CVE-2019-1345 : Detail

CVE-2019-1345

5.5
/
Medium
Overflow
0.06%V3
Local
2019-10-10
11h28 +00:00
2019-10-10
14h06 +00:00
CVE.org
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CVE Descriptions

An information disclosure vulnerability exists when the Windows kernel improperly handles objects in memory, aka 'Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability'. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2019-1334.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read
The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 5.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 [email protected]
V2 2.1 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 47487

Publication date : 2019-10-09 22h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes

We have encountered a Windows kernel crash in memcpy() called by nt!MiParseImageLoadConfig while trying to load a malformed PE image into the process address space as a data file (i.e. LoadLibraryEx(LOAD_LIBRARY_AS_DATAFILE | LOAD_LIBRARY_AS_IMAGE_RESOURCE)). An example crash log generated after triggering the bug is shown below: --- cut --- *** Fatal System Error: 0x00000050 (0xFFFFF805751F5000,0x0000000000000000,0xFFFFF805773CF6E5,0x0000000000000000) Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance) A fatal system error has occurred. Debugger entered on first try; Bugcheck callbacks have not been invoked. A fatal system error has occurred. [...] ******************************************************************************* * * * Bugcheck Analysis * * * ******************************************************************************* PAGE_FAULT_IN_NONPAGED_AREA (50) Invalid system memory was referenced. This cannot be protected by try-except. Typically the address is just plain bad or it is pointing at freed memory. Arguments: Arg1: fffff805751f5000, memory referenced. Arg2: 0000000000000000, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation. Arg3: fffff805773cf6e5, If non-zero, the instruction address which referenced the bad memory address. Arg4: 0000000000000000, (reserved) [...] TRAP_FRAME: ffff8380cd506820 -- (.trap 0xffff8380cd506820) NOTE: The trap frame does not contain all registers. Some register values may be zeroed or incorrect. rax=000000000000005c rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=ffff8380cd506c80 rdx=00007484a7cee364 rsi=0000000000000000 rdi=0000000000000000 rip=fffff805773cf6e5 rsp=ffff8380cd5069b8 rbp=ffff8380cd506fb0 r8=0000000000000008 r9=0000000000000003 r10=000000000000020b r11=ffff8380cd506be0 r12=0000000000000000 r13=0000000000000000 r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000000 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc nt!memcpy+0xa5: fffff805`773cf6e5 f30f6f4c1110 movdqu xmm1,xmmword ptr [rcx+rdx+10h] ds:fffff805`751f4ff4=???????????????????????????????? Resetting default scope LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from fffff805774a6642 to fffff805773c46a0 STACK_TEXT: ffff8380`cd505dd8 fffff805`774a6642 : fffff805`751f5000 00000000`00000003 ffff8380`cd505f40 fffff805`77322be0 : nt!DbgBreakPointWithStatus ffff8380`cd505de0 fffff805`774a5d32 : fffff805`00000003 ffff8380`cd505f40 fffff805`773d0f60 00000000`00000050 : nt!KiBugCheckDebugBreak+0x12 ffff8380`cd505e40 fffff805`773bca07 : fffff078`3c1e0f80 fffff805`774d0110 00000000`00000000 fffff805`77663900 : nt!KeBugCheck2+0x952 ffff8380`cd506540 fffff805`773e0161 : 00000000`00000050 fffff805`751f5000 00000000`00000000 ffff8380`cd506820 : nt!KeBugCheckEx+0x107 ffff8380`cd506580 fffff805`7727aaef : fffff805`77663900 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffff805`751f5000 : nt!MiSystemFault+0x1d3171 ffff8380`cd506680 fffff805`773ca920 : ffff8380`cd5068b0 fffff805`773caa4e fffff805`75000000 fffff078`3c1f1000 : nt!MmAccessFault+0x34f ffff8380`cd506820 fffff805`773cf6e5 : fffff805`7788397d ffff8d03`15813460 fffff805`7723944d ffff8d03`15813080 : nt!KiPageFault+0x360 ffff8380`cd5069b8 fffff805`7788397d : ffff8d03`15813460 fffff805`7723944d ffff8d03`15813080 ffff8d03`15cab288 : nt!memcpy+0xa5 ffff8380`cd5069c0 fffff805`7788238e : fffff805`75000000 ffffaf0f`9d705048 00000000`00000000 00000000`001f5000 : nt!MiParseImageLoadConfig+0x171 