Détail du CWE-925

The Android application uses a Broadcast Receiver that receives an Intent but does not properly verify that the Intent came from an authorized source.

Certain types of Intents, identified by action string, can only be broadcast by the operating system itself, not by third-party applications. However, when an application registers to receive these implicit system intents, it is also registered to receive any explicit intents. While a malicious application cannot send an implicit system intent, it can send an explicit intent to the target application, which may assume that any received intent is a valid implicit system intent and not an explicit intent from another application. This may lead to unintended behavior.

Modes d'introduction

Architecture and Design

Plateformes applicables

Langue

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologies

Class: Mobile (Undetermined)

Conséquences courantes

Mesures d’atténuation potentielles

Phases : Architecture and Design
Before acting on the Intent, check the Intent Action to make sure it matches the expected System action.

Méthodes de détection

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Efficacité : High

Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités

Justification : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Modèles d'attaque associés

NotesNotes

This entry will be made more comprehensive in later CWE versions.

Références

REF-922

Analyzing Inter-Application Communication in Android
Erika Chin, Adrienne Porter Felt, Kate Greenwood, David Wagner.
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/intents-mobisys11.pdf

Soumission

Modifications