute-force attack that relies on timing differences in responses to incorrect password guesses, aka a timing side-channel attack. |
| SSL implementation does not perform a MAC computation if an incorrect block cipher padding is used, which causes an information leak (timing discrepancy) that may make it easier to launch cryptographic attacks that rely on distinguishing between padding and MAC verification errors, possibly leading to extraction of the original plaintext, aka the "Vaudenay timing attack." |
| Virtual machine allows malicious web site operators to determine the existence of files on the client by measuring delays in the execution of the getSystemResource method. |
| Product uses a shorter timeout for a non-existent user than a valid user, which makes it easier for remote attackers to guess usernames and conduct brute force password guessing. |
| Product immediately sends an error message when a user does not exist, which allows remote attackers to determine valid usernames via a timing attack. |
| FTP server responds in a different amount of time when a given username exists, which allows remote attackers to identify valid usernames by timing the server response. |
| Browser allows remote attackers to determine the existence of arbitrary files by setting the src property to the target filename and using Javascript to determine if the web page immediately stops loading, which indicates whether the file exists or not. |
Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Modèles d'attaque associés
CAPEC-ID |
Nom du modèle d'attaque |
CAPEC-462 |
Cross-Domain Search Timing An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain. |
CAPEC-541 |
Application Fingerprinting An adversary engages in fingerprinting activities to determine the type or version of an application installed on a remote target. |
CAPEC-580 |
System Footprinting An adversary engages in active probing and exploration activities to determine security information about a remote target system. Often times adversaries will rely on remote applications that can be probed for system configurations. |
NotesNotes
Often primary in cryptographic applications and algorithms.
CWE 4.16 removed a demonstrative example for a hardware module because it was inaccurate and unable to be adapted. The CWE team is developing an alternative.
Soumission
Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Date de publication |
Version |
PLOVER |
|
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
Draft 3 |
Modifications
Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Commentaire |
Eric Dalci |
Cigital |
2008-07-01 +00:00 |
updated Time_of_Introduction |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-09-08 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-10-14 +00:00 |
updated Description |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2010-09-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-03-29 +00:00 |
updated Name |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-01 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-05-11 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-06-23 +00:00 |
updated Other_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-07-30 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-05-03 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Description, Name, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-06-25 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2024-02-29 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2024-11-19 +00:00 |
updated Maintenance_Notes |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-04-03 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |