There are two main variations:
Portée | Impact | Probabilité |
---|---|---|
Access Control | Bypass Protection Mechanism Note: If hard-coded passwords are used, it is almost certain that malicious users will gain access to the account in question. Any user of the product that hard-codes passwords may be able to extract the password. Client-side systems with hard-coded passwords pose even more of a threat, since the extraction of a password from a binary is usually very simple. | |
Integrity Confidentiality Availability Access Control Other | Read Application Data, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Other Note: This weakness can lead to the exposure of resources or functionality to unintended actors, possibly providing attackers with sensitive information or even execute arbitrary code. If the password is ever discovered or published (a common occurrence on the Internet), then anybody with knowledge of this password can access the product. Finally, since all installations of the product will have the same password, even across different organizations, this enables massive attacks such as worms to take place. |
Références | Description |
---|---|
CVE-2022-29953 | Condition Monitor firmware has a maintenance interface with hard-coded credentials |
CVE-2022-29960 | Engineering Workstation uses hard-coded cryptographic keys that could allow for unathorized filesystem access and privilege escalation |
CVE-2022-29964 | Distributed Control System (DCS) has hard-coded passwords for local shell access |
CVE-2022-30997 | Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) has a maintenance service that uses undocumented, hard-coded credentials |
CVE-2022-30314 | Firmware for a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) has hard-coded credentials for access to boot configuration |
CVE-2022-30271 | Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) uses a hard-coded SSH private key that is likely to be used in typical deployments |
CVE-2021-37555 | Telnet service for IoT feeder for dogs and cats has hard-coded password [REF-1288] |
CVE-2021-35033 | Firmware for a WiFi router uses a hard-coded password for a BusyBox shell, allowing bypass of authentication through the UART port |
CVE-2012-3503 | Installation script has a hard-coded secret token value, allowing attackers to bypass authentication |
CVE-2010-2772 | SCADA system uses a hard-coded password to protect back-end database containing authorization information, exploited by Stuxnet worm |
CVE-2010-2073 | FTP server library uses hard-coded usernames and passwords for three default accounts |
CVE-2010-1573 | Chain: Router firmware uses hard-coded username and password for access to debug functionality, which can be used to execute arbitrary code |
CVE-2008-2369 | Server uses hard-coded authentication key |
CVE-2008-0961 | Backup product uses hard-coded username and password, allowing attackers to bypass authentication via the RPC interface |
CVE-2008-1160 | Security appliance uses hard-coded password allowing attackers to gain root access |
CVE-2006-7142 | Drive encryption product stores hard-coded cryptographic keys for encrypted configuration files in executable programs |
CVE-2005-3716 | VoIP product uses hard-coded public credentials that cannot be changed, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information |
CVE-2005-3803 | VoIP product uses hard coded public and private SNMP community strings that cannot be changed, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information |
CVE-2005-0496 | Backup product contains hard-coded credentials that effectively serve as a back door, which allows remote attackers to access the file system |
For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible [REF-7].
In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection.
For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the saved hash.
Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.
For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete.
For hard-coded credentials in incoming authentication: use monitoring tools that examine the product's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the product was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.
Attach the monitor to the process and perform a login. Using call trees or similar artifacts from the output, examine the associated behaviors and see if any of them appear to be comparing the input to a fixed string or value.
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
CAPEC-ID | Nom du modèle d'attaque |
---|---|
CAPEC-191 | Read Sensitive Constants Within an Executable An adversary engages in activities to discover any sensitive constants present within the compiled code of an executable. These constants may include literal ASCII strings within the file itself, or possibly strings hard-coded into particular routines that can be revealed by code refactoring methods including static and dynamic analysis. |
CAPEC-70 | Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords An adversary may try certain common or default usernames and passwords to gain access into the system and perform unauthorized actions. An adversary may try an intelligent brute force using empty passwords, known vendor default credentials, as well as a dictionary of common usernames and passwords. Many vendor products come preconfigured with default (and thus well-known) usernames and passwords that should be deleted prior to usage in a production environment. It is a common mistake to forget to remove these default login credentials. Another problem is that users would pick very simple (common) passwords (e.g. "secret" or "password") that make it easier for the attacker to gain access to the system compared to using a brute force attack or even a dictionary attack using a full dictionary. |
Nom | Organisation | Date | Date de publication | Version |
---|---|---|---|---|
CWE Content Team | MITRE | 1.8 |
Nom | Organisation | Date | Commentaire |
---|---|---|---|
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, References | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Observed_Examples, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, References | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Observed_Examples | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships |