Related Weaknesses
CWE-ID |
Weakness Name |
Source |
CWE-20 |
Improper Input Validation The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. |
|
Metrics
Metrics |
Score |
Severity |
CVSS Vector |
Source |
V2 |
9.3 |
|
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C |
[email protected] |
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Exploit information
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 37917
Publication date : 2015-08-20 22h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=386&can=1
We have encountered a number of Windows kernel crashes in the ATMFD.DLL OpenType driver while processing corrupted OTF font files, such as:
---
DRIVER_PAGE_FAULT_IN_FREED_SPECIAL_POOL (d5)
Memory was referenced after it was freed.
This cannot be protected by try-except.
When possible, the guilty driver's name (Unicode string) is printed on
the bugcheck screen and saved in KiBugCheckDriver.
Arguments:
Arg1: fc937cdf, memory referenced
Arg2: 00000000, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation
Arg3: 91d75195, if non-zero, the address which referenced memory.
Arg4: 00000000, (reserved)
Debugging Details:
------------------
Could not read faulting driver name
READ_ADDRESS: GetPointerFromAddress: unable to read from 827a784c
Unable to read MiSystemVaType memory at 82786f00
fc937cdf
FAULTING_IP:
ATMFD+35195
91d75195 803802 cmp byte ptr [eax],2
MM_INTERNAL_CODE: 0
DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: VISTA_DRIVER_FAULT
BUGCHECK_STR: 0xD5
PROCESS_NAME: csrss.exe
CURRENT_IRQL: 0
LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from 91d7598d to 91d75195
STACK_TEXT:
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
8ba91638 91d7598d 8ba91890 00af0000 8ba91890 ATMFD+0x35195
8ba91730 91d74ee4 8ba91890 00af0000 8ba9174c ATMFD+0x3598d
8ba91834 91d75044 8ba91890 00af0000 8ba91968 ATMFD+0x34ee4
8ba91868 91d4512a 00000000 8ba91890 00af0000 ATMFD+0x35044
8ba91908 91d4718f 00000004 00000001 00000002 ATMFD+0x512a
8ba91988 91d43c8e 00000000 00000000 98435600 ATMFD+0x718f
8ba91a6c 91a67a9a 00000004 fc97efc0 fc95eff8 ATMFD+0x3c8e
8ba91ab4 91a679ec 00000001 fc97efc0 fc95eff8 win32k!PDEVOBJ::LoadFontFile+0x3c
8ba91af4 91a6742d ffa66130 00000019 fc97efc0 win32k!vLoadFontFileView+0x291
8ba91b80 91a5641f 8ba91c58 00000019 00000001 win32k!PUBLIC_PFTOBJ::bLoadFonts+0x209
8ba91bcc 91a57403 8ba91c58 00000019 00000001 win32k!GreAddFontResourceWInternal+0xfb
8ba91d14 8267a896 000d3e78 00000019 00000001 win32k!NtGdiAddFontResourceW+0x142
8ba91d14 779c70f4 000d3e78 00000019 00000001 nt!KiSystemServicePostCall
002efa84 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 0x779c70f4
---
The bugcheck is caused by an attempt to read memory from an unmapped address. The specific expression being dereferenced by ATMFD.DLL is "base address of the Name INDEX data + NAME.offset[x] - 1", however no bounds checking is performed over the value of NAME.offset[x] before using it for pointer arithmetic. To our current knowledge, this condition can only lead to an out-of-bounds read, thus limiting the impact of the bug to remote denial of service, or potentially local kernel memory disclosure. However, we have not fully confirmed that the severity of the bug is not in fact more significant due to some further ATMFD logic we are not aware of.
The issue reproduces on Windows 7 and 8.1. It is easiest to reproduce with Special Pools enabled for ATMFD.DLL (leading to an immediate crash when the bug is triggered), but it should also be possible to observe a crash on a default Windows installation in ATMFD.DLL.
Attached is an archive with three proof of concept font files together with corresponding kernel crash logs.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/37917.zip
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 42243
Publication date : 2017-06-22 22h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1213
We have encountered a Windows kernel crash in the ATMFD.DLL OpenType driver while processing a corrupted OTF font file, see below:
---
DRIVER_PAGE_FAULT_BEYOND_END_OF_ALLOCATION (d6)
N bytes of memory was allocated and more than N bytes are being referenced.
