Détail du CWE-296

CWE-296

Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust
Bas
Draft
2006-07-19
00h00 +00:00
2025-12-11
00h00 +00:00
CWE Mitre.org
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Nom: Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust

The product does not follow, or incorrectly follows, the chain of trust for a certificate back to a trusted root certificate, resulting in incorrect trust of any resource that is associated with that certificate.

Informations générales

Modes d'introduction

Implementation : When the product uses certificate pinning, the developer might not properly validate all relevant components of the certificate before pinning the certificate. This can make it difficult or expensive to test after the pinning is complete.
Implementation : REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Plateformes applicables

Langue

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
Class: Web Based (Undetermined)

Conséquences courantes

Portée Impact Probabilité
Non-RepudiationHide Activities

Note: Exploitation of this flaw can lead to the trust of data that may have originated with a spoofed source.
Integrity
Confidentiality
Availability
Access Control		Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Note: Data, requests, or actions taken by the attacking entity can be carried out as a spoofed benign entity.

Exemples observés

Références Description

CVE-2016-2402

Server allows bypass of certificate pinning by sending a chain of trust that includes a trusted CA that is not pinned.

CVE-2008-4989

Verification function trusts certificate chains in which the last certificate is self-signed.

CVE-2012-5821

Chain: Web browser uses a TLS-related function incorrectly, preventing it from verifying that a server's certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority (CA).

CVE-2009-3046

Web browser does not check if any intermediate certificates are revoked.

CVE-2009-0265

chain: DNS server does not correctly check return value from the OpenSSL EVP_VerifyFinal function allows bypass of validation of the certificate chain.

CVE-2009-0124

chain: incorrect check of return value from the OpenSSL EVP_VerifyFinal function allows bypass of validation of the certificate chain.

CVE-2002-0970

File-transfer software does not validate Basic Constraints of an intermediate CA-signed certificate.

CVE-2002-0862

Cryptographic API, as used in web browsers, mail clients, and other software, does not properly validate Basic Constraints.

Mesures d’atténuation potentielles

Phases : Architecture and Design
Ensure that proper certificate checking is included in the system design.
Phases : Implementation
Understand, and properly implement all checks necessary to ensure the integrity of certificate trust integrity.
Phases : Implementation
If certificate pinning is being used, ensure that all relevant properties of the certificate are fully validated before the certificate is pinned, including the full chain of trust.

Méthodes de détection

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Efficacité : High

Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités

Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Références

REF-18

The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf

REF-245

The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software
Martin Georgiev, Subodh Iyengar, Suman Jana, Rishita Anubhai, Dan Boneh, Vitaly Shmatikov.
https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_ccs12.pdf

REF-44

24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega.

Soumission

Nom Organisation Date Date de publication Version
CLASP 2006-07-19 +00:00 2006-07-19 +00:00 Draft 3

Modifications

Nom Organisation Date Commentaire
Eric Dalci Cigital 2008-07-01 +00:00 updated Time_of_Introduction
CWE Content Team MITRE 2008-09-08 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2009-03-10 +00:00 updated Description, Name, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2009-05-27 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2009-07-27 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-12-13 +00:00 updated Other_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2011-06-01 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-05-11 +00:00 updated References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2013-02-21 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2013-07-17 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2014-07-30 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2017-11-08 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2018-03-27 +00:00 updated Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
CWE Content Team MITRE 2019-09-19 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-02-24 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-07-20 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-10-28 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-04-28 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-01-31 +00:00 updated Description, Modes_of_Introduction
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2025-09-09 +00:00 updated References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2025-12-11 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
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