Détail du CWE-798

CWE-798

Use of Hard-coded Credentials
Haute
Draft
2010-02-16
00h00 +00:00
2024-11-19
00h00 +00:00
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Nom: Use of Hard-coded Credentials

The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key.

Description du CWE

There are two main variations:

  • Inbound: the product contains an authentication mechanism that checks the input credentials against a hard-coded set of credentials. In this variant, a default administration account is created, and a simple password is hard-coded into the product and associated with that account. This hard-coded password is the same for each installation of the product, and it usually cannot be changed or disabled by system administrators without manually modifying the program, or otherwise patching the product. It can also be difficult for the administrator to detect.
  • Outbound: the product connects to another system or component, and it contains hard-coded credentials for connecting to that component. This variant applies to front-end systems that authenticate with a back-end service. The back-end service may require a fixed password that can be easily discovered. The programmer may simply hard-code those back-end credentials into the front-end product.

Informations générales

Modes d'introduction

Architecture and Design : REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Plateformes applicables

Langue

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologies

Class: Mobile (Undetermined)
Class: ICS/OT (Often)

Conséquences courantes

Portée Impact Probabilité
Access ControlBypass Protection Mechanism

Note:

If hard-coded passwords are used, it is almost certain that malicious users will gain access to the account in question.

Any user of the product that hard-codes passwords may be able to extract the password. Client-side systems with hard-coded passwords pose even more of a threat, since the extraction of a password from a binary is usually very simple.

Integrity
Confidentiality
Availability
Access Control
Other
Read Application Data, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Other

Note:

This weakness can lead to the exposure of resources or functionality to unintended actors, possibly providing attackers with sensitive information or even execute arbitrary code.

If the password is ever discovered or published (a common occurrence on the Internet), then anybody with knowledge of this password can access the product. Finally, since all installations of the product will have the same password, even across different organizations, this enables massive attacks such as worms to take place.

Exemples observés

Références Description

CVE-2022-29953

Condition Monitor firmware has a maintenance interface with hard-coded credentials

CVE-2022-29960

Engineering Workstation uses hard-coded cryptographic keys that could allow for unathorized filesystem access and privilege escalation

CVE-2022-29964

Distributed Control System (DCS) has hard-coded passwords for local shell access

CVE-2022-30997

Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) has a maintenance service that uses undocumented, hard-coded credentials

CVE-2022-30314

Firmware for a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) has hard-coded credentials for access to boot configuration

CVE-2022-30271

Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) uses a hard-coded SSH private key that is likely to be used in typical deployments

CVE-2021-37555

Telnet service for IoT feeder for dogs and cats has hard-coded password [REF-1288]

CVE-2021-35033

Firmware for a WiFi router uses a hard-coded password for a BusyBox shell, allowing bypass of authentication through the UART port

CVE-2012-3503

Installation script has a hard-coded secret token value, allowing attackers to bypass authentication

CVE-2010-2772

SCADA system uses a hard-coded password to protect back-end database containing authorization information, exploited by Stuxnet worm

CVE-2010-2073

FTP server library uses hard-coded usernames and passwords for three default accounts

CVE-2010-1573

Chain: Router firmware uses hard-coded username and password for access to debug functionality, which can be used to execute arbitrary code

CVE-2008-2369

Server uses hard-coded authentication key

CVE-2008-0961

Backup product uses hard-coded username and password, allowing attackers to bypass authentication via the RPC interface

CVE-2008-1160

Security appliance uses hard-coded password allowing attackers to gain root access

CVE-2006-7142

Drive encryption product stores hard-coded cryptographic keys for encrypted configuration files in executable programs

CVE-2005-3716

VoIP product uses hard-coded public credentials that cannot be changed, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information

CVE-2005-3803

VoIP product uses hard coded public and private SNMP community strings that cannot be changed, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information

CVE-2005-0496

Backup product contains hard-coded credentials that effectively serve as a back door, which allows remote attackers to access the file system

Mesures d’atténuation potentielles

Phases : Architecture and Design

For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible [REF-7].

In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection.


Phases : Architecture and Design
For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password, key, or other authentication credentials for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password or key.
Phases : Architecture and Design
If the product must contain hard-coded credentials or they cannot be removed, perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded credentials. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.
Phases : Architecture and Design

For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the saved hash.

Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.


Phases : Architecture and Design

For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete.

  • The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords or keys that are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals.
  • Next, the passwords or keys should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access.
  • Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay-style attacks.