This cannot be protected by try-except.
When possible, the guilty driver's name (Unicode string) is printed on
the bugcheck screen and saved in KiBugCheckDriver.
Arguments:
Arg1: fb69b01e, memory referenced
Arg2: 00000000, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation
Arg3: 8f635862, if non-zero, the address which referenced memory.
Arg4: 00000000, (reserved)
Debugging Details:
------------------
[...]
FAULTING_IP:
ATMFD+35862
8f635862 803802 cmp byte ptr [eax],2
MM_INTERNAL_CODE: 0
CPU_COUNT: 4
CPU_MHZ: da3
CPU_VENDOR: GenuineIntel
CPU_FAMILY: 6
CPU_MODEL: 3e
CPU_STEPPING: 4
CPU_MICROCODE: 6,3e,4,0 (F,M,S,R) SIG: 19'00000000 (cache) 19'00000000 (init)
DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: WIN7_DRIVER_FAULT
BUGCHECK_STR: 0xD6
PROCESS_NAME: csrss.exe
CURRENT_IRQL: 2
ANALYSIS_SESSION_HOST: WIN7-32-VM
ANALYSIS_SESSION_TIME: 03-21-2017 10:49:20.0375
ANALYSIS_VERSION: 10.0.10586.567 x86fre
LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from 8f636088 to 8f635862
STACK_TEXT:
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
9625f538 8f636088 9625f790 05f70000 9625f790 ATMFD+0x35862
9625f630 8f6355b1 9625f790 05f70000 9625f64c ATMFD+0x36088
9625f734 8f635711 9625f790 05f70000 9625f868 ATMFD+0x355b1
9625f768 8f6051b0 00000000 9625f790 05f70000 ATMFD+0x35711
9625f808 8f607279 00000004 00000001 00000002 ATMFD+0x51b0
9625f888 8f603d14 00000000 00000000 94bb3200 ATMFD+0x7279
9625f96c 8f6e7b8d 00000004 fbad2fc0 fbadaff8 ATMFD+0x3d14
9625f9b4 8f6e7adf 00000001 fbad2fc0 fbadaff8 win32k!PDEVOBJ::LoadFontFile+0x3c
9625f9f4 8f6e74fc ffa6a130 0000002e fbad2fc0 win32k!vLoadFontFileView+0x291
9625fa80 8f6d6403 9625fb58 0000002e 00000001 win32k!PUBLIC_PFTOBJ::bLoadFonts+0x209
9625facc 8f6d73d8 9625fb58 0000002e 00000001 win32k!GreAddFontResourceWInternal+0xfb
9625fc14 8164ddb6 000d9b78 0000002e 00000001 win32k!NtGdiAddFontResourceW+0x142
9625fc14 77ad6c74 000d9b78 0000002e 00000001 nt!KiSystemServicePostCall
---
The bugcheck is caused by an attempt to read memory from an unmapped address. The specific expression being dereferenced by ATMFD.DLL is "base address of the Name INDEX data + NAME.offset[x] - 1", however no bounds checking is performed over the value of NAME.offset[x] before using it for pointer arithmetic. To our current knowledge, this condition can only lead to an out-of-bounds read, thus limiting the impact of the bug to remote denial of service, or potentially local kernel memory disclosure. However, we have not fully confirmed that the severity of the bug is not in fact more significant due to some further ATMFD logic we are not aware of.
Interestingly, the crash is almost identical to the one reported in Issue #386 (MSRC-30296) nearly two years ago, which was supposedly fixed as CVE-2015-2461 in the MS15-080 bulletin. The fact that the same bugcheck still reproduces can potentially mean that the patch was insufficient.
Only a single bitflip applied to a valid font file is sufficient to create an offending testcase (excluding SFNT table checksums). In our case, the byte at offset 0x375 in the original sample must be changed from 0x01 to 0x41. This corresponds to offset 0x71 of the "CFF " table. The PoC font can be found attached to this tracker entry.
The issue reproduces on Windows 7 (other platforms untested). It is easiest to reproduce with Special Pools enabled for ATMFD.DLL, leading to an immediate crash when the bug is triggered. The bugcheck occurs upon opening the font in any default utility such as the Windows Font Viewer -- no special tools are required.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42243.zip
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_7 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_8 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_8.1 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_rt >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_rt_8.1 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version r2
Microsoft>>Windows_vista >> Version -
References