IEEE 802.11

CPE Details

IEEE 802.11
ieee
ieee_802.11
-
2021-05-19
12h17 +00:00
2021-06-09
16h46 +00:00
CPE NVD
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CPE Name: cpe:2.3:a:ieee:ieee_802.11:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Informations

Vendor

ieee

Product

ieee_802.11

Version

-

Related CVE

Open and find in CVE List

CVE ID Published Description Score Severity
CVE-2022-47522 2023-04-15 00h00 +00:00 The IEEE 802.11 specifications through 802.11ax allow physically proximate attackers to intercept (possibly cleartext) target-destined frames by spoofing a target's MAC address, sending Power Save frames to the access point, and then sending other frames to the access point (such as authentication frames or re-association frames) to remove the target's original security context. This behavior occurs because the specifications do not require an access point to purge its transmit queue before removing a client's pairwise encryption key.
7.5
High
CVE-2020-24586 2021-05-10 22h00 +00:00 The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that received fragments be cleared from memory after (re)connecting to a network. Under the right circumstances, when another device sends fragmented frames encrypted using WEP, CCMP, or GCMP, this can be abused to inject arbitrary network packets and/or exfiltrate user data.
3.5
Low
CVE-2020-24587 2021-05-10 22h00 +00:00 The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.
2.6
Low
CVE-2020-24588 2021-05-10 22h00 +00:00 The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.
3.5
Low