Méthodes de détection

Black Box

Credential storage in configuration files is findable using black box methods, but the use of hard-coded credentials for an incoming authentication routine typically involves an account that is not visible outside of the code.
Efficacité : Moderate

Automated Static Analysis

Automated white box techniques have been published for detecting hard-coded credentials for incoming authentication, but there is some expert disagreement regarding their effectiveness and applicability to a broad range of methods.

Manual Static Analysis

This weakness may be detectable using manual code analysis. Unless authentication is decentralized and applied throughout the product, there can be sufficient time for the analyst to find incoming authentication routines and examine the program logic looking for usage of hard-coded credentials. Configuration files could also be analyzed.

Manual Dynamic Analysis

For hard-coded credentials in incoming authentication: use monitoring tools that examine the product's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the product was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.

Attach the monitor to the process and perform a login. Using call trees or similar artifacts from the output, examine the associated behaviors and see if any of them appear to be comparing the input to a fixed string or value.


Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Efficacité : SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Efficacité : High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Network Sniffer
  • Forced Path Execution

Efficacité : SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Efficacité : High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Efficacité : High

Automated Static Analysis

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Configuration Checker

Efficacité : SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Efficacité : High

Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités

Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Modèles d'attaque associés

CAPEC-ID Nom du modèle d'attaque
CAPEC-191 Read Sensitive Constants Within an Executable

An adversary engages in activities to discover any sensitive constants present within the compiled code of an executable. These constants may include literal ASCII strings within the file itself, or possibly strings hard-coded into particular routines that can be revealed by code refactoring methods including static and dynamic analysis.

CAPEC-70 Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords
An adversary may try certain common or default usernames and passwords to gain access into the system and perform unauthorized actions. An adversary may try an intelligent brute force using empty passwords, known vendor default credentials, as well as a dictionary of common usernames and passwords. Many vendor products come preconfigured with default (and thus well-known) usernames and passwords that should be deleted prior to usage in a production environment. It is a common mistake to forget to remove these default login credentials. Another problem is that users would pick very simple (common) passwords (e.g. "secret" or "password") that make it easier for the attacker to gain access to the system compared to using a brute force attack or even a dictionary attack using a full dictionary.

NotesNotes

The Taxonomy_Mappings to ISA/IEC 62443 were added in CWE 4.10, but they are still under review and might change in future CWE versions. These draft mappings were performed by members of the "Mapping CWE to 62443" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG), and their work is incomplete as of CWE 4.10. The mappings are included to facilitate discussion and review by the broader ICS/OT community, and they are likely to change in future CWE versions.

Références

REF-7

Writing Secure Code
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc.
https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223

REF-729

Top 25 Series - Rank 11 - Hardcoded Credentials
Johannes Ullrich.
https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-11-hardcoded-credentials/

REF-172

Mobile App Top 10 List
Chris Wysopal.
https://www.veracode.com/blog/2010/12/mobile-app-top-10-list

REF-962

Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)
Object Management Group (OMG).
http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCSM/1.0/

REF-1283

OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management
Forescout Vedere Labs.
https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/

REF-1288

Ethical hacking of a Smart Automatic Feed Dispenser
Julia Lokrantz.
http://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1561552/FULLTEXT01.pdf

REF-1304

ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-13-164-01): Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords
ICS-CERT.
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-alerts/ics-alert-13-164-01

Soumission

Nom Organisation Date Date de publication Version
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-01-15 +00:00 2010-02-16 +00:00 1.8

Modifications

Nom Organisation Date Commentaire
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-04-05 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-06-21 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences, References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-09-27 +00:00 updated Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-12-13 +00:00 updated Description
CWE Content Team MITRE 2011-06-01 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2011-06-27 +00:00 updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2011-09-13 +00:00 updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-05-11 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-10-30 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team MITRE 2013-02-21 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2014-07-30 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors
CWE Content Team MITRE 2015-12-07 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2017-01-19 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2017-11-08 +00:00 updated Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2018-03-27 +00:00 updated References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2019-01-03 +00:00 updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2019-06-20 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2019-09-19 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-02-24 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-08-20 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-12-10 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-03-15 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-07-20 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-10-28 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-06-28 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-10-13 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-01-31 +00:00 updated Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2024-02-29 +00:00 updated Observed_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2024-07-16 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram
CWE Content Team MITRE 2024-11-19 +00:00 updated Relationships