ffff8380`cd506d40 fffff805`777fc8a3 : ffff8380`cd507180 ffff8380`cd507180 ffff8380`cd506fb0 ffff8380`cd507180 : nt!MiRelocateImage+0x2fe ffff8380`cd506eb0 fffff805`777dca20 : ffff8d03`1526e520 ffff8380`cd507180 ffff8380`cd507180 ffff8d03`1526e4f0 : nt!MiCreateNewSection+0x5ef ffff8380`cd507010 fffff805`777dcd24 : ffff8380`cd507040 ffffaf0f`9d530760 ffff8d03`1526e520 00000000`00000000 : nt!MiCreateImageOrDataSection+0x2d0 ffff8380`cd507100 fffff805`777dc37f : 00000000`11000000 ffff8380`cd5074c0 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000002 : nt!MiCreateSection+0xf4 ffff8380`cd507280 fffff805`777dc110 : 000000c1`e89f8e28 00000000`00000005 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 : nt!MiCreateSectionCommon+0x1ff ffff8380`cd507360 fffff805`773ce115 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!NtCreateSection+0x60 ffff8380`cd5073d0 00007ff8`2fa5c9a4 : 00007ff8`2d7c1ae7 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 40b28496`f324e4f9 : nt!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x25 000000c1`e89f8db8 00007ff8`2d7c1ae7 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 40b28496`f324e4f9 feafc9c1`1796ffa1 : ntdll!NtCreateSection+0x14 000000c1`e89f8dc0 00007ff8`2d7c5640 : 000001d3`61bac500 0000002e`00000000 00007ff8`2f292770 00000000`00000022 : KERNELBASE!BasepLoadLibraryAsDataFileInternal+0x2e7 000000c1`e89f8ff0 00007ff8`2d7ac41d : 000001d3`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : KERNELBASE!LoadLibraryExW+0xe0 000000c1`e89f9060 00007ff8`2dd503d1 : 000001d3`61bd1d10 00000000`00000000 000001d3`61bb94d0 00007ff8`2dd66d85 : KERNELBASE!GetFileVersionInfoSizeExW+0x3d 000000c1`e89f90c0 00007ff8`2dd5035c : 00000000`00000000 00007ff8`2ced10ff 000001d3`61bd1d10 000000c1`e89f9410 : shell32!_LoadVersionInfo+0x39 000000c1`e89f9130 00007ff8`2cf4c1c1 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 ffffffff`fffffffe 00000000`00000000 : shell32!CVersionPropertyStore::Initialize+0x2c 000000c1`e89f9160 00007ff8`2cee23d4 : 00000000`00000080 00000000`00000000 00000000`80004002 00000000`f20003f1 : windows_storage!InitializeFileHandlerWithFile+0xc9 [...] --- cut --- We have minimized one of the crashing samples down to a 2-byte difference in relation to the original file, which change the Load Configuration Directory address from 0x1e4644 to 0x1f4f44. The issue reproduces on Windows 10 and Windows Server 2019 (32-bit and 64-bit, Special Pools not required). The crash occurs when any system component calls LoadLibraryEx(LOAD_LIBRARY_AS_DATAFILE | LOAD_LIBRARY_AS_IMAGE_RESOURCE) against the file, either directly or through another API such as GetFileVersionInfoSizeExW() or GetFileVersionInfoW(). In practice, this means that as soon as the file is displayed in Explorer, or the user hovers the cursor over it, or tries to open the file properties, or tries to rename it or perform any other similar action, the system will panic. In other words, just downloading such a file may permanently block the user's machine until they remove it through Recovery Mode etc. The attack scenario is similar to the one described in https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/microsoft-windows-remote-kernel-crash-vulnerability.html. Due to the nature of the bug (OOB read), it could be also potentially exploited as a limited information disclosure primitive. Attached is an archive with a minimized proof-of-concept PE image, the original file used to generate it, and three additional non-minimized samples. Please be careful when unpacking the ZIP as Windows may crash immediately once it sees the corrupted files on disk. Proof of Concept: https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/47487.zip

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1607

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1709

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1803

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1809

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1903

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version 1803

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version 1903

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2019 >> Version -

References