CWE-916 Detail

CWE-916

Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort
Incomplete
2013-02-21 00:00 +00:00
2024-02-29 00:00 +00:00

Alerte pour un CWE

Restez informé de toutes modifications pour un CWE spécifique.
Gestion des alertes

Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort

The product generates a hash for a password, but it uses a scheme that does not provide a sufficient level of computational effort that would make password cracking attacks infeasible or expensive.

Extended Description

Many password storage mechanisms compute a hash and store the hash, instead of storing the original password in plaintext. In this design, authentication involves accepting an incoming password, computing its hash, and comparing it to the stored hash.

Many hash algorithms are designed to execute quickly with minimal overhead, even cryptographic hashes. However, this efficiency is a problem for password storage, because it can reduce an attacker's workload for brute-force password cracking. If an attacker can obtain the hashes through some other method (such as SQL injection on a database that stores hashes), then the attacker can store the hashes offline and use various techniques to crack the passwords by computing hashes efficiently. Without a built-in workload, modern attacks can compute large numbers of hashes, or even exhaust the entire space of all possible passwords, within a very short amount of time, using massively-parallel computing (such as cloud computing) and GPU, ASIC, or FPGA hardware. In such a scenario, an efficient hash algorithm helps the attacker.

There are several properties of a hash scheme that are relevant to its strength against an offline, massively-parallel attack:

  • The amount of CPU time required to compute the hash ("stretching")
  • The amount of memory required to compute the hash ("memory-hard" operations)
  • Including a random value, along with the password, as input to the hash computation ("salting")
  • Given a hash, there is no known way of determining an input (e.g., a password) that produces this hash value, other than by guessing possible inputs ("one-way" hashing)
  • Relative to the number of all possible hashes that can be generated by the scheme, there is a low likelihood of producing the same hash for multiple different inputs ("collision resistance")

Note that the security requirements for the product may vary depending on the environment and the value of the passwords. Different schemes might not provide all of these properties, yet may still provide sufficient security for the environment. Conversely, a solution might be very strong in preserving one property, which still being very weak for an attack against another property, or it might not be able to significantly reduce the efficiency of a massively-parallel attack.

Informations

Modes Of Introduction

Architecture and Design : REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Applicable Platforms

Language

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Common Consequences

Scope Impact Likelihood
Access ControlBypass Protection Mechanism, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Note: If an attacker can gain access to the hashes, then the lack of sufficient computational effort will make it easier to conduct brute force attacks using techniques such as rainbow tables, or specialized hardware such as GPUs, which can be much faster than general-purpose CPUs for computing hashes.

Observed Examples

Reference Description
CVE-2008-1526Router does not use a salt with a hash, making it easier to crack passwords.
CVE-2006-1058Router does not use a salt with a hash, making it easier to crack passwords.
CVE-2008-4905Blogging software uses a hard-coded salt when calculating a password hash.
CVE-2002-1657Database server uses the username for a salt when encrypting passwords, simplifying brute force attacks.
CVE-2001-0967Server uses a constant salt when encrypting passwords, simplifying brute force attacks.
CVE-2005-0408chain: product generates predictable MD5 hashes using a constant value combined with username, allowing authentication bypass.

Potential Mitigations

Phases : Architecture and Design

Use an adaptive hash function that can be configured to change the amount of computational effort needed to compute the hash, such as the number of iterations ("stretching") or the amount of memory required. Some hash functions perform salting automatically. These functions can significantly increase the overhead for a brute force attack compared to intentionally-fast functions such as MD5. For example, rainbow table attacks can become infeasible due to the high computing overhead. Finally, since computing power gets faster and cheaper over time, the technique can be reconfigured to increase the workload without forcing an entire replacement of the algorithm in use.

Some hash functions that have one or more of these desired properties include bcrypt [REF-291], scrypt [REF-292], and PBKDF2 [REF-293]. While there is active debate about which of these is the most effective, they are all stronger than using salts with hash functions with very little computing overhead.

Note that using these functions can have an impact on performance, so they require special consideration to avoid denial-of-service attacks. However, their configurability provides finer control over how much CPU and memory is used, so it could be adjusted to suit the environment's needs.


Phases : Implementation // Architecture and Design
When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.

Detection Methods

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness : SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness : SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness : High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness : High

Automated Static Analysis

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Configuration Checker

Effectiveness : SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness : High

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Rationale : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comments : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Related Attack Patterns

CAPEC-ID Attack Pattern Name
CAPEC-55 Rainbow Table Password Cracking
An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of passwords are stored. They then use a rainbow table of pre-computed hash chains to attempt to look up the original password. Once the original password corresponding to the hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain access to the system.

References

REF-291

bcrypt
Johnny Shelley.
http://bcrypt.sourceforge.net/

REF-292

Tarsnap - The scrypt key derivation function and encryption utility
Colin Percival.
http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt.html

REF-293

RFC2898 - PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0
B. Kaliski.
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2898

REF-294

How To Safely Store A Password
Coda Hale.
https://codahale.com/how-to-safely-store-a-password/

REF-295

How Companies Can Beef Up Password Security (interview with Thomas H. Ptacek)
Brian Krebs.
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/06/how-companies-can-beef-up-password-security/

REF-296

Password security: past, present, future
Solar Designer.
https://www.openwall.com/presentations/PHDays2012-Password-Security/

REF-297

Our password hashing has no clothes
Troy Hunt.
https://www.troyhunt.com/our-password-hashing-has-no-clothes/

REF-298

Should we really use bcrypt/scrypt?
Joshbw.
https://web.archive.org/web/20120629144851/http://www.analyticalengine.net/2012/06/should-we-really-use-bcryptscrypt/

REF-636

Speed Hashing
Jeff Atwood.
https://blog.codinghorror.com/speed-hashing/

REF-631

Password Storage Cheat Sheet
OWASP.
https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html

REF-632

Enough With The Rainbow Tables: What You Need To Know About Secure Password Schemes
Thomas Ptacek.
http://hashphp.org/hashing.html

REF-908

Password hashing at scale
Solar Designer.
https://www.openwall.com/presentations/YaC2012-Password-Hashing-At-Scale/

REF-909

New developments in password hashing: ROM-port-hard functions
Solar Designer.
https://www.openwall.com/presentations/ZeroNights2012-New-In-Password-Hashing/

REF-633

The Importance of Being Canonical
Robert Graham.
https://blog.erratasec.com/2009/02/importance-of-being-canonical.html#.ZCbyY7LMJPY

Submission

Name Organization Date Date Release Version
CWE Content Team MITRE 2013-01-28 +00:00 2013-02-21 +00:00 2.4

Modifications

Name Organization Date Comment
CWE Content Team MITRE 2014-02-18 +00:00 updated Potential_Mitigations, References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2014-07-30 +00:00 updated Detection_Factors
CWE Content Team MITRE 2017-01-19 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2017-11-08 +00:00 updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2019-01-03 +00:00 updated Description
CWE Content Team MITRE 2019-06-20 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-02-24 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-10-28 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-01-31 +00:00 updated Description
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2024-02-29 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
Cliquez sur le bouton à gauche (OFF), pour autoriser l'inscription de cookie améliorant les fonctionnalités du site. Cliquez sur le bouton à gauche (Tout accepter), pour ne plus autoriser l'inscription de cookie améliorant les fonctionnalités du site.